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ABSTRACT 
Marines in Gray:  The Birth, Life and Death of the Confederate States Marine Corps.  
(December 2006) 
Michael E. Krivdo, B.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Joseph G. Dawson, III 
  
This thesis explores and provides analysis on several areas of study related to the 
history of the Confederate States Marine Corps that have long been neglected.  It 
examines the military and political processes that were instrumental in both creating and 
employing a Southern Marine Corps.  It also investigates relationships between the U.S. 
and Confederate Marine Corps, particularly in light of how the experiences of former 
U.S. Marines shaped the growth of the Southern Corps.  In particular, the thesis asserts 
that, despite shared origins, the CSMC seized on opportunities presented by the Civil 
War and became expert in new mission areas through the efforts of a core group of 
determined and experienced leaders.  In the process, the CSMC came to eclipse its 
Northern cousin, becoming a valued and vital element of the Confederate Navy. 
 The CSMC is examined in light of its national service, thereby affording fresh 
perspectives on the patterns formed by its actions as part of the Southern war effort.  
This new research framework supports a better understanding of the roles and missions 
expected by Southern leaders from their Corps, and more clearly illuminates the 
iv 
CSMC’s differences.  In particular, this approach highlights the inherent strengths of the 
CSMC’s unique structure that lent itself to a more efficient concept of employment.   
 Finally, this thesis asserts that the CSMC became, for its abbreviated history, the 
agile, innovative, and versatile fighting unit that, man-for-man, the U.S. Marine Corps 
would not achieve until some time late in the nineteenth century.  However, the lessons 
of its service were not realized, in part because of its relative historical obscurity.     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 The American Civil War has been scrutinized to the point that it may seem to 
pose no new questions for historians to research; that all substantive matters regarding 
the war and its participants already have been answered.  While much research has been 
done on the Civil War, some unexplored issues remain to be analyzed.  This thesis 
investigates a neglected subject, the Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC), and 
analyzes the military and political relationships that influenced that unit’s creation and 
employment.  It examines how Confederate leaders allocated scarce Marine Corps assets 
in response to the enemy’s activities and looks at the patterns formed by such use to 
discern the concept for employing this unique military organization.  In doing so, 
analysis will reveal a more complete and nuanced understanding of the Confederate 
Armed Forces.  This thesis also explores the various roles and missions assigned to 
Confederate Marines, evaluates their performance at accomplishing those tasks, and 
looks at how they moved into new and more challenging assignments as the war 
progressed.  It asserts that the Confederacy knowingly created the CSMC with a 
different structure than that of its Northern cousin, the USMC, and that the differences 
made the CSMC a more flexible and adaptable organization.  The structural differences 
                                                 
     This thesis follows the style and format of the Journal of Military History. 
 
  
2 
 
allowed leaders to employ the CSMC on a national level, despite its small size, and also 
to rapidly concentrate units to meet more significant threats.    
In its short life, the CSMC acted upon ideas already in gestation prior to the 
conflict and performed essential, yet historically unappreciated, roles in support of the 
Confederate cause.  The CSMC implemented certain operational concepts originally 
conceived in the pre-war U.S. Marine Corps, such as the deployment of battalion-sized 
expeditionary units integrated with modern rifled artillery, features that allowed it to 
better allocate its finite resources to meet stronger Union challenges with increased 
capability.1   Yet despite its successes, the CSMC’s military contributions have been 
generally unrecognized, overshadowed, or co-opted by other, larger unit operations or 
events.  This work argues that the Confederacy, in creating and employing its Marine 
Corps, reaped benefits and rewards on a scale greater than the sum of its investment.     
The Civil War provided an opportunity (or necessity) to experiment with 
innovative military concepts and tactics, an opportunity that the leaders of both the 
CSMC and its higher organization, the Confederate States Navy, seized to their 
advantage.  The CSMC became expert not only in traditional Marine tactics and 
weaponry, but also in employing modern weapons systems such as rifled artillery and 
torpedoes.  Marines adapted their traditional tactics to keep pace with the rapid changes 
taking place in naval warfare during the war.  The CSMC also became adept at, and 
helped develop, new and innovative tactics for use during specialized amphibious raids, 
such as seizing enemy naval ships at sea.  In doing so, Marines became experts at 
raiding; and mastered the complex intricacies of what later came to be called special 
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operations tactics.  Therefore, Confederate Marines came to be considered an essential 
component of such operations, and leaders of raids actively sought out their service for 
the most difficult of tasks.  In general, the CSMC became an innovative military unit and 
its leaders were willing to think outside the normal boundaries and experiment with new 
ideas.  Confederate commanders sought out Confederate Marines to form the nucleus of 
specialized raiding and landing parties, units whose operations struck fear in the hearts 
of Union commanders and precipitated a greater emphasis on wide-scale defensive 
measures by Union forces.  This thesis focuses on the development of these new military 
ideas and concepts, the effects of their implementation in the South, and the implications 
for their future military use.  It argues that CSMC leaders seized every opportunity to 
further the value of their unit within the Confederate military, and consequently pursued 
new tactics and challenging assignments throughout the war.   
 Elements of the CSMC served with distinction throughout the Civil War, 
participating both in major battles on land and in engagements at sea.  The highest levels 
of Confederate political and military leadership officially commended Marines’ actions, 
and evidence suggests that their initiative, tenacity and courage may have contributed to 
significant achievements such as saving the Confederate capital itself from direct 
bombardment and capture early in the war.2  Nonetheless, little has been published on 
their contributions or accomplishments.  In fact, their presence, in the few instances 
where historians acknowledge it, is often reduced to that of an historical oddity:  an 
insignificant unit that contributed little to the Confederate war effort.3  This thesis 
concludes that the reality was just the opposite:  Confederate Marines provided a 
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significant portion of the combat manpower of the navy and fought with a tenacity and 
courage that gained the recognition and respect of senior commanders. 
 The issue of anonymity aside, Confederate Marines served the southern cause 
from its earliest actions through the last shots of the war:  from the siege of Fort Pickens, 
Florida, to the surrender at Appomattox and beyond.  Within days of the South’s firing 
on Fort Sumter that precipitated the war, CSMC units began forming and converging 
across from the last remaining Union stronghold in the South at Fort Pickens.  Soon, 
other Marine companies converged on that site and coalesced into the first of several 
battalions, and the Corps’ performance quickly established a favorable reputation as an 
expeditionary element of the navy.  In the final days of the war, Confederate Marines 
also fought side-by-side with Lieutenant General Robert E. Lee’s men as part of a Naval 
Brigade attached to Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s Corps.  On 6 April 1865, that 
Naval Brigade participated in the final major engagement of the war at Sailor’s Creek.4  
The Marines fought well, but in vain.  Surrounded by a numerically superior foe, the 
Naval Brigade held its ground while flanking units withdrew, leaving them isolated.  
Although some Marines evaded Union encirclement at Sailor’s Creek, they nonetheless 
were forced to surrender three days later with Lee’s forces at Appomattox Court House.  
Other Marines continued to serve even after the dissolution of Lee’s army, fighting on in 
Mobile and Savannah and even performing special missions such as guarding President 
Jefferson Davis and other government officials during their flight from Union troops.5  
This thesis provides answers to several important questions concerning the 
origins of the Confederate States Marine Corps.  Specifically, why, in a period of intense 
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manpower shortages and competing priorities, did the Confederate leadership decide to 
create a Marine Corps?  What influence did the U.S. Marine Corps have on the forming 
and employing of the CSMC?  When they decided to create a Marine Corps, and why 
did southern leaders depart from the contemporary model as represented by the U.S. 
Marine Corps?  Where does the Confederate States Marine Corps fit in the overall naval 
strategy of the South?  What was its relationship with the Confederate States Navy?  Did 
the concept of employing Marines evolve throughout the war?  If so, how did it evolve, 
and why?  Finally, was the creation of the CSMC worth the investment of scarce 
manpower and materiel?  This project concludes that it was worth the expenditure, and 
that the CSMC fit well with the Confederate naval strategy. 
This thesis also explores questions of a comparative nature.  Were there 
institutional differences between the two American Marine Corps?  And, if so, were they 
significant?  If so, how were they significant and what do the differences represent?  
Furthermore, were there differences in leadership, training, employment and overall 
performance between the two corps?  How, if at all, were the differences related to the 
senior leadership, both officer and civilian, of the Federal and Confederate respective 
systems?  Did the CSMC embrace innovation and new technologies while its counterpart 
seemed to regress into traditional roles and missions?  Were these institutional attitudes 
in some way related to the senior leadership of each respective service?  
This study argues that the South’s gain of competent and experienced officers 
from the U.S. Marine Corps contributed to a proportional, but opposite effect to the 
USMC itself.  The loss of significant numbers of experienced and seasoned leaders to 
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the rebel cause robbed the USMC of a critical resource at a particularly vulnerable time 
and the USMC encountered great difficulty recovering from the effect of that loss.  
Conversely, the Confederacy gained a wealth of seasoned leaders at a time it most 
needed them, and their influx provided the CSMC with an immediate source of veteran 
leaders around whom the rest of the unit could form.   
The majority of CSMC officers gained from the USMC were company-grade 
veterans, a stratum particularly important to unit training and operating.  These officers 
were also the Marines with the most recent expeditionary experience, and their loss was 
keenly felt within the USMC and eagerly welcomed by the South.  Because of this 
transfer of talent during a particularly critical transition period for both services, the 
CSMC managed to fill its ranks and field units in a remarkably short period of time.  
Moreover, these same leaders proved adept at exercising individual initiative and 
creativity to accomplish missions in the absence of guidance from above, making the 
CSMC an even more flexible and adaptive force.  Given the many opportunities that the 
war provided, these company-level leaders exercised their initiative from below and 
were responsible for pushing the CSMC into new functional areas that the USMC did 
not venture into.  The degree of depth of this inverse relationship of leadership has not 
previously been fully explored.   
The historiography of the Confederate States Marine Corps is surprisingly light.  
Although few areas of American history have been scrutinized as closely as the Civil 
War, many students remain unaware of the existence or contributions of the CSMC.  
Fewer still have sufficient knowledge of its activities in order to form an opinion – much 
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less consensus – of its effectiveness as a fighting organization.   
For example, historian Frank Vandiver reduces the CSMC’s total contribution 
during the war to one blunt sentence: “The [Confederate] Marine Corps, pitifully small, 
was of little use.”6  Historian Allan Millett also slights the Confederate Marines.  He 
states that they came to suffer “not only from the institutional weaknesses of its parent 
organization [the US Marine Corps] but the ravages of national defeat.”  Millett 
maintains that “the Confederate Marines were doomed to serve through the war with 
diminished usefulness and growing anonymity,” inferring that the Confederate Marines’ 
lack of prominence constituted de facto proof of their lack of value to the South.7   
Historian Ralph Donnelly disagrees with the assessments of Vandiver and 
Millett.  He believes that Vandiver’s characterization gives “a completely erroneous 
picture of the Confederate States Marine Corps.”8  Instead, Donnelly asserts that “the 
demand for [Confederate] Marines was constant and widespread, and they were used 
whenever available.”9  This thesis supports Donnelly’s assertion.  Nonetheless, despite 
its uniqueness as an organization, particularly one that fought throughout the war on 
both land and sea in a number of roles, the CSMC is probably the least historically 
documented regimental-sized unit in the war.       
 About the only point of consensus in the historical writings about the 
Confederate Marines is that there is a paucity of official correspondence regarding their 
activities.  This lack of easily accessible documentation has been explained in a number 
of ways.  First, the Confederate Marine Corps was a small organization, one that 
probably never numbered greater than 600 Marines at any time during the war.10  
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Second, the Marines were normally attached to other commands where they served as 
small components, an arrangement that in some cases relegated their service to 
anonymity.  Third, the Confederate Navy destroyed many of its official records, 
including those of the CSMC, during the fall of Richmond at the end of the war.  Fourth, 
the records of individual ships in which many Marines served, were routinely destroyed 
or lost in the final actions of the ship.11  Because of these factors, little official 
documentation survived the war.  The few records available are found mostly in private 
collections or in the personal correspondence files of some of the principal leaders.   
 To make the situation more difficult for researchers, attempts to produce a 
definitive monograph on the Confederate Marine Corps were not undertaken until the 
1950s, almost a century after the Civil War.12  By that time, all of the participants had 
died and, with them, a valuable source of first-hand knowledge was lost.  In contrast, a 
greater percentage of the Confederate Army’s records survived intact, providing 
researchers with a clearer picture of the army’s individual unit activities.  Moreover, in 
contrast to the Confederate Marines, many army survivors left memoirs, records and 
correspondence.  For all these reasons, analytical studies of the Confederate States 
Marine Corps are few.  Previous accounts of the CSMC offer mostly discontinuous 
accounts of that organization.  This thesis builds on the earlier works to reconstruct a 
solid history of the CSMC, and to contribute to its historiography.   
 The first general history of the CSMC is a 1956 master’s thesis by James 
Gasser.13  In it, Gasser provides a framework for the basic organization of the CSMC 
and recapitulates some of their contributions during select combat actions.  Gasser’s 
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project presents a narrative history of the CSMC, yet lacks analysis to address some 
difficult issues about why the CSMC was created, how well it served in its role, and 
what contributions it made to the Confederate war effort.  It also fails to place the CSMC 
within the context of how it compared to the wartime performance of the U.S. Marine 
Corps. 
 Following in Gasser’s footsteps, historian Ralph Donnelly wrote several books 
and articles on the CSMC, making some significant contributions to the historiography 
of the CSMC.  Beginning with three articles published in 1959, 1964 and 1966,14 
Donnelly established the foundation on the CSMC that provided for later research on the 
subject.  In subsequent years, he expanded his works to the point where he eventually 
produced a total of four books related to the CSMC.  Two of the books are collections of 
biographical essays and service record material on the commissioned officers and some 
enlisted Marines of the CSMC, while the remaining two books are different versions of a 
narrative history of the CSMC.15  Of the two, the later work, Rebel Leathernecks, 
incorporates a broader sampling of primary source material and is a more refined 
product.  While that book imparts to the reader a general perspective of the nature of the 
CSMC and a narrative of some its activities, it has a number of flaws.  Basically, the 
book provides information related to the state wherein particular actions occurred.  This 
approach has the effect of imparting to the reader a stream of factual material of varying 
value that offers a fragmented and discontinuous storyline.  Donnelly’s organizational 
style makes it difficult to see the overall picture of the sequence of deployments to meet 
Confederate military requirements from a broad perspective.  To complicate matters, 
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Donnelly’s narrative presentation, while informative, leaves some evident gaps.  Also, 
while the book adequately describes in general terms the organization and actions of the 
CSMC, it does not provide analysis of why Southern leaders created the CSMC with its 
unique structure, nor assess how well it performed its missions in relation to other units 
or opponents.   
 Finally, while over the years several journal articles have been published 
providing more information about certain specific actions of the CSMC, these are fairly 
limited in scope and generally do not present new analysis of its creation or relative 
performance.  Few offer new insight on the leadership of the unit or its overall 
contributions or effectiveness.  And while there are a number of histories of the U.S. 
Marine Corps and its performance during the Civil War, none provide a critical 
comparative analysis between the USMC and CSMC or explore the significance of the 
CSMC as it related to the USMC.16  This thesis fills these gaps.  Although the CSMC 
was a relatively small military organization, it is apparent that the Confederacy invested 
considerable effort and resources toward creating, deploying, operating and maintaining 
their Marine Corps.  And, because both the CSMC and USMC evolved in large part 
from the same pre-war organization, it is both relevant and necessary to discuss pre-
conflict naval issues and the development of naval strategies, operations and tactics.  
Since the Confederacy, like the Union, believed in civilian control of its armed forces, 
information gleaned from research into the political influences that helped shape the 
development of the naval services, and the various social factors that affected recruiting 
and retaining Marines are also incorporated.  This project postulates that national 
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strategy considerations played a central role in the creation, maintenance, and 
employment of the South’s Marines.  
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CHAPTER II 
CREATING A CONFEDERATE CORPS OF MARINES 
 
On 16 March 1861, barely a month after forming a new government, adopting a 
new constitution and inaugurating a president, the Provisional Congress of the 
Confederate States of America created a Confederate Navy.  One component of that new 
navy consisted of a “corps of marines,” an organization originally conceived as a 
battalion-sized unit commanded by a major and further subdivided into six one-hundred 
man companies, each commanded by a captain (see Figure 2-1).1  Although the 
legislation did not specifically state the purpose for the Confederate States Marine Corps 
(CSMC), or detail how it would be employed, there are clues that may help to fill in 
these blank spaces in the historical record.  One fact is evident:  Confederate leaders 
created the CSMC with a distinctly different organizational structure.  They did not form 
the CSMC as a mere copy of its cousin, the United States Marine Corps (USMC), but as 
a unique organization altogether.  Their departure from the USMC model indicates that 
Confederate legislators and administrators had some different purposes in mind for their 
Marine Corps.  If form follows function, it seems logical that Confederate leaders 
created the CSMC along different lines to meet different requirements.  As the war 
continued and the CSMC coalesced into a seasoned collection of fighting units, the 
variations in structure between the two organizations became more apparent as 
Confederate leaders further expanded and modified the CSMC.   
17 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1.  Initial Organizational Model of the Confederate States Marine 
Corps, 16 March 1861.2
When they created their military, Confederate leaders might reasonably have 
been expected to duplicate the organization with which they were most familiar:  the 
U.S. military.  In the case of the CSMC, the USMC provided a functional and existing 
model that could have readily served as a base for that of a similar Confederate service.  
Certainly, the easiest solution would have been for Southern leaders to simply adopt a 
scale model of the USMC structure, particularly since a majority of the Confederate 
Marine Corps’ leaders had invested many years of service in that unit and were 
intimately familiar with its organization.  However, from its inception the CSMC 
departed from the USMC structure in several significant ways.  Presumably, there were 
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reasons for these changes, yet this study is the first to analyze the data and provide 
probable reasons for these differences.   
This chapter explores the influences and events that culminated in the 
establishing and early fielding of the CSMC to better understand to what degree, and 
why, that organization differed from its northern cousin.  Also, the events that led to 
creating, manning and organizing the Confederate States Marine Corps, and the 
personalities and intentions of the leaders most closely involved in its administration and 
employment are investigated to gain a clearer appreciation of the how this unique 
military unit came to be.  Additionally, changes to the organization took place in 
response to the increasing pressures of war.  This chapter also examines the events 
surrounding the early employments of the CSMC in relation to the wartime situation to 
ascertain how and why these changes came about.  Since the CSMC gestated in part 
from the prewar USMC, some appreciation of the nature of the prewar Marine Corps 
and its driving influences at the time of secession and war provide a necessary key 
toward better understanding of why the CSMC developed as it did.  Therefore, the 
departure point for this study is the status of the U.S. Marine Corps within the naval 
service in the decade prior to the start of the Civil War.   
The 1850s constituted a decade of reform for both the U.S. Navy and the Marine 
Corps.  Some Southern Democrats, with Northern support, demanded an enhanced 
American influence in the Caribbean, particularly around Cuba.  These politicians 
believed that they needed to strengthen the capabilities of the American Navy to offset 
British naval activities in that region.  According to historian Joseph Durkin, the 
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American Navy had been in a period of general decline since the end of the War of 
1812, to the point where, by 1853, it did not possess one vessel of comparable quality or 
capability to those of any major European naval force.  Although the naval services had 
improved the professional standing of their officer corps after 1800, following the War 
of 1812 there was little support to maintain a strong and modern navy.  By the 1850s, 
more than two decades of neglect caused by differing political priorities had taken their 
toll on the navy and the quality of both personnel and equipment had declined.  The 
naval officer corps had not only aged, some had rotted on the vine, and in many cases 
the men were both unfamiliar with the modern naval technological advances in use in 
foreign navies, and reluctant to pursue them.3  As a result, some Navy leaders proved 
resistant to efforts to modernize the service, and reluctant to consider new technologies 
and innovations that were becoming standards in first-rate modern navies. 
To reverse the weakness in American naval power, some political leaders set out 
to strengthen the naval service.  Achieving that goal required qualitative as well as 
quantitative changes.  Simply increasing the numbers of ships and sailors were not 
enough.  Outmoded to begin with, some of the Navy’s ships had been left to deteriorate 
in various dockyards for years.  Of the Navy’s seventy ships, Secretary of the Navy 
James Dobbin reported to Congress in 1852 that many of the ships “are not only unfit for 
service, but  . . . are not worth repairing.”  He estimated that “There are not in the Navy 
forty vessels which could be brought into service in ninety days, if needed.”  Even if the 
ships were returned to service, America’s squadrons would still be decades behind 
European navies in terms of technology and utility.  To compete, the Navy needed to 
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modernize its ships, weapons, and equipment by constructing new hulls that 
incorporated technologies already in use by first-rate navies, such as those of England 
and France.  Congress supported the effort in a number of ways.  In December 1853, 
Secretary Dobbin pushed through funding to construct six new steam frigates.  And the 
passage of the Naval Reform Act of 1855 increased funding for research and 
development of newer ships and up-to-date naval weaponry, such as rifled cannon.  
These efforts eventually led to the commissioning of several modern American fighting 
vessels powered by steam as well as sail, and armed with powerful new artillery pieces.4  
For the modernization to succeed, the Navy needed better personnel.  Manning 
the new ships required men with different skills than those needed on the vessels of the 
old navy, and maintaining proficiency in those skills required making changes to the 
Navy’s recruiting and training practices.  Steadily, yet not without resistance, unskilled 
line-haulers and laborers gave way to skilled engineers and mechanics as steam 
supplemented sail.  The increased application of technology necessitated a greater 
screening of recruits to ensure better-qualified and capable officers and men were 
selected, trained and retained -- men who could master the technical challenges of the 
new shipboard duties.  Congress empowered a Naval Retiring Board to let aging or 
infirm officers go and retain and promote younger ones, with the intent of creating a 
more robust cadre that would be more capable of meeting the challenges that the new 
technologies presented.  Congress also made changes to the Naval Academy 
appointment process to enhance the selecting and recruiting of more qualified men.  
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These reforms, though controversial, resulted in the forging of a younger, more 
professional fighting force that entered the 1860s with improved capability.5
 Although it too had passed through a period of stagnation and organizational 
neglect in the period 1820 to 1840, the U.S. Marine Corps entered the 1850s as a healthy 
and vibrant service.  It had the advantage of excellent leadership interested in modern 
tactics and weaponry.  The Marine Corps, whose service had been sometimes 
misunderstood, maligned, or questioned in the past, became increasingly valued by its 
parent (the Navy) and by the country at large.  Capitalizing on the long tenure of its fifth 
Commandant, Brevet Brigadier General Archibald Henderson, the Marine Corps’ 
operational versatility and proven performance in combat in a variety of foreign 
engagements earned it the respect of its government and citizens.  In his nearly fifty-
three years of service, almost thirty-nine of them as Commandant, Henderson personally 
orchestrated a period of growth and reform that converted the small, weakly organized, 
fragmented and sometimes poorly led assemblage into a seasoned fighting force both 
relevant for the times and reliable in its service.  Henderson revitalized the Marine 
Corps, and some of his concepts anticipated by a number of years those that Congress 
later implemented to modernize the Navy.  Henderson’s leadership style, political skill 
and perceptive vision transformed the Corps from an organization in crisis to one 
considered by the Secretary of the Navy to be “an indispensable branch of the Naval 
Service.”6  
 From the time he assumed the commandancy of the Marine Corps in 1820, until 
his death in 1859, Archibald Henderson aggressively sought to fix problems within his 
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corps and to further its status and reputation as a service.  When he assumed command, 
morale was at a low point and the Marine Corps threatened with either outright 
disbanding or being broken into small, separate ships’ detachments.  Henderson fought 
zealously for the USMC’s continued existence and succeeded in expanding it into new 
roles.  Under his tutelage, the Marine Corps began to embrace the role of a naval 
expeditionary force.  Close to home, it participated in landings on enemy coasts from 
California to the Gulf of Mexico, thus “contributing to the American domination of [the 
Pacific] coast.”7  Farther abroad, embarked Marine detachments provided naval forces 
with greater combat power, allowing American diplomats and commanders to exert 
force where needed to support foreign policy or protect American interests.  The power 
of naval presence began to be realized, and the USMC played its part in that effort.  For 
example, during Henderson’s tenure as commandant, Marines participated in over fifty 
armed landings around the world.  In fights that spanned the range of expeditionary 
operations, Marines waded ashore with sailors around the world, fighting and dying in 
support of American expansion and diplomacy.  They fought against pirates in Sumatra 
from 1832 to 1839 and in Africa in 1843, stormed barrier forts along the Chinese coast 
in 1856 and 1859, and protected American citizens and interests in South and Central 
America, the South Pacific and Japan, becoming the centerpiece in naval landings and 
shows of force.  In addition to the traditional role of providing detachments of Marines 
for service aboard Navy ships, Henderson also formed ad hoc Marine battalions and 
deployed them to fight alongside the Army in both the War with Mexico and the 
Seminole Wars, where they served with distinction.8  In this manner, Henderson 
instituted flexibility and responsiveness into the Marine Corps’ persona in ways that 
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enabled it to fight across the spectrum of warfare, whether that meant participating in 
traditional small-unit actions through deployed shipboard service to operating at a larger 
scale at the battalion level in concert with the Army. 
Looking toward the future, Henderson also began to incorporate artillery training 
within the corps and considered ways to enhance naval landing force procedures.  
Understanding the effects that the shift from sail to steam propulsion and the increased 
use of armor plate would have on modern navies, and realizing how these changes 
would render many of the traditional roles of Marines afloat obsolete, Henderson sought 
to adopt several reforms that would make his service more valuable and relevant in 
modern naval warfare.  He foresaw the advantages of integrating Marines into ships’ 
naval artillery crews, and further believed in incorporating Marine artillery in landing 
parties would both allow Marines to fill an important role and significantly increase the 
combat power of those landing parties.  To accomplish this, he advocated for acquiring 
an organic artillery capability within the Corps and introducing artillery training for all 
ships’ detachments, believing these efforts would consequently increase the importance 
of Marines in expeditionary operations.  To implement his vision, he first sought to have 
select Marine officers attend the U.S. Army’s artillery course at West Point, intending to 
create a pool of knowledge and expertise within the corps that could then be employed 
to train other Marines in artillery skills.  His ideas soon bore fruit.  In 1857, Lieutenant 
Israel Greene became the first Marine officer to graduate from that course, and 
Henderson posted him to the Marine Barracks at Washington, D.C., to serve as the 
Corps’ Instructor of Artillery.  In that same year, Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey 
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supported Henderson by providing the Marines with their first organic artillery pieces, 
two 32-pound cannon and four modern Dahlgren guns, giving Henderson the ordnance 
needed to make his vision come to life.  Receipt of these guns allowed him to make 
artillery training a required element of the pre-deployment program for Marines assigned 
to duties afloat.  As a result, some Marines soon found themselves assigned to gun crews 
aboard select warships as part of their regular duties.9   
Commandant Henderson also lobbied hard to acquire modern, more accurate 
rifles to replace the Corps’ older musket-type shoulder weapons.  He emphasized 
marksmanship training, resulting in an increase in their range, accuracy and capability.  
Furthermore, he enhanced the overall quality of the training of enlisted Marines by 
adopting and adhering to standardized infantry, artillery and engineer training programs.  
Also, as part of his struggle to make the Marine Corps a more useful service, Henderson 
seized every opportunity to prove its value as a flexible and expeditionary force.  The 
commandant consistently volunteered his Corps for assignments outside of their normal 
mission areas.  By successfully handling domestic crises at home ranging from quelling 
prison riots to restoring order on the streets of Washington and New York, and actively 
participating in actions and interventions abroad, the Corps improved its public 
reputation and demonstrated its versatility to the nation at a time when some political 
and military leaders still sought to do away with it.  Instead of being dissolved, under 
Henderson the Marine Corps grew threefold in size and became a trusted and valued 
component of the naval force.  As evidence of that new trust and confidence, in the years 
immediately preceding the Civil War, President James Buchanan called his Marines on 
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several occasions to counter some serious threats to the security and stability of the 
nation’s capital.  In June of 1857, Buchanan authorized the employment of Marines to 
restore order to Washington, D.C. in the wake of several days of violent riots that 
overwhelmed city police forces.  In November 1859, the president authorized Marines to 
recapture the Federal Armory at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia that had been seized by the 
violent abolitionist John Brown.  And, in the days following the secession crisis in 
December 1860 and January 1861, Buchanan and his secretaries of War and the Navy 
again ordered Marines to garrison several forts surrounding the capital that had been left 
seriously undermanned by Army units due to chronic shortages and massive desertions.  
To senior leaders such as President Buchanan, General Winfield Scott and Secretary of 
the Navy Isaac Toucey, the Marines were proving their value in times of crisis.  Toucey 
summed up his opinion of the Corps in his 1859 annual report, stating that “the Marine 
Corps is an indispensable branch of the Naval Service [. . . and] a gallant little band 
upon which rests the most widely extended duties at home and in every sea and clime, 
without sufficient numbers to perform them.”10  Nonetheless, all the hard work and 
dedication that went into earning that reputation seemed a wasted effort in light of the 
events that soon transpired. 
Unfortunately for the U.S. Marine Corps, Henderson’s tutelage ended abruptly 
with his death in January 1859, on the cusp of the Civil War.  With his passing, 
leadership of the Corps changed dramatically, the position of commandant falling 
automatically to the next senior man, Colonel John Harris.  Harris, then sixty-eight years 
old, held the distinction of being not only the next senior officer, but also the last veteran 
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officer of the War of 1812 on active duty in the Marine Corps.  Harris quickly proved to 
be quite different in outlook, temperament, and vision from Henderson:  he remained 
firmly set in stolid, sedentary ways and shared little of Henderson’s prescient ideas.  
According to historian Joseph Alexander, Harris had two glaring flaws:  he lacked “the 
broad vision of Henderson,” and was “simply too old and stale to meet anything but the 
bare minimum requirements of his office.”11  Lacking Henderson’s drive and prescience, 
Harris had passed the previous twenty-five years in various duties ashore, fulfilling the 
basic functions of his postings routinely and without distinction.  As the next senior 
officer on active duty, Harris fully expected, and received, routine nomination as 
Henderson’s successor by conservative-minded Secretary Toucey, who appeared to give 
no serious consideration to look at alternative nominees.12  Ultimately, Harris’s 
appointment changed the character of the Marine Corps for the worse at that same 
critical moment when America faced imminent division and conflict.  With Harris’s 
appointment many of Henderson’s initiatives died.   
Although Harris experienced a number of problems during his tenure as 
commandant, the secession crisis of early 1861 posed a particularly special challenge to 
his leadership.  In all of the Union’s military services, alarming numbers of officers 
resigned their commissions, and the Marine Corps proved to be no exception to this 
phenomenon.  However, early in the crisis, some civilian leaders noted that Marine 
officers seemed to be resigning in higher percentages than did Navy officers, and “the 
[rate of] defections did little for the Marine Corps’s status with the Lincoln 
administration or with social Washington.”13  To make matters worse, neither Secretary 
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Toucey nor Commandant Harris took steps to stem the tide, and Harris actually 
approved many of the early resignations, instead of punishing them with dismissal.  In 
fact, Harris even went so far as to provide some of the departing officers with glowing 
recommendations, essentially embarrassing the administration and seemingly approving 
of their actions.  In one open recommendation for Lieutenant Andrew Hays, Harris not 
only approved his resignation, he went so far as to remark that “should he decide to enter 
any other military corps, I take great pleasure in recommending him as a gentleman to be 
relied upon at all times,” words that helped gain Hays a commission in the CSMC less 
than a month later.14  The incoming Lincoln administration soon mandated a harsher 
stance regarding the flood of officer resignations, directing that all resigning officers be 
automatically dismissed from service, and not allowing them to resign as the first had 
been.  Yet in spite of the personal implications of dismissal, these administrative details 
did little to stem the flow of officers to the Confederacy.  In a short span of time, a slight 
majority of Harris’s company grade officers resigned, and many of them soon after 
joined the Confederate military in some capacity (see Table 2-1).  With them also went 
an unknown number of non-commissioned officers and enlisted Marines, some possibly 
influenced by the same departing officers.  In addition to losing more than half of their 
company grade officers, a prized source of mid-level leadership, the Corps also lost (and 
the South consequently gained) two important field grade officers:  Major Henry Tyler, 
Sr., the Corps’ Adjutant-Inspector; and Major George Terrett, commander of the Marine 
Barracks in Washington, D.C.  These two officers, both intimately involved with the 
training of new personnel, resigned just as the USMC began its wartime expansion.  And 
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in another embarrassing moment, one of the revered former commandant’s sons, Richard 
Henderson, accepted a commission as a lieutenant in the CSMC.15   
Table 2-1.  Listing of U.S. Marine Officers Who Resigned or Were Dismissed Between 
December 1860 and December 1863.16
Name Rank Separation Type Later Service  
Terrett, George H. Major Dismissed CSMC, CSA 
Tyler, Henry B. Sr. Major Dismissed CSMC 
Rich, Jabez C. Capt Dismissed Va. MC 
Simms, John D. Capt Dismissed CSMC 
Tansill, Robert Capt Dismissed CSMC, CSA 
Taylor, Algernon S. Capt Dismissed CSMC 
Baker, Adam N. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Greene, Israel 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Hays, Andrew J. 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Henderson, Charles A. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Holmes, George 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Kidd, Robert 1st Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Matthews, S. H. 1st Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Meier, Julius E. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Read, Jacob 1st Lt Resigned CSMC 
Stark, Alexander W.  1st Lt Dismissed CSA 
Tattnall, John R. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Turner, George P. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Tyler, Henry B. Jr. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Wilson, Thomas S. 1st Lt Dismissed CSMC 
Cummins, George W. 2nd Lt Dismissed Unknown 
Grant, Oscar B. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
Howell, Becket K. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Ingraham, Henry L. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Rathbone, J. H. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
Reber, J. M. 2nd Lt Dismissed Remained In North (Civilian) 
Sayre, Calvin L. 2nd Lt Resigned CSMC 
Sells, D. M. 2nd Lt Resigned Remained In North (Civilian) 
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Through these defecting officers, the South’s Marine Corps came to be infused 
with the spirit of Henderson’s reforms and imagination.  A significant number of these 
incoming CSMC officers had previously been intimately involved in implementing 
Henderson’s initiatives, and many carried out that effort for their new Corps.  Major 
Tyler, Henderson’s Adjutant and Inspector, went on to command a Confederate Marine 
battalion for a critical period of time in the unit’s infancy and then afterward served in 
the CSMC headquarters.  Major Israel Greene, former artillery instructor to the USMC, 
became the CSMC’s Adjutant and Inspector.  Major George Terrett, previously the 
commander of the Washington Marine Barracks during a time when that post served as 
Henderson’s training ground for new recruits, later commanded a Confederate Marine 
battalion at Drewry’s Bluff, successfully integrating Marine infantry and artillery troops 
into a force that helped defeat the Union Navy’s drive toward Richmond.  Drewry’s 
Bluff eventually came to serve also as the training center for the CSMC, a location at 
which most new officers and many enlisted received their initial screening and 
training.17  This centralization of training served to standardize techniques, procedures 
and traditions throughout the new Corps, under the watchful eyes of former Henderson 
disciples.  Other examples exist as well that support the contention that Henderson’s 
influence permeated the new corps through these men. 
The former Federal Marine officers transferred to the South a wealth of recent 
combat experience and operational expertise, particularly at the small-unit level.  They 
constituted a valuable nucleus of leadership around which the fledgling Confederate 
naval service formed.  Concurrently, their defections caused a deficit of experience in 
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the USMC, a vacancy that some believe contributed to its relatively poor performance, 
particularly in the critical first engagements in the war.  According to historian Allan 
Millett, the defections stripped the USMC of much of its company level leadership, 
leaving the large numbers of raw recruits that filled the gap without effective instruction 
or supervision.18  As a result, during the USMC’s initial combat employment of the war, 
at Bull Run near Manassas, the meager fifteen officers and noncommissioned officers 
with prewar experience proved insufficient in number to keep the remaining three 
hundred thirty raw recruits in check when the fighting started.  Under the pressures of 
their first experiences in combat the Marine Battalion fell back three times before it 
broke and ran from the enemy, forging an early reputation as poor fighters that proved 
difficult to shake.  And, in a twist of fate akin to rubbing salt in an open wound, one of 
the Confederate brigades that the Marine Battalion faced at Bull Run, the Fourth Brigade 
of Virginia Volunteers, had been ably commanded by former USMC Major George 
Terrett, now holding a commission as a colonel in the Provisional Army of the 
Confederacy.  Soon afterward, with the arrival of Brigadier General James Longstreet, 
Terrett relinquished his command and received a second commission as a major in the 
CSMC.19  Examples of service like Terrett’s illustrate the level of experience and 
capability of many of the former USMC officers and represent the value that they added 
to the Confederate military. 
Volumes have been written discussing reasons why some officers decided to 
resign their Federal commissions and enter the service of the Confederacy, and some did 
not.  Much of that discussion is outside the scope of this work.  It is acknowledged that 
31 
 
 
the decision appears to be very much an individual one, with each officer weighing his 
own circumstances, politics, or sense of loyalties before making that decision.  Although 
many factors contributed toward individual officers making their decision, one factor 
germane to this study is the possible effect that the personality, policies and leadership 
style of Commandant Harris may have played in influencing Marines.  Where all 
services experienced significant numbers of resignations, the percentage of officers 
resigning from the Marine Corps surpassed that of the Navy, suggesting that the USMC 
had its own unique problems with retention.  Personal feelings toward Colonel Harris 
may have been a contributing factor in some officers deciding to resign.  From the time 
of his appointment in 1859 until his death on 12 May 1864, Harris represented a divisive 
influence within the Corps.  Generally, historians characterize his tenure as a period of 
incessant bickering, backstabbing and general discontent among the officer corps, with 
friction and mistrust common throughout the chain of command.20  A command climate 
such as his is not conducive to team building or cohesion, and it is easy to imagine that 
personal resentments toward Harris may have tipped the balance in favor of going South 
when it came time to decide that issue.  
For example, in April 1860 the Marine Corps’ Adjutant and Inspector, Major 
Henry Tyler, Sr., and his son, Lieutenant Henry Tyler, Jr., placed Harris on report for 
alleged improprieties in assignments, and won their case.  Both Tylers then continued to 
work directly under Harris in Washington until they resigned their commissions.  In the 
interim, their daily relations with Harris were most likely strained.  Unlike other 
Virginia-born officers who resigned quickly upon that state’s secession, the elder Tyler 
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deliberated for over a week and did not tender his resignation until 1 May 1861.  Quite 
possibly he spent that time debating the possible consequences of leaving the service of 
the Marine Corps to which he had invested thirty-eight years of his life.  His uneasy 
relationship with Harris may have played a role in his eventual decision; it may even 
have been the deciding factor.21  Harris, who considered his role as commandant to be 
more of an administrator than a field leader, aggravated previously existing tensions 
between the ranks of the older, more sedentary barracks commanders and the younger, 
more active junior leaders, the latter of which carried the brunt of expeditionary 
assignments and possessed the most recent combat experiences in their service around 
the world.   
Tyler was not the only USMC officer to have experienced troubled relations with 
Harris; other officers had also endured some type of conflict with him in years past.  
While a majority of the officers who resigned were originally from the South, others like 
Captain Israel Greene were not, leaving open the question of how many resigned due to 
ideology, perceived opportunity, or simply as a way to extend a vote of “no confidence” 
on Harris’s leadership.22  Most likely, some combination of all these factors played a 
role in influencing individual Marine officers to decide whether or not to resign their 
commissions.  It is reasonable to assume that officers who had experienced contentious 
relations with their commandant might view an opportunity to join another organization 
in a more favorable light. 
Harris’s leadership problems crossed political and ideological lines and did not 
end with the secession crisis; he proved a divisive force even among those officers who 
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remained with the Union.  Even after the war began, the Corps’ officers continued to 
squabble amongst themselves, jockeying for promotions or favors, reinforcing the notion 
that some problems in the USMC extended beyond the more obvious North– South 
tensions.  On occasion, these personal and professional differences became a distraction 
from the more important task of fighting the war.  At times the war seemed secondary to 
the infighting and, in one instance, the open bickering reached the point where the new 
Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, felt compelled to personally intervene to stop the 
squabbling.  In May 1862, with the Peninsular Campaign in full swing and the Union 
Navy fighting Confederates for control of the James River, more than one third of the 
USMC’s senior officers, including Harris himself, were instead embroiled in an 
embarrassing public trial in Washington, D.C.  Marine Lieutenant Colonel John 
Reynolds openly accused Harris of perjury, dereliction of duty, and various other 
offenses, hoping to publicly humiliate him.  The spectacle dragged on for almost two 
weeks and played out in the press on a daily basis, eventually forcing Welles to take 
action directly.  Disgusted with both the proceedings and in how they were carried out in 
public, Welles ignored the official recommendations of the court and instead issued a 
“letter of reproof” to both Harris and Reynolds for their roles in the spectacle.  
Afterward, in his diary, Welles grimly stated, “Almost all the elder [Marine] officers are 
at loggerheads and ought to be retired,” an expression of what he felt about the senior 
leaders of the Corps.23  On Harris’s death two years later, Welles recalled that thought, 
and indicated that little had changed over the years regarding his low opinion of the 
Marine leaders and his belief that they were part of the Corps’ problems, and not likely 
to produce solutions.  Remarking matter-of-factly that Harris’s “death gives 
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embarrassment as to a successor,” he frankly assessed that “The higher class of marine 
officers are not the men who can elevate or give efficiency to the corps.”24  Welles 
decided that fixing the Corps required a drastic solution.  Afraid of repeating the 
mistakes of his predecessor who routinely promoted the next senior man in line (Harris), 
Welles broke with tradition and dug deep into the USMC’s officers to promote one 
based on personal qualifications, not longevity.  He reached down and elevated Major 
Jacob Zeilin to the commandancy, and simultaneously retired four of the Corps’ most 
senior officers.25  With this action, Welles began a new tradition of selecting 
commandants based on their fitness, and without regard for whether such a selection 
might offend more senior officers.  Nonetheless, Welles’ move came too late in the war 
to have much effect on the USMC’s performance in the conflict.  
Under Harris, the U.S. Marine Corps missed the perfect opportunity to become 
the amphibious force that Henderson had envisioned.  The consensus among historians 
is that the USMC’s overall combat service record during the Civil War was generally 
disappointing.  Following the sub-par performance of the Union’s Marine Battalion at 
the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, subsequent Marine battalions produced an 
equally poor string of outright failures or flawed performances at Fort Sumter in 
September 1863 and during both attacks on Fort Fisher in December 1864 and January 
1865.  Also, embarrassing episodes like the Ariel incident, in which 150 armed Marines 
(including six officers) in transit at sea were captured by the Confederate cruiser 
Alabama without firing a shot, did little to build confidence among Union military 
leaders or the general public about the fighting capability of Marine units larger than 
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detachment size.  In some cases, even when naval commanders attempted to employ 
Marine battalions, Army commanders countermanded or ignored the orders.  For 
example, when Flag Officer Samuel DuPont attempted to employ his Marine battalion to 
conduct raids in 1862 along the St. Johns River in Florida, Brigadier General William T. 
Sherman disregarded DuPont and, instead, substituted his own troops for those missions.  
DuPont became so frustrated with the situation that he declared he would “send the 
battalion back home” to Washington, believing “it is idle to attempt to fit it in anywhere 
and they are a fine body of well-drilled and disciplined troops and should be 
employed.”26  Although several opportunities surfaced during the war that might have 
highlighted the amphibious role of the Marines, the USMC failed to capitalize on them.  
As a result, other units generally fulfilled the amphibious role during Union operations, 
and the Federal Marines missed their chance to carve out what would have been a 
distinctive niche.  Writing on that subject after the war, USMC Captain Louis Fagan, 
himself a participant in the near-disastrous Union naval assault on Fort Fisher, dryly 
observed, “the War was our great opportunity and we owlishly neglected it.”27   
 In contrast, the CSMC appears to have embraced the initiatives first put in 
motion by Archibald Henderson.  Confederate Marines, led by the same officers that 
helped Henderson implement infantry and artillery training in the USMC, turned those 
same skills and experiences toward creating a Confederate Marine Corps that could 
operate comfortably either on land or sea, and became firmly enmeshed with the 
Confederate Navy on several levels: the CSMC could operate equally well in 
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detachment, company, or battalion configuration, depending on the situation.  
Succeeding chapters will explore this concept in greater detail.     
Residuals from Henderson’s prewar influence extended into other Confederate 
services as well, primarily through the services of several former USMC officers who 
later applied their experiences gained under Henderson’s tenure to benefit the armed 
forces of the South.  For example, former USMC Second Lieutenant Alexander Stark put 
his early Marine Corps artillery training to use for the Confederacy to a degree that 
deserves special recognition.  Stark returned from an overseas naval deployment too late 
to secure a posting in the CSMC.  Instead, he joined the Confederate army as a major of 
artillery, and advanced to the rank of lieutenant colonel while commanding an artillery 
battalion that bore his name.  Stark distinguished himself in one other way as well:  he 
became one of only a handful of Confederate officers to author a field manual, 
Instruction for Field Artillery, which the Secretary of War then published and distributed 
throughout the army.28
 Returning attention back to actions in the South, the secession crisis led to a 
frenzy of activity as southern delegates attempted to create a functioning central 
government and armed forces where none had previously existed before.  On 1 February 
1861, in response to the pending inauguration of Republican president-elect Abraham 
Lincoln, seven states of the Deep South seceded from the Union.  Their decision was not 
a hasty one; Americans had openly debated the notion of secession for many years.  
Lincoln’s election in November 1860 precipitated a political crisis in the South, causing 
advocates for secession to dispatch representatives to other slave-holding states to push 
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for secession and to lobby for the formation of a Southern, confederated government.  
Beginning with South Carolina on 20 December 1860, special conventions of seven 
slave-holding Southern states each adopted separate ordinances of secession and 
withdrew from the Union, soon to be followed by other states.  Things began to move 
rapidly in the new Confederacy:  by 4 February 1861, the First Session of the 
Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of American convened in Montgomery, 
Alabama; by 8 February, that congress crafted and unanimously adopted a constitution; 
and on 9 February selected Jefferson Davis as president.29  The new Confederacy now 
had a functioning legislative and executive branch of government. 
 With the possibilities of war on the horizon, one of the Provisional Confederate 
Congress’s first priorities was to create an army and a navy.  On 21 February 1861, three 
days after Jefferson Davis was inaugurated as president of the Confederacy, the congress 
passed “An Act to Establish the [Confederate] Navy Department,” and with it a Marine 
Corps.  The president looked next for a man to lead that navy.  On 25 February, Davis 
nominated former U.S. Senator Stephen Russell Mallory for the position of Secretary of 
the Navy, and congress confirmed that appointment on 4 March.  Although never a naval 
officer, Mallory brought to the post a wealth of experience, having served eight years on 
the Committee on Naval Affairs, six as the committee chairman, before resigning from 
the U.S. Congress in February 1861.  Importantly, he had been an active and central 
figure behind a series of efforts to reform and modernize the navy in the 1850s.30  With 
Mallory’s selection, the Confederacy gained a leader experienced in naval affairs, 
administration, and possessed of an eye to the future.   
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 From the beginning, differences became apparent between the president’s 
command relationships over the Confederate Army and Navy.  President Davis, who had 
served as secretary of war to U.S. President Franklin Pierce, held tight rein over his own 
secretary of war.  Generally, Davis delegated little authority over the actions of field 
commanders to the various men who held that office.  Instead, he either personally 
issued orders and guidance directly to the field, or directed subordinates to deliver such 
orders for him.  Davis placed strict limitations on the powers to be exercised by his 
various secretaries of war, even to the point of advising one of them that he must always 
work through “the established channel,” meaning through Davis personally, in any 
matter that included “the removal of an army, the transfer of a general . . . the 
assignment of general officers,” or any subject “material to the public defense.”31  In one 
of his first actions as commander in chief, Davis issued instructions that all contracts 
sent through the secretary could only be approved by Davis himself, prompting his 
critics to remark that he had reduced the role of the secretary of war to the status of 
“chief clerk.”32  Davis reinforced this belief by routinely superseding orders issued by 
the secretary of war and even publicly stated that “he did not believe any civilian could 
competently direct” the affairs of that department.33  That is, no civilian other than 
himself. 
 In contrast, Davis conferred a great deal more authority to his Secretary of the 
Navy, Stephen Mallory.  In part, Davis perceived Mallory to be competent in naval 
affairs in his own right, based on Mallory’s own experiences with that service during his 
years in the senate.  Yet another factor may have been Davis’s unfamiliarity with the 
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naval service, and he demonstrated a proclivity to focus on things familiar to him, and he 
considered the army and war department to be very familiar, indeed.  Therefore, from 
the very beginning, Davis seemed to be more keenly interested in every aspect and detail 
of running the army, and subordinated other efforts, like creating and maintaining a 
navy, to others.  Despite some political opposition to Mallory’s nomination as Secretary 
of the Navy, Davis expressed complete confidence in his selection, and soon after 
congress confirmed his appointment.34  Ironically, in his new role Mallory now faced 
that same modern and capable navy that he had helped create in the 1850s.  
  Although sometimes drawing criticism from political foes, Mallory brought 
competence, innovative vision, hard work, and loyalty to his position.  According to 
historian Rembert Patrick, Mallory made an extraordinarily capable secretary of the 
Navy who, during his tenure, “directed the Navy Department of the Confederacy 
brilliantly,”35 skillfully incorporating new technologies, imaginative ideas and initiative.  
Patrick also observes that Mallory’s “temperament enabled him to work in harmony with 
the President, and generally with his fellow cabinet members,”36 giving him a degree of 
leverage in gaining support among the cabinet for his programs.  He earned the trust, 
confidence and respect of the president, who in turn conferred on Mallory greater 
independence and authority than he granted to any of his secretaries of war.37   
In turn, Mallory seems to have developed a similar relationship with his own 
subordinate, Colonel Lloyd Beall, who became the Commandant of the CSMC on 23 
May 1861, shortly after congress expanded and reorganized the corps as a regiment.  
Beall, a thirty-one year U.S. Army veteran who had served in the Black Hawk War with 
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Jefferson Davis, had earned high respect from several high-ranking Confederate officers.  
Chief among them was General Joseph E. Johnston, who once wrote General Robert E. 
Lee that he considered “Colonel Beall of the ‘Marine Corps’ eminently qualified for the 
grade of brigadier-general,”38 a rank that the CSMC, even after its expansion, did not 
rate.  Correspondence between Beall and Mallory suggests that they possessed a mutual 
respect for each other, and were both frank in expressing their opinions and honest in 
their assessments.  There are no indications that Mallory felt compelled to closely 
supervise Beall’s performance or countermand his orders, as Davis often did with his 
secretary of war, leading one to conclude that Mallory trusted Beall’s judgment in 
Marine Corps matters.  Reciprocally, Beall apparently felt comfortable discussing 
problems with Mallory, and the secretary often acted on Beall’s recommendations even 
when the proposed solutions were not popular or politically palatable.  On occasion, 
Beall respectfully disagreed with certain policies or regulations he considered to be 
detrimental to the CSMC, and proved successful in tactfully pursuing his point to a 
conclusion favorable to the CSMC.39  In general, the CSMC benefited from the close 
and trusted relationship between its commandant and the Navy secretary, and Colonel 
Beall, in turn, looked out for the welfare of his men and organization. 
Congress’s act of 17 March 1861 established a Confederate Navy Department 
consisting of five sub elements:  four bureaus and a Marine Corps Command.  The four 
bureaus were the Office of Ordnance and Hydrography; the Office of Orders and 
Details; the Office of Medicine and Surgery; and the Office of Provisions and Clothing 
(see Figure 2-2).  The Marine Corps Command comprised the headquarters element for 
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the CSMC, and served primarily as an administrative link with the Navy Department, 
coordinating with the other bureaus and the Secretary’s office on all Marine Corps 
matters.  Each bureau chief, including the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reported 
directly to the Secretary of the Navy, who exercised sole decision-making authority over 
both Navy and Marine Corps under order of the president.  Under this arrangement, 
Mallory employed direct administrative and operational control over units in the field in 
concert with the commandant’s advice and counsel.40   
 
Figure 2-2.  Organization of the Confederate States Navy Department. 
That same act of congress established the battalion-sized organization depicted 
earlier in Figure 2-1.  As the requirements of the new Marine Corps solidified, the 
organization grew on paper to meet them, eventually gaining a colonel, as Commandant, 
who reported directly to Mallory.  Administratively and logistically, Marine 
detachments, companies and battalions were normally provided with supplies, arms, 
ammunition, pay, and other support by the army or navy command to which they were 
assigned at the time.  Nonetheless, the CSMC maintained its own paymasters and 
quartermasters as well, providing the headquarters with some degree of centralized 
control over its expenditures and the ability to deal with unique payroll and supply 
issues.  For command and control purposes, Marine units in the field relied on a mixture 
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of telegraph, correspondence, and messengers to maintain contact with the headquarters 
in Richmond, providing reports on events within their area of responsibility, while 
concurrently cooperating with the local commander to whom they were assigned.  
Detachments reported to companies, which in turn reported information to battalion staff 
(if one was in place) or directly to the Marine Corps Headquarters in Richmond.  
Headquarters provided guidance, direction and orders accordingly to either the battalion 
or company commander, as applicable.  In this manner, Secretary Mallory and Colonel 
Beall applied a method of command and control that could best be described as 
“centralized command, decentralized execution,”41 a type of system that can be highly 
responsive to the intent of the commander, yet allows for great flexibility and initiative 
on the part of subordinate leaders.42   
Organization is critical to the command and control process and should reflect 
the requirements of the commander.  The structuring of the CSMC into companies, with 
the provision of forming battalions from those companies as required, represented a 
remarkable departure from traditional USMC organization.  Surprisingly, the USMC had 
no specified structure, only Congress’s table of maximum authorized personnel, listed 
by rank.  Traditionally, the USMC had routinely formed units and filled billets to 
administrative barracks assignments on an ad hoc basis, an inefficient system at best.  
No standardized structure existed until the Spanish-American War in 1898.  The 
CSMC’s structure thus represented a giant step forward in the development of the 
Marine Corps, and the creation of permanent companies as the base unit became the core 
of its organization.  Although he does not specify how he arrived at his conclusion, 
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historian Ralph Donnelly believed the creation of companies to be an “innovation 
suggestive of [that used by] the British Marine Corps,”43 yet the importance of that 
feature has been widely overlooked.  The ability to deploy by permanent individual 
companies and also by provisional battalions comprised of those companies constituted 
a significant improvement in operational flexibility over the USMC, a subject that will 
be examined in detail later in this thesis.  The CSMC’s prescient structure allowed it to 
be more flexible and adaptable to changing field situations while maintaining a high 
degree of cohesion and standardization.  This gave the Confederates more options to 
select from when dealing with changing enemy threats and priorities.  These options 
ranged from the posting of detachments afloat, the stationing of individual companies to 
select locations, to the forming of ad hoc battalions to respond to priority threats.  At 
times the CSMC did all of these concurrently.  The CSMC’s operational concept and 
organization therefore maximized both economy of force and mass, two long-standing 
principles of war that are particularly difficult to attain by military forces with chronic 
personnel shortages such as that of the Confederacy.44   
There is an unusual aspect to Mallory’s adoption of the company-based 
organizational model:  it appears in the earliest iterations of the CSMC, even prior to 
adopting a formal strategy for fighting the war.  This is unusual because, in the absence 
of a formal strategy, the easy solution would have been to simply copy the existing U.S. 
Marine Corps structure.  Instead, the Confederates departed from that model and created 
a Marine Corps organized along quite different lines.  Perhaps Mallory and other naval 
leaders had a different vision for the CSMC, one that afforded them the operational 
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flexibility that was probably desired at that time when so many aspects of the Navy 
remained unclear and unresolved.45  Or, it may be that Mallory, unsure how the overall 
strategy would look, favored flexibility over tradition as a way of countering 
uncertainty.   
 It is one thing to create an organization on paper, but bringing that paper unit to 
life requires tangible resources.  Manning and equipping the Confederate Navy and 
Marine Corps presented a considerable challenge to Southern leaders.  Unlike the 
Confederate Army, with its access to state militias that could provide some immediate 
fighting capability and resources, the Confederate Navy initially had no assets:  no 
personnel, equipment, money or ships.  However, the requirements were immediate and 
of critical importance to the continued survival of the Confederacy.  Writing of the 
challenges Mallory faced in raising his naval force, Confederate veteran J. Thomas 
Scharf observed that “the timber for his ships stood in the forests, and when cut and laid 
was green and soft; the iron required was in the mines, and there were neither furnaces 
nor workshops; the hemp for the ropes had to be sown, grown, reaped, and then there 
were no rope walks.  .  .  .  Without a rolling mill capable of turning out a 2.5 [inch] iron 
plate, nor a workshop able to complete a marine engine, and with a pressing need to 
build, equip and maintain ships-of-war, the embarrassments and difficulties which Mr. 
Mallory encountered may be estimated.”46   
The Navy’s personnel circumstance proved equally distressful.  Mallory and his 
staff were challenged to organize, man and equip the Navy quickly, while competing 
with other organizations for its share of resources.  From its birth, the Confederate naval 
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service had a critical deficiency of qualified technical personnel.  Fortunately for the 
Confederacy, experienced individuals helped establish the Navy Department.  The first 
officers and enlisted men in the Confederate Marine Corps came essentially from three 
sources:  from the U.S. military, from politically connected Southerners seeking military 
positions, and state militia men (see Table 2-2).  Each of these sources provided the 
Confederacy with a core for what quickly became a functioning navy, a reservoir of 
persons of known capabilities, technical expertise or professional experience, yet they 
were too few in number to completely fulfill the pressing needs of the Confederacy.47   
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Table 2-2.  Confederate Marine Officers with Prior U.S. Military Service.48
Name Rank/Service Years Served CSMC Rank 
Allison, Richard Taylor Purser, USN 1849-1861 Major 
(Paymaster) 
Baker, Adam Neill 1st Lt, USMC 1853-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Beall, Lloyd James Col, USA 1826-1861 Colonel 
(Commandant) 
Gonzalez, Samuel Zacharias Storekeeper, USN 1854-1861 Major 
(Quartermaster
) 
Greene, Israel Capt, USMC 1847-1861 Major 
(Adjutant) 
Hays, Andrew Jackson 1st Lt, USMC  1847-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Holmes, George 1st Lt, USMC, USA 1849-1861 Captain 
Howell, Beckett Kempe 2nd Lt, USMC 1860-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Ingraham, Henry Laurens 2nd Lt, USMC 1858-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Meier, Julius Ernest 1st Lt, USMC 1855-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Read, Jacob Capt, USMC 1847-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Sayre, Calvin Lawrence 2nd Lt, USMC 1858-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Simms Jr., John Douglas Capt, USMC 1841-1861 Captain 
Stockton, Edward Cantey Lieutenant, USN 1849-1858 2nd Lieutenant 
Tattnall, John Rogers Capt, USMC 1847-1861 Captain 
Taylor, Algernon Sidney Capt, USMC 1839-1861 Major 
Terrett, George Hunter Major, USMC 1830-1861 Major 
Thom, Reuben Triplett 1st Lt, CSA 1846-1848 Captain 
Turner, George Pendleton 1st Lt, USMC 1856-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Tyler Sr., Henry Ball Major, USMC 1823-1861 Lieutenant 
Colonel 
Tyler Jr., Henry Ball 2nd Lt, USMC 1855-1861 1st Lieutenant 
Wilson, Thomas Smith 2nd Lt, USMC 1857-1861 1st Lieutenant 
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Recruiting became paramount.  To obtain qualified personnel, congress followed 
up its organization acts by issuing formal invitations and conducting reviews of 
unsolicited recommendations to select officers to fill the vacancies.  Experienced men 
were offered appointments, with consideration given toward the individual’s former rank 
and experience.  Also, select invitations were extended to several Southern gentlemen of 
reputable background who may have had little or no former military familiarity, but who 
were either politically connected or even personally related to senior Confederate 
government officials.49  Regardless of their source, these officers became the core of the 
CSMC during its formative first year of existence, and came to imprint it with their 
personal characteristics.    
The strong link between the prewar Union and Confederate Marine Corps has 
been noted.  Of the fifty-four officers known to have served with the CSMC between 
1861 and 1865, seventeen had served previously in the U.S. Marine Corps.50   Three 
other officers came from active service with the U.S. Navy, where they were familiar 
with Marines and their duties.  Two other officers had served previously in the U.S. 
Army:  one, Lloyd Beall, became the Colonel Commandant of the CSMC, while another, 
Reuben Thom, became a company commander.  One other officer, Alfred Van 
Benthuysen, had served as a privateer in a number of foreign armies before becoming a 
CSMC company commander.51  Not surprisingly, these former military officers entered 
key leadership billets in the new Confederate Marine Corps, thereby infusing that 
organization with their knowledge and experience.  Moreover, according to historian 
John McGlone, over one hundred enlisted Marines left the USMC and entered the 
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Confederate Marines, a factor that helped provide stability and experience within its 
enlisted ranks.52  
It is important to reiterate that several of the officers who “crossed-over” to the 
South had played key supporting roles during Commandant Henderson’s period of 
reform of the U.S. Marine Corps.  An exact degree to which Henderson’s ideals, goals, 
and influence transferred to the Confederate Marines is impossible to estimate with 
precision.  Nonetheless, it appears likely that some of Henderson’s ideas and reforms 
were infused in the Confederate Marines through the influence of these former Union 
officers, and most recognizable is Henderson’s emphasis on mastery of artillery skills, 
both afloat and ashore.  The converse is also true; the loss of these leaders’ service and 
experience to the U.S. Marine Corps probably negatively affected that service, and some 
historians attribute the loss of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers to the 
generally poor performance of the USMC during the Civil War years.53
In any event, the Confederacy began to fill the leadership vacancies in the Corps.  
On 25 March 1861, newly selected Confederate President Jefferson Davis appointed 
Reuben Triplett Thom of Fredericksburg, Virginia, to the rank of captain in the CSMC, 
granting him the distinction of being the first officer in that service.  Thom, who had 
seen previous combat service as a first lieutenant in the Alabama Regiment of Infantry 
during the Mexican War, and who had held the position of Quartermaster General of 
Alabama prior to entering the CSMC, also became the organization’s first recruiting 
officer.  Mallory directed Thom to solicit volunteers within the Montgomery area for 
what would eventually become his own company.  Although Montgomery was then the 
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capital of the Confederacy, recruiting there proved slow and unreliable:  by 29 April, 
one month after starting his assignment, Thom had only managed to enlist about twenty-
seven Marines, a far cry from the one hundred he needed for his company.54   
Four days later, Davis commissioned five more officers, two to the rank of 
captain and three as first lieutenants, all of whom had served previously in the U.S. 
Marine Corps.  Concurrently, Secretary Mallory decided to shift the organization’s 
recruiting effort to New Orleans.  One of the captains, George Holmes of Portland, 
Maine, had a wealth of military experience.  He had served with the Florida Volunteers 
during the Mexican War and later spent twelve years as an officer in the U.S. Marine 
Corps before resigning that commission only one month previous to accepting the 
CSMC appointment.  Mallory ordered Captain Holmes and newly commissioned First 
Lieutenant Beckett K. Howell, who also recently resigned as a second lieutenant in the 
U.S. Marine Corps, to proceed to New Orleans for recruiting duty.55
On 30 March, Davis commissioned another captain of Marines, Alfred Crippen 
Van Benthuysen, a native of New Orleans who, like Howell, was also related to 
President Davis.  That same day, Mallory ordered Captain Van Benthuysen to “proceed 
to New Orleans and report to Captain George Holmes . . . for recruiting duty.”  Although 
Van Benthuysen had not previously served in the U.S. military, he had led a colorful 
life.  Prior to being appointed to the CSMC, it appears that he had seen combat in China 
during the Tai-Ping Rebellion of 1857-58, and had also served on the staff of Guiseppe 
Garibaldi’s army during its campaigns in Italy in 1860.56   Counting Captain Van 
Benthuysen, the CSMC now had almost half of the active officers it needed to fill its 
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rolls, and three of its future company commanders, with most of their effort focused on 
recruiting enlisted men around New Orleans.   
Enlistment proved fruitful in the Crescent City.  About 280 Marines were 
enlisted in or around New Orleans between 10 April and 29 June 1861, a period of less 
than three months.  Since each company consisted of about one hundred enlisted men, 
recruits from New Orleans filled out the majority of three complete companies, about 
half of the six companies originally authorized by the Confederate Congress.  Therefore, 
enlistees from New Orleans were over represented in the CSMC, particularly during the 
first year of the war.  In fact, since the overall strength of the CSMC at the close of 1861 
totaled approximately 350 men, New Orleans Marines constituted about 80 percent of 
the Corps’ total strength at the end of the first year of the war.  Despite this apparent 
success, Mallory seemed dissatisfied with the pace of recruiting, and instead 
complained, “the whole number of marines as authorized by law has not yet been 
obtained.”57  He blamed the perceived lack of progress on the level of competition 
caused by concurrent efforts of the Confederate army, and the state militias of both 
Alabama and Louisiana to recruit in the same cities at the same time.58  
Mallory’s disappointment aside, analysis of CSMC recruiting and retention 
indicate it experienced success under the conditions it had to operate in.  Although the 
total strength of the CSMC most likely never exceeded 600 Marines at any time, its size 
remained fairly consistent and its personnel served both afloat and ashore at practically 
any location where the Confederate Navy engaged Union forces.  Indeed, as the war 
dragged on and many army regiments decreased in size, the CSMC actually increased in 
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personnel strength until the very end, when combat actions and disintegration of 
governmental functions took their toll.59  Considering the difficulties, the CSMC in fact 
did comparatively well in manning and maintaining its level of personnel throughout the 
war.    
Events soon occurred making the task of fielding operational units a priority of 
Confederate leaders and provided an opportunity for the CSMC.  On 12 April 1861, 
Southern forces under the command of General Pierre G. T. Beauregard opened fire on 
Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, causing the Union garrison there to surrender the next 
day.  The war had started.  Confederate leadership now focused its attention on the only 
remaining Union stronghold in the South:  Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida.  On 24 
April, Secretary Mallory directed the commander of the first operational Marine 
company, Captain Van Benthuysen, to proceed with his men to the Warrington Navy 
Yard, opposite Fort Pickens.  In an exhibition of readiness, Van Benthuysen’s company, 
soon to be designated as Company B, departed New Orleans by steamship that same 
evening, and arrived in Pensacola two days later on the evening of the 26th, through a 
combination of steamship, rail and foot transport.  On arrival, Van Benthuysen reported 
for duty to Beauregard, who placed him “in charge of a heavy battery in front of Fort 
Pickens.”60  The New Orleans Delta reported that Van Benthuysen’s company occupied 
front-line combat positions along the left flank of the Confederate defenses, indicating 
the importance of their assignment.  Van Benthuysen’s company, now one of the first 
units committed to the Pensacola – Fort Pickens area, improved on the existing 
fortifications, trained in naval artillery and infantry skills, and prepared for combat.61    
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Meanwhile, recruits continued to trickle in fill CSMC vacancies in New Orleans.  
The companies began to take shape, and CSMC officers organized and began to train 
their men.  As companies became operational, they were ordered to the front to help 
augment forces already there.  On 12 May, Lieutenant Howell escorted a contingent of 
about 150 more Marines from New Orleans to Pensacola, where they joined what 
Secretary Mallory now described in reports as a Marine battalion, commanded by 
Captain Van Benthuysen.  By 24 May, the battalion contained about 320 Marines 
organized into three companies, each involved in training or operating around Pensacola.  
At this time, Captain Holmes commanded Company A; First Lieutenant Henry Laurens 
Ingraham (another former USMC officer who received his commission in the CSMC 
with Holmes and Howell on 29 March) commanded Company B while Van Benthuysen 
led the battalion; and Captain Thom commanded Company C.  Mallory then issued Van 
Benthuysen some general directions concerning the welfare of the Marines and granted 
him authority to arrange billeting, requisition arms, and draw clothing and supplies for 
the battalion.  He also directed Van Benthuysen to “see that the Marines are so 
instructed and drilled in the use of their arms as to make them efficient soldiers in the 
shortest time.”62   
The Marine battalion in Pensacola drew other assignments.  Twelve Marines 
from Company B were detached to serve aboard the transport steamer CSS Time, which 
helped protect the Confederate positions around Pensacola harbor.  Marines were also 
dispatched to protect the naval stores at the railroad depot.  Moreover, to discourage 
Union attempts to infiltrate Confederate positions, Bragg instituted a harbor patrol to 
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conduct picket duty in the water at night.  That patrol, equipped with two small boats, 
consisted of a small force of thirteen Marines and several sailors.  Additionally, when 
the Confederate Navy placed the bark-rigged screw steam cruiser Sumter (formerly the 
merchant steamship Habana) into military service on 3 June, Van Benthuysen detailed 
Lieutenant Howell and twenty Marines to serve as the ship’s detachment aboard that 
vessel.63  The CSMC had committed its first effective, provisional battalion of the war. 
With an active battalion engaged against Fort Pickens, Mallory foresaw a 
requirement to expand the CSMC to meet its commitments.  Following the secession of 
four states of the Upper South and the subsequent expansion of the Confederacy, and at 
Mallory’s specific request, congress expanded the Confederate States Marine Corps’ 
organization with an amendatory act on 20 May 1861.  This “Act to Enlarge the Marine 
Corps” authorized a total strength of forty-nine officers and 944 enlisted men (see Figure 
2-3).  Although earlier studies of the CSMC have noted that the new structure was 
“similar to those authorized for an army ten-company regiment,” there is more to it than 
that.64  The organization structure of the expanded CSMC contained important 
differences that went beyond a superficial similarity with a Confederate Army regiment.  
Building off of earlier similarities between the first iteration of the CSMC and existing 
Confederate army regiments, the corps’ new regimental structure continued to diverge 
from the familiar USMC organization, and those differences provide clues that point to 
the way that Confederate leaders envisioned employing their Marines.  
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Figure 2-3.  Expanded CSMC Structure, 21 May 1861.65
The reorganization act, while expanding the Corps to a regimental-sized unit, 
maintained the company as its base unit, evidence that leaders valued the flexibility that 
the company offered as a concept of employment.  However, other important 
refinements were included in the new structure that both acknowledged and supported 
the CSMC’s capabilities to employ as even smaller units:  as detachments for service 
aboard navy ships and stations.  The new organization increased the numbers of 
lieutenants and non-commissioned officers in each of the companies, giving those units 
a sufficient number of small-unit leaders to both facilitate the creation of separate 
detachments and provide for adequate supervision of the men while serving away from 
the direct control of the company commander.  Although this newer table of 
organization did not specify an intermediate battalion level of command, the CSMC 
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continued to form and employ battalions throughout the war, often assigning persons 
from within the regimental headquarters to fill required battalion command and 
administrative positions.66  This structure allowed the leaders to frequently shape and 
reallocate their personnel situation to match their operational requirements, an efficient 
and frugal way of maximizing their personnel resources.  
The expansion act also authorized a billet for a Colonel Commandant, filled three 
days later through the appointment of Colonel Lloyd J. Beall.  After assuming command, 
Beall soon forwarded several recommendations for further adjustments to be made to the 
corps’ structure, citing increased requirements for the extended deployment of Marines 
afloat.  Beall specifically requested that more noncommissioned officers be added to the 
table of organization to enhance the leadership, supervision and training capability of 
small, detached elements, particularly during extended deployments.  Specifically, Beall 
argued that “having found by experience that the peculiar service of marines requires a 
larger proportion of noncommissioned officers and musicians than the land service, from 
the fact that the Corps is liable to be divided up into small detachments as guards on 
board of ships and at naval stations, and that these guards are not complete without one 
or two noncommissioned officers and a musician to each.”67  Congress, facing national 
shortages in manpower, quite naturally hesitated to accede to these requests for more 
small-unit leaders, but with Mallory’s vigorous support many of these recommendations 
for increased structure were nonetheless adopted in later amendatory acts to the corps’ 
structure (see Figure 2-4).  Mallory also supported the addition of several civilian staff to 
the headquarters of the CSMC, improving the overall command and control capability.68  
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These increases in structure in the face of national shortages indicate a validation of the 
requirement for more Marines, regardless of the pressures applied by competing 
services. 
 
Figure 2-4. Further Expansion of the CSMC Structure, 24 September 1862.69
A new wave of officer accessions helped fill the ranks of the expanded 
Confederate Marine Corps.  On 26 July 1861, newly commissioned Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry B. Tyler, Sr., reported for duty in Pensacola and assumed command of the Marine 
battalion.  Only recently resigning his commission as a U.S. Marine major, Tyler had 
served that organization for thirty-eight years.  He had most recently held the post of 
Adjutant and Inspector, one of the Marine Corps most senior and influential positions, a 
posting that placed him in close proximity to Commandant Henderson.  In that post, 
Tyler had responsibilities related to the implementation of many of Henderson’s reforms 
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and initiatives.  Now, in the service of the Confederate Marine Commandant, Tyler 
applied his expertise to continue to train and prepare the men of the CSMC battalion, 
while concurrently fulfilling required duties in the battle lines around Fort Pickens.70  
Other former U.S. Marines were also inducted into key positions in the newly 
expanded Marine Corps.  George Terrett, recently the commanding officer of the Marine 
Barracks in Washington, D.C., and thirty-one year veteran, received a commission as a 
line major on 20 June 1861.  Israel Greene, who had led the USMC detachment in the 
famous and successful operation against John Brown at Harper’s Ferry, and former 
Instructor of Artillery, received an appointment as a captain on 30 June 1861.  Soon 
after, Greene received a promotion to major and assumed the post of Adjutant and 
Inspector for the CSMC.  John Simms, a twenty-year veteran of the USMC who served 
in the War with Mexico and led a battalion in the assault at Chapultepec, among other 
distinctions, received a commission as a captain on 15 July 1861.  Other former Marines 
moved into vacant leadership billets, raised new companies, and began to train for the 
fights that were soon to come.  By the end of the first year of the war, the CSMC had a 
robust organization filled with motivated Marines and led by capable, experienced 
combat veterans.71  
 By the end of 1861, the Confederacy possessed a Marine Corps comprised of 
three companies and a battalion staff, which had already engaged in combat with the 
enemy and continued to gain operational experience with each passing day.  Its senior 
leadership, both civilian and military, exercised a form of command and control that 
provided centralized direction and guidance, yet relied on the imagination, initiative and 
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judgment of its subordinate leaders to accomplish assigned missions.  The individual 
companies and detachments were well led by persons possessed of a wealth of 
experience in the military.  As an advantage, these leaders understood the tactics, 
operations, and capabilities of their enemy well, yet were not bound to the same 
limitations. 
The CSMC possessed a new and unique form of organization that made it 
flexible and responsive to changing operational requirements.  Naval leaders developed 
a concept of employment for the corps that allowed them multiple options in fielding 
forces to meet ever-changing situations.  Mallory possessed a combat unit that could be 
employed throughout the South as an economy of force measure, yet could also be 
concentrated at a single location if the threat warranted.  More importantly, the 
leadership of the CSMC, at all levels, embraced new technologies, inventions and 
procedures, and leaned into the future of warfare, not away from it.  As Mallory built his 
navy with new weapons and ships, the CSMC stood ready and willing to integrate itself 
into the fight.  At the small unit level, new leaders were trained and developed, and men 
of all ranks infused with an esprit de corps that could be traced directly to the days of 
Archibald Henderson.  As the CSMC continued to expand, it also became increasingly 
engaged with the enemy and consequently redeployed, concentrated and relocated its 
elements as necessary to meet the national demands for its service.  
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CHAPTER III 
CHANGING ROLES AND MISSIONS 
 
 Around 6:30 A.M. on Thursday, 15 May 1862, a flotilla of Federal gunboats 
approached the last major turn in the James River before a stretch of about six miles of 
straight water that penetrated the heart of the Confederate capital of Richmond (see 
Figure 3-1).  The five Union Navy vessels, under the command of Commodore John 
Rodgers, had spent the last five days fighting upriver past Confederate batteries and 
positions in a bold attempt to penetrate Richmond’s defenses and “shell the city to a 
surrender.”1  Rodgers led his force from the deck of his flagship, the ironclad Galena, 
with the remainder following in a line-ahead formation.  The formidable Monitor, fresh 
from its famous engagement with the Confederate ironclad Virginia (formerly 
Merrimack) steamed in trace of the Galena.  Behind the Monitor came the ironclad 
Stevens Battery (or Revenue Steamer E.A. Stevens, also Naugatuck), and finally two 
wooden gunboats, the Aroostock and the Port Royal.  The Federal sailors had high 
morale and anticipated a quick victory, perhaps one that would lead to the capture of 
Richmond.2   
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Figure 3-1.  Drewry’s Bluff and the James River South of Richmond.3
As the ships began to negotiate the bend in the river, Confederate Marines 
concealed in prepared positions along both banks opened fire with their rifles on the 
vessels, driving the Union sailors to seek shelter inside the hulls of their ships to avoid 
being hit.  Galena pushed forward, but a series of obstacles that had been hastily 
emplaced by Confederates impeded her progress, forcing her to halt about 400 yards 
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from the obstructions.  As soon as the Union ships stopped, Confederate shore batteries 
commenced fire on the concentrated vessels.  The first shot penetrated the Galena’s hull 
armor at the port bow, wounding two sailors.  The second shot also pierced her armor, 
killing one sailor and injuring three more.  Subsequent shots by the Confederate batteries 
pounded the flagship, inflicting heavy damage on her equipment and personnel.4  
To draw fire from the Galena and to bring its own guns into action, the Monitor 
moved alongside the flagship and both Union ships returned fire on the entrenched 
Confederate positions.  Due to the location of the Confederate batteries, sited on bluffs 
that towered about eighty feet above the river’s surface, the Union ships had great 
difficulty elevating their guns to the point where they could hit enemy positions.  In 
particular, the Monitor’s crew found they could elevate their guns but a few degrees, 
making them relatively useless in engaging the bluff batteries.  As a result, most of the 
Union fires proved ineffective against the Confederate guns.  Less than four hours after 
the engagement began, all five Federal ships had been damaged, with the Galena 
suffering the most, and the situation forced Rodgers to give the order to withdraw (see 
Figure 3-2).5  The small Confederate defensive force had gained a timely victory over 
the Union Navy and protected its capital from bombardment. 
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Figure 3-2.  Contemporary Drawing Depicting  
“Balloon View” of the Drewry’s Bluff Engagement.6
 The Confederate defense at Drewry’s Bluff is but one of many actions that 
Confederate States Marines participated in, yet the various roles the Marines played in 
this one engagement contributed significantly toward the South’s winning a victory in 
that fight.  This chapter explores some of the various ways in which the Confederate 
Navy employed the Confederate States Marine Corps, particularly how the CSMC 
departed from traditional roles and missions practiced by its counterpart, the U.S. Marine 
Corps, and filled new ones.  In this chapter, role is defined as “a specific task or 
function,” assigned to a service, and mission defined as “a duty assigned to an individual 
or unit.”  The term tactics is related to procedures and techniques, involving the 
“employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other” using both 
“standard, detailed steps” and “non-prescriptive ways or methods to perform missions, 
functions, or tasks” in battle.7    
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As naval forces modernized for war, the changes dictated new requirements for 
the employment of Marines, and a concomitant need for different tactics to gain 
advantage over an enemy.  The Confederate Marines, to a greater degree than their 
Northern counterparts, built on ideas and concepts already in gestation during 
Commandant Henderson’s tenure, and even expanded their capabilities into new areas.  
Successes on the proving grounds of combat made the CSMC an integral part of the 
Confederate Navy and consequently their services became sought after for difficult 
assignments.   Confederate Marines also developed and adopted innovative tactics to 
deal with the new challenges of naval warfare in the age of ironclads.  The roles and 
missions of the CSMC expanded as a result.  The CSMC seized every opportunity to 
develop new tactics to gain advantage over their enemy, adapted old tactics to better use, 
and conducted operations that reflect their flexibility and adaptability. 
Before discussing ways that the Confederate Marines differed from their 
Northern cousins, it is first necessary to clearly identify what the traditional roles and 
missions of Marines were prior to the start of the Civil War.  Since its inception as the 
Continental Marines in 1775, Marines were normally assigned to duties both afloat and 
ashore under the operational command of the navy.  Afloat, Marine detachments were 
assigned aboard select naval vessels, where they served as a guard force for the ship’s 
officers and performed various security functions.  In combat, Marines were often posted 
to the “fighting tops,” positioning themselves in the ship’s rigging, from which they 
could engage the officers and gunners of enemy ships with their rifles and marksmanship 
skills.  In this role, Marines attempted to kill enemy officers or gunners, thereby 
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disrupting the enemy’s command and control capability or reducing the effectiveness of 
enemy fires.  When required, ship’s Marines also formed the nucleus of landing parties, 
task organized units formed when needed to attack shore batteries or enemy positions 
depending on the tactical situation ashore.  In port, Marines typically stationed guards to 
control access to the ship and prevent desertion of sailors, being in effect the security 
force for the ship.8      
 Ashore, Marines were assigned to guard naval bases and installations.  In this 
role the Marines were typically organized into garrison units called Marine Barracks, 
commanded by a major.  Guard shifts were organized to meet the requirements of the 
post.  On occasion, barracks Marines were utilized for civil functions, such as quelling 
civil disturbances.  For example, in the summer of 1857, Marines from the barracks in 
Washington, D.C., were deployed in reaction to disturbances in that city caused by 
violent activities of members of the anti-immigrant “Know-Nothing” party.  The 
Marines were dispatched to break up the mobs and restore order through a show of 
force.  In much the same fashion, battalion-sized units were sometimes formed out of 
barracks and detachment Marines, and deployed primarily as ad hoc infantry units that 
served alongside army units.  This concept saw first use in the Seminole War, but proved 
effective during the Mexican War as well, where Marines gained fame for fighting in the 
“Halls of Montezuma.”9
 In the first half of the nineteenth century a revolution in naval technology took 
place in the American Navy that brought with it new methods of naval warfare.  These 
changes, accelerated by the war itself, affected the way naval battles were fought as the 
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capabilities of navy ships increased.  As naval forces employed these capabilities, 
Marines had to change their traditional roles and missions or risk becoming irrelevant.  
New tactics were needed that could deal with the problems of fighting ironclad navies.  
The transition from sail to steam, the increased use of iron and armor plating in ship 
construction, and the development of longer range, and more accurate naval artillery 
brought with it new opportunities for Marines.  The increased use of armor plating on 
ships and the longer ranges of engagement made possible by new innovations in artillery 
rendered the stationing of Marines in the rigging as obsolete as the rigging itself would 
become.  Additionally, naval reforms increased the morale of sailors and thereby 
reduced the incidence of crew mutinies, consequently diminishing the need for Marines 
to enforce order and discipline aboard ship.  The combat role of Marines afloat had to 
adapt with the times.  Anticipating these changes, Commandant Archibald Henderson 
proposed in 1823 that Marines also be trained in artillery so that they could both man 
ships’ guns while afloat and provide increased combat capability for landing forces 
ashore, a mission that Marines would undertake with increasing frequency throughout 
the 1850s.  During that decade, artillery went ashore with landing parties on at least nine 
occasions, and in one year (1854), artillery deployed with landing forces during three 
occasions.  Henderson’s intention that Marines be equipped with organic artillery to 
provide landing parties with greater firepower proved a prescient concept, and predated 
the development of amphibious tactics in the early twentieth century.  Because of 
Henderson’s reforms, most Marines routinely received training in naval artillery before 
the Civil War, and were often assigned duties afloat with a ship’s gun batteries.10  Under 
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Henderson’s tutelage, the U.S. Marines had developed a reputation as skilled gunners, a 
role that caused some naval officers to increasingly value their services afloat.   
Surprisingly, following the outbreak of war in 1861, the Marine Corps seemed to 
split on its role as naval artillerymen, and that split seemed to follow along sectional 
lines.  Many of the officers who resigned to join the Confederate Marine Corps had 
earlier been instrumental in implementing Henderson’s reforms, particularly those 
involving artillery training and employment, and it is probable that their experiences 
compelled some of them to continue that role within the CSMC.  For example, the U.S. 
Marine Corps’ longtime Adjutant and Inspector, Major Henry Tyler, Sr., of Virginia; the 
commander of the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., Major George Terrett of 
Virginia; the Corps’ first artillery instructor, Captain Israel Greene of New York; and 
other key officers involved in the training of Marines resigned their commissions and 
joined the CSMC.  Conversely, after the outbreak of war U.S. Marine leaders seemed 
divided on their roles in support of the Navy, with some leaders openly withholding their 
Marines from manning guns or performing other duties afloat.11
During the Civil War, the Union employed the USMC primarily in three ways:  
as guards serving in Marine barracks at various naval shore installations, as Marine 
detachments serving aboard select naval vessels, and as infantrymen in ad hoc 
battalions.  The first two roles are long-standing and traditional.  The few U.S. Marine 
battalions that were formed spent much of their existence being transported from one 
location to another awaiting use as part of a landing force, or were committed alongside 
army troops.  Historian Allan Millett, in his analysis of the small number of times these 
83 
 
 
battalions were employed, stated that their operations in that role “were marked by 
minimal success.”12  Marines’ service while guarding naval installations was so 
traditional that naval officers took it for granted.  Of course, it constituted a support role, 
not a combat role entailing direct contact with enemy forces.  Afloat, Federal Marines 
performed several functions, the most notable being their manning of a ships’ main or 
secondary gun batteries.  However, some Marine officers resisted or refused to allow 
their Marines to man ship’s guns.  On at least one occasion, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps became personally involved by censuring a captain who refused to have 
his men serve selected guns aboard ship.  Although USMC detachments performed well 
as naval gunners in some of the Union Navy’s most famous wartime engagements, it 
also appears that not all U.S. Marine officers appreciated or wanted to continue such a 
means of supporting the Navy while afloat.  In fact, some senior USMC officers 
questioned the need to retain close relations between the Navy and Marine Corps at all, 
causing the Commandant to again intervene on the behalf of the Navy.  After receiving 
complaints from a commander of a naval base about lack of support from Marines, the 
Marine Commandant personally admonished the commander of that base’s Marine 
Barracks for being “unwilling to be associated with the Navy,” and directed him to be 
more cooperative in the future.  Painfully aware of efforts underway in Congress at the 
time to transfer the USMC to the Army, such episodes only fanned the flames of 
institutional dissatisfaction with the Corps and further forced the commandant to take 
direct steps to improve the spirit of cooperation between the two naval services.13  In any 
event, some USMC officers questioned the role of Marines, particularly while afloat on 
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Navy ships.  With most Marines serving in ad hoc infantry-type battalions afloat waiting 
for possible duty as part of a landing party, some dilution of their active participation as 
ship’s company must have occurred.  The result appeared to be an emphasis on the U.S. 
Marine Corps’ role as infantry, and a deemphasizing of their role as naval artillerists.   
With Northern Marines seeming to favor employment in infantry-type roles, the 
Southern Marines embraced both infantry and artillery roles, and some of their units 
even shifted between these roles as required by the situation.  In general, CSMC units 
also transitioned seamlessly between duties afloat and ashore, and this agility made them 
more valuable to squadron commanders who operated predominantly from bases in the 
littorals.  In this regard, the engagement at Drewry’s Bluff on 15 May 1862 provides a 
good case study of the versatility of the CSMC in combat.  Analysis of the engagement 
and, in particular, the contributions of the Marines offers scholars an understanding of 
the versatility of the operational and tactical capabilities of the CSMC at a relatively 
early stage in its existence.  It also documents CSMC contributions to the war effort in 
several distinctly different roles.  A Marine battalion was rapidly constituted from 
various ships and stations and recommitted into combat under strict time constraints.  
The rapidity with which the Marine leaders reorganized their forces validates the 
effectiveness of their organizational model.  In a show of efficiency and flexibility, 
various ships’ detachments flowed back into their parent companies, and the companies 
joined an ad hoc battalion formation, providing them a clear and unambiguous command 
and control structure.  And, in this one engagement, Marines served as both infantrymen 
and naval artillerists, the latter mission conducted from batteries located both afloat and 
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ashore.  Marines also assisted in the construction of fighting positions and obstacles 
within the defensive area, helping provide two engineering elements that proved vital to 
the success of the defensive operation.  Additionally, some of the units shifted from one 
role to another, or from service afloat to service ashore, without any apparent loss in 
capability.  Throughout, all of their actions were integrated into the overall plan of 
action, with the central purpose of defeating the Union naval force and halt its advance 
up the James River. 
The Confederates earned a timely victory at Drewry’s Bluff, and the CSMC 
participated in that success.  Despite pressing time limitations caused by the Union 
force’s advance up the James River, the Confederate defenders managed to concentrate 
their previously scattered forces on select features of key terrain, shook off the effect of 
some recent tactical setbacks, and dove with fierce determination into the mission of 
saving their capital from direct attack.  They quickly formulated a plan that focused their 
strengths in such a way as to best attack the enemy’s weaknesses, and then went right 
into the execution of that plan while still retreating from enemy action.  Under pressure 
of the enemy’s advance, the defenders nonetheless constructed effective obstacles to halt 
the enemy at a precise point where they could then engage them with their weapons.  
The defenders planned their fires according to modern combined arms concepts designed 
to place the enemy in a dilemma, giving the Union gunboats no options for success.  The 
location selected for the defense also offered several advantages to the Confederate 
forces:  the topography of Drewry’s Bluff allowed Confederate batteries to engage 
approaching Union gunboats at close range, giving them the advantage of surprise; and 
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the heights of the bluffs allowed the defenders to engage the enemy with both direct and 
plunging fires.  To add depth and flexibility to their fires, the defenders incorporated two 
complementary combat arms elements:  they integrated naval vessels into the plan, siting 
them upstream where they could provide enfilading fires on the Union ship formation as 
it negotiated the bend; and they stationed a battalion of Marine sharpshooters along both 
banks.  Finally, the close proximity of Drewry’s Bluff to the last major bend in the river 
before Richmond alternately protected the Confederate positions from long-range 
observation or fires, and denied the Union attackers the favorable use of their longer-
range artillery.14   
The defenders designed and constructed the obstacle belt to defeat the Union 
Navy’s greatest strength, its mobility.  Moreover, they deliberately located the line of 
obstructions out of sight of the Union ships until they came out of the bend in the river, 
and where it would halt Federal ships at the exact position where Confederate fires could 
be massed from all batteries (see Figure 3-3).  Although the Confederates had identified 
the requirement for obstacles on the James River several months previously, little work 
had been accomplished as late as 28 April.  A series of Confederate setbacks such as the 
evacuation of Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard on 10 May and the surprise scuttling of the 
CSS Virginia on 12 May soon added a sense of urgency and even desperation to the 
situation.  With the Confederate capital literally open to attack up the James River, 
Confederate leaders committed all available forces to the defense of Drewry’s Bluff.  
Under pressure from Congress to “defend [Richmond] to the last extremity,”15 Secretary 
Mallory ordered Commander Ebenezer Farrand, CSN, to pursue an aggressive 
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engineering effort to finish the construction of an effective obstacle belt across the river 
in the shortest time possible.  As panic hit Richmond and prominent Confederates 
relocated their families and belongings to safer cities, a relatively small collection of 
sailors, Marines and militiamen converged on Drewry’s Bluff to attempt to accomplish 
what the Confederate Navy had so far failed to do:  stop the advance of the Union 
Navy.16   
 
Figure 3-3.  Sketch of the Obstacle Belt at Drewry’s Bluff, Virginia.17
The CSMC played a central part in preparing for the engagement by helping to 
site and construct gun positions, prepare infantry firing positions, and construct the 
obstacle belt.  With most of the manpower coming from naval sources, Secretary of the 
Navy Stephen Mallory placed Confederate Navy Commander Ebenezer Farrand, in 
88 
 
 
overall command of the Drewry’s Bluff position, thereby investing joint command of the 
defense in one person.  Mallory also ordered the crew of the Virginia and all surviving 
vessels of the James River Squadron (including the CSS Patrick Henry and CSS 
Jamestown) to proceed to Drewry’s Bluff to augment Farrand.  Fortunately for Farrand, 
the two Virginia militia artillery batteries already in place at Drewry’s Bluff were under 
the command of Colonel Robert Tansill, late of the USMC and holder of a dual 
commission as a captain in the CSMC and a Colonel (Artillery) in the Virginia militia.  
By all indications, the two commanders cooperated closely on all matters.  To strengthen 
the artillery capability on the bluffs, the naval artillery pieces from the scuttled 
Jamestown and Virginia were emplaced as shore batteries.  Farrand also ordered one 
piece of artillery from the Patrick Henry dismounted and added to the bluff batteries to 
provide reinforcing fires.  The Marines that had been assigned to those ships, all of 
whom had seen recent combat service as gunners afloat during the naval engagements at 
Hampton Roads, continued to man their guns, whether those pieces were now positioned 
afloat on the Patrick Henry or ashore on the bluffs.  Additionally, two Marine companies 
were ordered to Drewry’s Bluff and organized into a provisional infantry battalion.  
Farrand assigned the Marine battalion the mission of providing coordinated, close 
protection for the shore batteries.  To accomplish this, the Marines constructed prepared 
fighting positions along the riverbanks from which they could fire on exposed Union 
officers or sailors, or repel any Federal attempts to land troops.18  
Soldiers, sailors, Marines and civilians not required for strengthening of the 
battery positions were assigned to assist in the construction of the obstacle belt.  Work 
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crews constructed wooden cribs out of timber framing and the cribs were placed 
approximately two hundred feet apart across the width of the river.  Once in position, the 
cribs were then filled with rocks until they sank into the mud.  The cribs were 
manufactured so that their height, when submerged, came to a level just below the 
surface of the water at the low water level.  This made the cribs difficult to detect until 
the enemy was almost upon them.  Steam pile drivers were employed to drive wooden 
poles into the river bottom to reinforce the obstacle belt.  Farrand’s men then filled gaps 
in the pattern formed by the submerged rock cribs and pilings by sinking the sloop 
Thomas Jefferson, the steamer CSS Jamestown, and several smaller ships brought down 
from Richmond for that express purpose.  According to participant Robert Wright, “the 
Jamestown was sunk lengthwise in the channel [with] her bow standing up the river.  
Canal boats, laden with stone, the steamer Curtis Peck and the steamboat Northhampton 
were sunk outside of the piles, thus making a very strong blockade” (see Figure 3-4).19  
To make it more difficult for the enemy to attempt to move or dislodge the wrecks, the 
hulls of the scuttled ships were chained together prior to their sinking.  Working around 
the clock for days on end, by the evening of 14 May the defenders had succeeded in 
creating one solid line of obstacles that extended across the James River from one bank 
to the other.20   
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Figure 3-4.  Visible Wrecks Outlining the Obstacle Belt.21
After completing the obstacle belt and emplacing the shore batteries, the 
defenders had effectively created an efficient and deadly kill zone into which they hoped 
to trap the Union force.  And, once the Union forces entered that trap and commenced 
firing, another factor became apparent that made the Union Navy’s situation even worse.  
Opening fire, the Federals discovered that the obstacles stopped their flotilla at a position 
in the river where their ships’ guns could not be elevated to the degree where they could 
engage the Confederate batteries sited on the higher bluffs (see Figure 3-5).  In 
particular, Union Navy Lieutenant William Jeffers, commanding officer of the Monitor, 
reported that after pulling up next to the Galena “to take off some of the fire” directed at 
that ship, “found that my guns could not be elevated sufficiently to point at the fort.”  
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Conversely, the Confederates were able to deliver accurate plunging fires that achieved 
great effect on the thinner, more vulnerable upper decks of the Union ships.22   
 
Figure 3-5.  View of Drewry’s Bluff from across the James River.23
At this stage in the war, ironclads still retained an aura of invincibility, and the 
Galena, as yet an unknown and untested factor, nonetheless presented a formidable 
façade that caused great concern to the Confederates.  Northern scientists had 
proclaimed the Galena’s unique armor design as “impregnable.”24  However, once the 
firing started, Confederate rounds began to penetrate the Galena’s hull and decks with 
an ease that surprised and alarmed the Union sailors manning that ship.  The first two 
rounds fired by Confederates penetrated the armor at the port bow, killed one sailor 
immediately and wounded five more.   The longer the Confederates engaged it, the more 
they were able to see that their shots were having effect.  Some hits penetrated the 
Galena’s armor more than once, causing even greater damage to the ship.  An account 
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by one Confederate gunner, Sergeant Samuel Mann, described an impact thus:  “shot 
could be seen coming out of and tearing up her deck, after glancing up, having been 
deflected from something inside of her hull.”  Shots began to pierce the armor with 
shocking regularity.  Finally, at about 11:05 A.M., a round fired from the Patrick 
Henry’s 8-inch smoothbore pierced the armor of the Galena at her now battered port 
bow, and smoke soon began to billow from her gun ports, indicating a fire on board the 
ironclad.  Within minutes following that hit, the Galena “signaled a withdrawal from 
action, slipped her cables and retired”25 back down the James, accompanied by small 
arms fires and “three hurrahs” from delighted Confederates along both banks.  One 
Confederate heckler, having served previously with the commander of the Monitor, 
shouted to the crew of that retreating ship to “Tell Captain Jeffers that is not the way to 
Richmond.”26  The defeat of the Union Navy’s drive was complete.  If, as historian Kurt 
Hackemer indicates, “the Galena gave Union forces in the James River a psychological 
edge” before the engagement, her defeat transferred some of that edge to the 
Confederates.27      
Other factors also combined to defeat the Union Navy’s drive to Richmond.  
Before, during and after the battle, to further increase the dilemma of the attackers, 
Confederate Marine sharpshooters maneuvered along fighting positions located on the 
banks of the river, delivering a deadly accurate and concentrated fire on Union gunners, 
artillery observers, helmsmen, and any person who attempted to venture on deck.  Even 
prior to the Union flotilla rounding the bend and entering the trap, sharpshooters shot 
and killed a sailor from the Galena who attempted to take depth soundings.   And, in a 
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departure from the tradition of fighting from stationary positions in the “fighting tops,” 
the Marine sharpshooters maneuvered from one prepared position to another to gain 
further advantage over their enemy.  Their fires forced Federal officers, sailors and 
Marines to ‘button up’ and remain out of sight behind the protection of the ships’ armor 
to prevent being shot.  This effectively reduced the Federals’ visibility, and consequently 
limited their abilities to maneuver or accurately adjust fires.  It also forced the sailors to 
physically suffer from the prolonged oppressive effects of being bottled up within the 
confines of the ironclad.  A veteran of the Monitor, Paymaster William Keeler, described 
the situation thus:  “Not a man could shew (sic) himself on deck without a ball whizzing 
by him.  A man on the Galena who was sounding was badly wounded & one passed 
between my legs & another just over Lt. Greene’s head.”28  Keeler’s shipmate, Navy 
Lieutenant S. D. Greene, also described the harsh environment within the ironclad:  
“Probably no ship was ever devised which was so uncomfortable for her crew, and 
certainly no sailor ever led a more disagreeable life than we did on the James River, 
suffocated with heat and bad air if we remained below, and a target for sharp-shooters if 
we came on deck.”29  Essentially, the sharpshooters trapped the crewmen within their 
own hull, subjecting them to that oppressive and confined atmosphere. 
Confederate Marine sharpshooters also severely wounded the captain of the Port 
Royal, removing him from the action early.  The steady, accurate fires of the Marines 
frustrated several Federal attempts to breach the river obstacles through use of 
explosives or grappling hooks, and prevented the Union forces from landing troops that 
might have flanked Confederate artillery positions.  The sharpshooters proved so 
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effective that Captain Charles Wilkes, commander of the Federal Navy’s James River 
Flotilla, recommended after Drewry’s Bluff that Union forces develop rocket batteries or 
similar shipboard weaponry that might “prove effective in driving the sharpshooters out 
of the woods,” and minimize their threat to ships during riverine operations.  At 
Drewry’s Bluff the Union dilemma proved complete:  they could not move forward, 
could not remain where they were, and their attempts to counter one of the Confederate 
threats exposed them to the fires of another.  With no other options, the Union navy 
retreated from the engagement, leaving the Confederates in control of the upper James 
for almost three more years.30   
 In the end, the Confederate defense at Drewry’s Bluff played a major part in 
halting the Federal advance on Richmond using the James River approach.  One reason 
for its success was the performance of the Marines in several distinct roles:  as infantry, 
and as artillerists, both afloat and ashore.  Moreover, the CSMC’s role at Drewry’s Bluff 
is not the only instance of such versatility, but rather one of several examples of its 
operating in multiple roles that illustrate its value and relevance to the Confederacy.  
And, more importantly, the nature of its fulfilling multiple roles further differentiated its 
service from that of the USMC.   
Its Drewry’s Bluff service has been discussed here, yet Marines performed other 
roles and missions as well.  The Civil War provided the CSMC with many opportunities 
to expand its tactical development outside their previous traditional Marine Corps roles 
and missions, allowing it to develop into a more flexible and adaptable force that could 
be employed in a broader range of assignments.  Southern Marines adapted well to the 
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challenges of the war.  As a result, they honed their new skills to a fine edge, in the 
process refining their tactics and procedures to accomplish new combat missions, and 
some of them fell within the parameters of special operations.  Furthermore, the 
Confederate Marines executed their missions to the same exacting standards of planning, 
training and preparation.   
One of the new missions that Confederate Marines became increasingly involved 
in was participating in specialized raids.  Although Marines had participated in 
conventional raiding actions from the very beginning of the war, conducting a raid on 
Ship Island as early as July 1861, and at Santa Rosa Island on 9 October 1861, as the 
war ground on, the CSMC began to increasingly be called on to participate in several 
highly specialized raids against a wide variety of enemy targets, such as seizing or 
sinking enemy warships at sea. 31  Marines participated in even more complex and risky 
raids, such as attempts to free prisoners of war or to attack enemy shipping behind the 
battle lines.  In conjunction with their service as raiders, Marines took up and gained 
some degree of proficiency with new weaponry.  For example, CSMC elements assisted 
in the employment of torpedoes (early sea mines).  All of these missions reveal the level 
of depth of the skills developed by Confederate Marines. 
In 1863, Confederate naval planners directed an ambitious project designed to 
incapacitate or capture the most dangerous form of warship at the time, the ironclad or 
iron vessel.  In the spring of that year Confederate officers grew concerned about the 
number of Union monitors operating around Charleston Harbor and convened a board of 
officers to study methods of destroying them.  The board developed several options, or 
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plans, to enable a select group of well-trained sailors and Marines to board and destroy 
ironclads at sea.  The first “means of boarding the vessel” identified by the planning 
board consisted of simply using small boats to ferry troops to the target vessel.  The 
strength of this method was that Charleston, and indeed the entire South, had great 
numbers of such small boats readily available for use.  The second method consisted of 
employing two or three small steamers to place the boarding party in position.  The third 
method involved construction of a purpose-built ship “without spars, divided into several 
water-tight compartments,’ and fitted with a “light scaffold to extend … ten or fifteen 
feet over the side,” over which the raiders could quickly board the target vessel.  
Although leaders gave consideration toward construction of a special purpose ship, none 
was ever built to fill this requirement.  Instead, the board decided upon the use of small 
boats as a more practical, and stealthy method of boarding enemy vessels.32
The raiders meticulously planned their actions in great detail.  Leaders assigned 
each member of the boarding party a specific duty, allowing individuals to train and 
rehearse to the point where they mastered the skills required for that task.  According to 
one surviving plan of action, the commander, Confederate Navy Lieutenant William A. 
Webb, directed:   
“the boarding force to be divided into parties of tens and twenties, each 
under a leader.  One of these parties [is] to be prepared with iron wedges, to wedge 
beneath the turret and the deck; a second party [is] to cover the pilot-house with 
wet blankets; a third party of twenty [is] to throw powder down the smoke-stack or 
to cover it; another party of twenty [is] provided with turpentine or camphene in 
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glass vessels, to smash over the turret, and with an inextinguishable liquid fire to 
follow it; another party of twenty [is] to watch every opening in the turret or deck, 
provided with sulphuretted cartridges, etc. to smoke the enemy out.  Light ladders, 
weighing a few pounds only, could be provided to reach the top of the turret.  A 
rough drawing illustrative of this design is enclosed.”33  
 
The degree of detail reflected in the plan illustrates the level of effort and thought 
that went into solving the technical problems of boarding and seizing modern armored 
vessels.  This planning process was remarkably similar in principle to the procedures 
used in modern special operations tactics.  Not only were tasks assigned to parties, or 
teams, but also subtasks were assigned to specific individuals, allowing them to 
concentrate on honing their skills to execute that subtask that would in turn mesh with 
those of other team members, enabling the group to accomplish the overall mission.  To 
illustrate the degree of detail given to planning these raids, the following individual 
assignments were specified for a raiding force under the command of Confederate navy 
Lieutenant William G. Dozier: 
“Stack Men 
T. S. Wilson, Capt. C.S.[M.C.], in charge; I. A. Mercer, Sergt.  Bottle and 
Sulphur:  Hugh Aird, Pat’k Hart, Wm. Bell, Stephen Caul.  Blankets and Powder:  
Henry Calvin, Jas. Gorgan, Thos. Crilley, Theodore Davis.  Ladder, Bottles and 
Sulphur:  Richard McGregor, John Barratt.  Axe:  W. A. Bassant, Anthony 
Cannon.  Plateman:  S. C. Curtis. 
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Turretmen. 
S. M. Roof, Capt. C.S.A., Vol. in charge; A. D. Jean, Sergt.  Bottle and 
Sulphur:  O. Hackabon, C. Backman, M. B. Buff, C. Blackwell, P. P. Clarke.  
Cleavemen, Bottles and Sulphur:  J. J. Chanus, J. J. Dooley, H. H. Bankman, J. K. 
Dooley.  Wedge and Hammermen:  E. E. Gabell, S. Gregores, J. A. Gregores, E. 
Human.  Sailmen, Bottles and Sulphur:  Paul Hutts, S. M. Hutts, A. Howard, J. 
Hook, W. Leach. 
Hatch and Ventilator Men. 
J. J. Hook, Lieut. C.S.A., Vol. in charge;  D. S. Griffith, Corporal.  Bottles 
and Sulphur:  G. D. Lacombs, F. M. Mathios, S. Miller, J. Mack, M. Hutts.  
Tarpaulin, Hammer and Nails:  S. B. Parr, H. Pool, J. Pool. 
Seamen. 
John Berry, with grapline;  John Cronan, with grapline.”34
 
According to Scharf, Dozier’s “special service” group embarked aboard the CSS 
Sumter, a steamer tasked with transporting the raiding force to the vicinity of the target 
vessel, where the raiders would then transfer to smaller boats and then row out to board 
enemy ships.  Once alongside, the seamen would deploy grappling lines to allow the 
teams to gain access to the deck of the target ship.  A leader and assistant leader directed 
the actions of each team and its individual team members.  The “stack men” intended to 
put the enemy ship’s wheelhouse out of action by covering it with blankets and filling it 
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with sulphur, and to also cover the ship’s smoke stack, causing the engine’s exhaust to 
instead build within the hull.  “Turretmen” practiced driving iron or wood wedges into 
the base of gun turrets to prevent their movement, making it possible to then disable the 
gun turret with sulphur or “inextinguishable liquid fire,” essentially rendering the turret 
uninhabitable to gunners.  “Ventilator or Hatch Men” were assigned to specific openings 
in the enemy ship, developing and refining techniques to seal the openings to both egress 
and airflow.  Such actions produced two effects:  first, isolating the ship’s crew below 
decks where they were less effective in countering the attackers; and second, making it 
easy to “smother the monitors” either by diverting the ship’s own engine exhaust below 
decks, or by introducing sulphur or other chemicals inside the ship’s hull.35  If all 
worked as planned, the enemy crewmen would be sealed below decks, and then blinded, 
panicked or incapacitated by any combination of smoke, fumes or fire, rendering them 
incapable of defending the ship.   
The problems associated with seizing what were essentially hostile, floating 
fortresses were well thought out.  The Confederate plans were ingenious in that they 
directly attacked critical weaknesses they identified in ironclads of the era:  specifically, 
their limited visibility, confined quarters and spaces, and lack of adequate ventilation.  
By blocking vision ports with blankets, the ship would be blinded; freezing the turrets in 
place with wedges inhibited the ship’s ability to direct its fires against the attackers; and 
blocking the ship’s own ventilation and ducting could easily smother the ship’s crew in 
their own exhaust.  Each facet of the attack targeted weaknesses in ironclad design and 
used them against the ship’s crew.   
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However, Scharf noted that Confederate leaders issued orders for the raiding 
parties to “attack by twos the New Ironsides or any monitor” inside the outer bar of the 
harbor during the hours of darkness on 12 April 1863.  Plans were formulated that were 
both detailed and meticulous, with consideration also given to possible contingencies the 
raiders might encounter.  For example, if discovered and hailed by Union sentries prior 
to commencing the attack, the raiders were instructed to answer with “contrabands,” or 
“boats on a secret mission.”  The hope was that the raiders might be able to confuse the 
sentries as to their real purpose, allowing them to take advantage of any hesitation in 
their response.  Finally, at around midnight on the 11th, fifteen boats full of raiders lay 
alongside the CSS Stono, and the leaders went aboard to conduct final coordination for 
the raid.  In the midst of their meeting, Commodore John Tucker, commander of 
Confederate naval vessels afloat at Charleston, “came on board to announce that the 
[Union] monitors had left the bar,” and were steaming out of the harbor.  With their 
targets now gone, the attacks were cancelled, depriving the raiders of the opportunity to 
execute their plans.36
Before new raids could be planned, Mallory ordered the Marine battalion and the 
rest of the special expedition back to the Richmond area.  Quite possibly, the 
combination of the successful defense of Charleston Harbor from an attack by nine 
Union monitors on 7 April and the later withdrawal of several remaining monitors on 11 
April convinced Mallory that his scarce assets could best be employed elsewhere.  In any 
event, despite repeated requests from General P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of 
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Confederate forces in Charleston, to keep the raiders, Mallory recalled the force back to 
their camp at Drewry’s Bluff, where they arrived by the 21st.37   
Nonetheless, the time, effort and resources invested into the raiders’ training to 
conduct shipboard seizures were not wasted, but invested.  Soon after, the same 
individuals who trained and rehearsed to seize Union ironclads in Charleston Harbor 
conducted similar raids.  One such example is the CSMC’s participation in the capture 
and destruction of the USS Underwriter, a Federal warship assigned to blockade duty in 
the Neuse River in North Carolina.  In January 1864, the Navy Department ordered the 
creation of a volunteer unit to perform special service under the command of 
Confederate Commander John Taylor Wood.  Wood, a veteran of the CSS Virginia’s 
battle at Hampton Roads and the engagement at Drewry’s Bluff, had already earned a 
reputation as a skilled raider.  Following the first fight at Drewry’s Bluff in May 1862, 
Wood led a group of select volunteers to attack enemy ships operating within the 
Chesapeake Bay and Rappahanock River areas.  His efforts were rewarded with the 
capture of two Federal gunboats and four merchant schooners.  Hoping to repeat his 
achievements, Wood again secretly handpicked volunteers, including twenty-five 
Marines under the command of Captain Thomas Wilson, “for special service” in North 
Carolina, audaciously intending to seize a Union warship as it conducted blockade duty 
offshore.  Captain Wilson also had experience in these types of operations, having 
previously served as team leader of the ‘stackmen’ during earlier preparations for raids 
against the Union ironclads in Charleston Harbor.  Quite possibly, other members of his 
command did as well.  On the night of 1-2 February, Wood’s raiding party, outfitted 
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with rifles, pistols, cutlasses, and forty rounds of ammunition apiece, loaded aboard 
fourteen small boats on the Neuse River and proceeded downstream towards New 
Bern.38   
By all accounts, Wood placed a great deal of emphasis on preparing his men for 
the operation.  In addition to organizing the party for the mission, he spent some time 
and effort thinking of the obstacles that he needed to overcome to ensure that his men 
succeeded in their mission.  Wood intended to take their target ship at night, relying on 
the element of surprise to give him the advantage.  Knowing that the limited visibility 
would make control of his forces difficult, Wood prescribed that each man in the raiding 
party wear a band of white cotton cloth around their left arm, just above the elbow.  He 
even went one step further, issuing a watchword, “Sumter,” that could be used to 
verbally verify members of their party and identify foes.  And, anticipating a close 
quarters fight, each raider armed themselves with a cutlass and a navy revolver.  Marines 
also carried their rifles to engage targets at further ranges, should it be required.  Wood 
divided the raiding party into two groups, one to board the port side of the ship, and one 
the board the starboard side.  Since boats naturally rebound once they strike the side of a 
ship, opening a dangerous gap into which boarders might fall, Wood detailed some of 
his “coolest men” and issued them grapnels to ensure the boat remained secured to the 
ship’s side while boarding.  Finally, Wood reconnoitered the area to identify his target 
and fix her position for the raiders.  Preparations complete, the raiders then retired to the 
woods to rest for the coming action.  According to a member of his party, “Wood paid 
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no attention to doubts and surmises, but had his eye fixed on boarding and capturing that 
ship.”39
Shortly after midnight on the 2nd, Wood’s raiders embarked their boats and 
manned the oars.  The party formed into two columns of four boats apiece, each column 
designated to attack a different part of the target.  At about 2:30 A.M., the raiders closed 
on the Underwriter while that ship lay at anchor.  During the approach, leaders of the 
raiding party studied the ship with glasses, memorizing its features and disposition.  The 
Union ship had only posted two sentries above deck, and most of the crew lay asleep in 
their quarters below.  About one hundred yards out from the hull, a sentry aboard the 
ship shouted, “boat, ahoy,” alerting the crew.  The exposed raiders pulled at the oars, 
knowing “the only reply we could make was by the marines (three or four being in each 
boat), who delivered their fire with great coolness.”  As the Marines provided covering 
fires for the boarding party from the unsteady platform of their small craft, the raiders 
made fast their boats, climbed up over the rails, neutralized the sentries and fired at 
Federal sailors as they tried to react to the attack.  The Marines then followed the 
boarding party onto the deck of the Underwriter and quickly overpowered the remaining 
Union sailors, soon compelling them to surrender.40
Unfortunately for the raiders, the ship’s boilers were cold and the noise of the 
fighting had alerted neighboring Union vessels.  The alarm spread quickly through the 
Federal forces.  Although the darkness made it difficult for them to discern targets, 
Union gunners from nearby Fort Stevens began firing their artillery in the general 
direction of the Underwriter, and even managed to hit it several times.  Wood, realizing 
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that his men would be unable to fire the boilers and make sufficient steam to move the 
ship before enemy gunners could better range her, reluctantly ordered that the ship be 
destroyed.  He detailed an officer and several men to set her afire, and then withdrew to 
safety with the remainder of his raiders, wounded and prisoners.  While pulling away, 
Wood’s men could see flames leap from the ship’s wheelhouse, further attracting the 
attention of the Union gunners, who now had an aiming point on which they could 
concentrate their fires.  The flames soon touched off the ship’s magazine, which 
exploded, sinking the gunboat.  In the meantime, Wood and his party made it ashore, 
where they transferred their prisoners and wounded to the care of the army.  The daring 
event soon captured the attention of Northern newspapers and the story circulated 
widely.41   
Commander Wood forwarded a separate report on the performance of the 
Marines to Colonel Beall, Commandant of the CSMC.  In it, Wood commended the 
Marines for their actions while on “special duty” with his group.  He observed that 
“though their duties were more arduous than those of the others” in his group, the 
Marines “were always prompt and ready for the performance of all they were called 
upon to do.”  In closing, Wood commented that Captain Wilson’s Marines “would be a 
credit to any organization, and I will be glad to be associated with them on duty at any 
time.”42  Not surprisingly, Marines would soon get another opportunity to serve on 
“special duty” with Wood. 
Four months later a similar operation took place, this time launched from 
Savannah, Georgia.  On the afternoon of 31 May 1864, a group of about one hundred 
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twenty sailors and Marines led by Confederate Navy Lieutenant Thomas Pelot boarded 
seven small boats and rowed down the Savannah River.  Moving only by night, the 
raiders reached Raccoon Key in the early morning hours of 2 June.  From concealed 
positions, the force observed Union gunboat movements, and on 3 June Pelot’s scouts 
discovered that one of the Union vessels lay at anchor in Ossabaw Sound, only a few 
miles from the raiders’ vantage point.  After consulting with his scouts, Lieutenant Pelot 
decided to attack the vessel later that night.  Assisted by the arrival of rainy weather and 
conditions of limited visibility, the force made final preparations and moved out shortly 
after midnight, intending to seize the vessel.  Similar to the attack on the Underwriter, 
the boats separated into two columns, one to attack each side of their target 
simultaneously.  A short time later, despite being challenged by Union sentries, the 
raiding force approached, boarded and seized the side-wheel Federal Navy steamer 
Water Witch (see Figure 3-6).  Although Union newspapers reported the crew put up “a 
desperate fight,” the raiders quickly captured the ship, overpowering the crew in about 
ten minutes because of their use of surprise and rapidity of action.  One report stated that 
a small boat came alongside the Water Witch in the darkness, hailed the sentries, and 
shouted, that he “and a number of contrabands […] wished to come on board.”  The 
ship’s “officer of the deck gave them permission to come alongside,” and “in an instant 
[the raiders] were on deck.”43  The raiding party, using ropes and nets, gained access to 
the decks on both the port and starboard sides simultaneously, and fanned out to seize 
Union crewmen as they tried to respond.  Once in control of the ship and its crew, the 
raiders sailed the Water Witch back to Savannah, where Confederate defenders 
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integrated its firepower into the harbor’s defenses.  The raider officers later forwarded 
the ship’s battle flag to Mallory as a trophy of their escapade.44  
 
Figure 3-6.  Contemporary Drawing of the USS Water Witch.45
Although small in scale, the obvious successes of these ship seizures and the 
evident desire and capability of Confederate raiders to repeat these raids produced a 
negative effect on the operations of the Union blockaders.  The seizures of ships like the 
Underwriter and Water Witch caused morale among Federal sailors to suffer and forced 
blockading ships to move further offshore, making them less effective in accomplishing 
their mission.  In a flurry of orders and reports on the situation, Rear Admiral John A. 
Dahlgren, Union commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, issued stern 
warnings and guidance to his ships’ captains, and advised Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles that the burden of the extra precautions to avoid repeat seizures were such that “it 
is not to be disguised […] that the force under my command is becoming inadequate to 
the duties of this station.”46  The New York Times proclaimed the seizure of the Water 
Witch “A Naval Disaster,” and lambasted the officers of the Underwriter for their 
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“criminal” neglect and the “carelessness” of their actions in allowing themselves to be 
seized at sea.47
Northern naval leaders took special notice of these raiding operations, and their 
comments on the subject provided some of the strongest praise for the raiders bold and 
audacious actions.  The successes of Wood’s raiders in particular caused Union 
Undersecretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox to remark that the Federal Navy should create 
similar organizations.  Writing to Admiral Samuel P. Lee, Fox believed that such raids 
were a worthwhile expenditure of men and materiel, even if the attempts fail.  He noted 
that historically, the English Navy had long “abounded in rash coast attacks and cutting 
out expeditions of all kinds.  They were encouraged, and form a bright page of naval 
history.”  Hoping to encourage similar efforts within his own Navy, Fox continued, 
“You may be very sure the Department will not find any fault with any dashing 
expeditions that give reasonable hope of a result injurious to the enemy, even though 
they fail occasionally.”  Fox advocated the Union adopt a similar approach:  “Going into 
the river to destroy a blockade runner about to sail is a most happy idea, and most 
serious to the enemy, because cotton and dispatches would be burned.”48  However, no 
such action would be undertaken.  Similarly, following the attack on the Underwriter, 
Union Admiral David Dixon Porter admitted, “This was rather a mortifying affair for the 
navy, however fearless on the part of the Confederates.”  Furthermore, as long as the 
South possessed men with talent and audacity as found in John Taylor Wood, Porter 
predicted, “. . . such gallant action would often be attempted . . . .”49   
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At that stage in the war, these raids proved to be embarrassing to the Union Navy 
and helped raise the morale of the South’s naval forces, providing sailors and Marines 
with proof of their contributions to a war effort that focused predominantly on the 
actions of the Army.  Southern newspapers lauded the efforts of the raiders, with the 
Charleston Mercury proclaiming the seizure of the Water Witch an event that “will rank 
among the brilliant achievements of the war.”50  Northern newspaper correspondents in 
the South focused on the embarrassment of Union navy forces over the episodes:  the 
New York Times’ own Hilton Head correspondent reported that the seizure of the Water 
Witch was “conceded to be one of the most disgraceful marine disasters that has ever 
taken place in the department.”51  Several raiders became quite famous throughout the 
Confederacy.  In particular, John Taylor Wood achieved a reputation for his bold and 
daring exploits, and historian John M. Taylor characterizes him as a “brown-water ‘Jeb’ 
Stuart, striking by water behind Federal lines when the enemy least expected him.”52  In 
his North Carolina volume for the book series Confederate Military History, historian 
and former Confederate General D. H. Hill, Jr. wrote “few more daring deeds than 
[Wood’s capture and destruction of the Underwriter] were done during the war.”53  
None less than Robert E. Lee praised Wood for his part in the action, stating, 
“Commander Wood who had the hardest part to perform did his part well.”54  Wood’s 
men received special recognition in the form of a ‘Thanks of Congress’ from their 
government, and he and several other leaders also received more tangible and direct 
benefits in the form of meritorious promotions, a rarity in the Confederate naval service.  
Encouraged by the successful raids, members of the House Committee on Naval Affairs 
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wrote President Davis, urging that similar expeditions be attempted.  Despite the 
inherent dangers in these types of missions, Marines and sailors actively sought spaces 
in raiding parties.  Iverson D. Graves, stationed aboard the CSS Savannah at the time of 
the seizure of the Water Witch, wrote “Much to my disappointment I was not one of the 
party, although I fully expected to go with it.”55  Despite the dangers involved, there 
appeared to be no shortage of men for these adventures.  Ship captures sometimes 
yielded more tangible benefits in the form of valuable intelligence information:  three 
naval signal books were seized aboard the Water Witch, and were expeditiously 
forwarded by Flag Officer William Hunter, commander of Confederate ships at 
Savannah, to Confederate Navy headquarters in Richmond, with the observation that 
they might “be useful in your James River operations.”56   
As the war continued, Confederate leaders increasingly called upon Marines to 
assist in raids that were even more risky and bold.  In June 1864, General Robert E. Lee 
and President Jefferson Davis developed a daring plan to free thousands of Confederate 
prisoners held at Point Lookout, a prison compound in southern Maryland.  Intelligence 
from a Confederate spy indicated that few troops were stationed in or around Maryland 
and Washington, D.C., and the agent, identified only as “DARST,” recommended that “a 
diversion should be made, either to capture or release our prisoners at Point Lookout or a 
raid upon Washington with a view to the destruction of military supplies and public 
property.”57  Lee advocated freeing and arming prisoners in camps behind enemy lines, 
a bold action that would not only provide the Confederates much needed manpower, but 
might also turn Grant’s forces toward such a threat, thereby relieving some of the 
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existing pressure on Confederate forces defending Petersburg and Richmond.  In a letter 
to Davis, Lee proposed a desperate and fantastic scheme:  “Great benefit might be drawn 
from the release of our prisoners at Point Lookout, if it can be accomplished.  The 
number of men employed for this service would necessarily be small, as the whole 
would have to be transported across the Potomac where it is very broad, the means of 
doing which must first be procured.”58     
General Lee believed that the prisoner force, once free and armed, could be used 
to press a limited attack on Washington, forcing Grant’s forces to move north to deal 
with the threat.  For some time, rebel spies had been providing Richmond with estimates 
of as many as twenty to thirty thousand prisoners at Point Lookout (in reality an inflated 
figure), supposedly guarded by a small force of second-rate, inferior quality troops.  
Based on this information, Davis, Lee and other Confederate leaders believed that the 
potential gains from such a raid far outweighed the risks.   To accomplish his intent of 
freeing and arming the Southern prisoners, Lee proposed that two elements carry out the 
raid:  a land force composed primarily of cavalry and artillery, drawn mainly from 
Maryland forces fighting for the South; and a waterborne force under the command of 
veteran raider Commander (and holder of an Army commission as a colonel) John 
Taylor Wood, backed by a force of sailors and Marines skilled in amphibious-type 
operations.  Lee envisioned Wood’s mission as embarking aboard two blockade runners 
loaded with arms and supplies, conducting an amphibious landing near the camp, linking 
up with friendly ground troops, and overwhelming the prison guards.  The prisoners 
could then be freed, armed and supplied, and the now reinforced raid force could then 
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attack toward Washington, D.C., in concert with Confederate Army Lieutenant General 
Jubal Early’s land force.  Davis concurred with Lee’s plan and ordered it placed in 
motion.  Orders were soon issued to Early and Wood, and Wood began gathering his 
raiders, procuring arms for the prisoners and arranging for transport of his amphibious 
landing force to Point Lookout.59       
According to participant Captain Edward Crenshaw, CSMC, on 2 July 1864, 
Captain John Simms, commander of the Marine Battalion at Drewry’s Bluff, “received 
an order to put all the effective men and officers of his command […] with orders to 
proceed to Wilmington, North Carolina” for special duty.  At about 3:00 A.M. on 3 July, 
about ninety Marines under the command of Captain George Holmes left Drewry’s Bluff 
by steamer to Richmond, where forty more Marines from the city’s navy garrisons 
joined them.  Many of these men were veterans of previous raids.  By 7:00 A.M., the 
battalion, now numbering about one hundred thirty Marines, departed Richmond on the 
Danville railroad and, through a combination of rail movement and road marches, 
arrived in Wilmington on 6 July.  On arrival, the Drewry’s Bluff battalion linked up with 
Captain Alfred Van Benthuysen’s Company B, CSMC, which had been stationed in that 
town some months previously.  The Marine component of Wood’s raiding force now 
numbered more than two hundred men.60   
On 7 July, officers briefed the Confederate Marines on the plan and the entire 
force began preparing for the mission.  Wood’s plan involved running the Union 
blockade off Wilmington, and landing his force across a Maryland beach near Point 
Lookout at dawn on 12 July.  The extra weapons and supplies for the freed prisoners had 
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already been procured and were being prepared for shipment aboard the transports.  For 
embarkation purposes, Wood divided the Marine battalion into two separate groups of 
over one hundred men apiece, and assigned each group to a specific ship for transport to 
the landing beaches.  This tactical arrangement served two purposes:  that each ship 
would have some organic fighting capability during the transport phase, and that in the 
event only one ship arrived at the landing area, Wood would still have some Marines in 
his landing party.  On 8 July, both elements were embarked respectively aboard “two 
fast running blockade running steamers, the Let-Her-B and Florie, having been seized by 
the Government and fitted out for us.”  Captain Holmes commanded the group located 
aboard the Florie, while Captain Thomas Wilson (of Water Witch fame) commanded his 
men on board the Let-Her-B.  Additional stores and provisions for the mission were then 
loaded aboard the ships, along with the two thousand rifles that Colonel Wood had 
procured for arming the prisoners as they were freed.  Once all cargo and troops were 
embarked, the ships got underway and moved downstream to anchor off Smithville for 
the night.61  
On the night of 10-11 July, both ships left anchor and moved downriver to run 
the Union blockade, but while passing Fort Fisher “were signalled [sic] to stop, that 
dispatches in cipher had just arrived from the President to Col. Wood.”62  The ships held 
position while a small boat went ashore and retrieved the coded message from Davis.  
The dispatch brought bad news:  Union forces were not only aware of the plan, but had 
started to transfer the prisoners from Point Lookout to other prison camps located deeper 
in the North.  Despite attempts at secrecy, news of the raid had circulated widely in 
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Richmond for days, and it was not surprising that some rumors found their way to Union 
ears.  As early as 7 July, the New York Herald reported, “most of the prisoners at Point 
Lookout have been sent to Elmira, N.Y., and the remainder are being transferred as 
rapidly as possible.”63  Confederate war clerk Robert Kean recorded in his diary on 11 
July that news of the expedition “has been in everybody’s mouth [in Richmond] for 
more than a week past,” and that news of the raid had likely leaked to the North.64  
Apprised of the movement of the prisoners from Maryland and fearful of a trap, Davis 
ordered the cancellation of the raid and the return of the force to Drewry’s Bluff.65  
Although Wood’s raiders did not have the opportunity to follow through with their plan 
to free the prisoners, this episode nonetheless illustrates the degree of confidence that the 
higher levels of the Confederate government had in the capabilities of the CSMC to 
handle complex and risky assignments. 
Along with their regular duties, Confederate Marines also operated closely with 
the Confederate Navy’s Torpedo Service.  Not only did Marines learn the principle 
tactics and techniques related to the employment of torpedoes (the forerunner of modern 
sea mines), they conducted several missions as part of joint raid forces during torpedo 
attacks on Union shipping.  During these missions, Marines normally served both as 
security for the raid force and as an assault element to attempt to seize or destroy Federal 
ships using torpedoes as offensive weapons.  For example, during the aforementioned 
operations in Charleston Harbor in early 1863, J. Thomas Scharf remarked that the 
attempts to “smother the monitors” were to take place in conjunction with simultaneous 
torpedo attacks on other Union ships.  For several months the men of the raiding crews 
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and torpedo boats worked and trained side-by-side, preparing for attacks on the Federal 
ironclads should the opportunity arise.66       
In February 1865, thirteen Marines led by Lieutenant James Thurston, CSMC, 
were detached from their duties at Drewry’s Bluff and directed to report to Navy 
Lieutenant Charles W. Read for “temporary special duty.”  That duty involved serving as 
an element of a raiding force to conduct a bold attack on Union navy vessels in the 
vicinity of the main Federal supply base at City Point, Virginia.  At the time, City Point 
functioned as the principle logistics center for General Grant’s forces as he tightened his 
grip on the cities of Petersburg and Richmond.  Read had the support of the highest 
levels of the Confederate Navy, and he pulled together between ninety to one hundred 
twenty sailors and Marines for the assignment.  His mission was to infiltrate Union lines 
with four torpedo-equipped boats loaded on wagons, and attack Federal ironclads and 
other shipping near the Union supply base at City Point.  If possible, the raiders were 
also to attempt to seize one or more Federal ironclads in that area and use them to add 
more firepower and support for the Confederate attack.  If the raiders achieved success, 
other Confederate forces were prepared to exploit the situation by retaking City Point 
with gunboats and troops, thereby cutting Grant’s supply lines and turning his flank.  
Naturally, the plan hinged first on the successful infiltration of Union lines by the raiding 
force and the launching of their torpedo boats in the James River.  However, Union 
naval officers, long concerned about Confederate torpedo activities, actively questioned 
rebel deserters and prisoners for any hints of such plans, and took quick action on any 
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intelligence concerning torpedo operations.  Secrecy and stealth were therefore vital to 
the success of the raiders’ mission.67   
Shortly after dawn on 3 February 1865, Read’s torpedo expedition left Drewry’s 
Bluff with four wagons specially constructed to carry torpedo-equipped boats.  The beds 
of the wagons had been removed, and chocked in place over the axles and frame were 
whaleboats, which were laden with torpedoes, spars, and other essential equipment 
packed carefully for the road march.  Read and his second-in-command, Navy 
Lieutenant William Ward, led the convoy, followed by the sailors and wagons, then the 
Marine Detachment.  The Confederate Marines, armed with rifles, provided security for 
the force on the march.  The weather was bitterly cold and the roadbed frozen, making 
the trip miserable for the party.  By evening the men arrived at General Richard 
Anderson’s headquarters about two miles west of Petersburg and camped for the night.  
Early the next morning, the raiders departed friendly lines from Anderson’s positions 
and crossed over into Union-held territory.  Avoiding Union pickets, by the evening of 6 
February the group managed to reach Wakefield Station, about halfway to the James 
River.  The next day, as described by raider W. Frank Shippey, the appearance of a 
sudden, severe snowstorm forced the party to seek shelter and “stop for a few hours, the 
sleet being so blinding that our mules could not make headway, besides the road being 
frozen and slippery.”  While warming themselves in a deserted farmhouse, the group 
encountered a Confederate messenger who informed Read that his party’s mission had 
been betrayed to Union forces by one of its own members sent ahead to scout out the 
terrain.  According to Shippey, “a regiment of Federals lying in ambuscade and awaiting 
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our arrival” now occupied the location where they were to rendezvous with the scouts.  
Read, hesitant to believe the report when they were so close to their objective, rode 
forward alone to verify the story, and returned to inform the party that the report was 
accurate.  Federal troops were indeed alerted to their plans.  Read had no option but to 
retreat with his force back to Confederate lines, forfeiting any chance of attacking 
Federal ships at City Point.  Despite Union attempts to find them, the party reentered 
Confederate army positions on 13 February, having spent a total of about ten days 
behind Union lines.68  Although the raiders failed to achieve their goals, the mission 
nonetheless provides yet another example of the CSMC’s role in conducting special 
operations. 
Afloat, the CSMC enjoyed a prominent role in ship’s actions, on all the oceans of 
the world.  Despite the relatively small size of the service, the CSMC nonetheless 
provided detachments for most of the ships of the Confederate Navy.  To do this with 
such a small organization, the CSMC often transferred detachments from one ship to 
another as the situation demanded.  Once a particular ship was removed from battle, or 
the prospects of further direct engagement reduced, Marines were usually transferred to 
another ship whose chances of combat were greater.  Rarely were Marine detachments 
maintained aboard ships whose prospects for battle were remote, indicating that the 
naval leadership both recognized the value of Marines in combat afloat and realized the 
finite nature of the Corps’ (and the Navy’s) manpower.  By transferring detachments 
between ships according to the tactical need, the Navy could better meet operational 
demands in a more economical fashion.   
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For example, Second Lieutenant David Raney, Jr., formerly a corporal in the 1st 
Florida Infantry Regiment before being commissioned in the CSMC on 22 April 1861, 
reported for duty with Company A in Pensacola, and around 19 June was assigned as an 
officer in charge of a Marine detachment aboard the transport steamer CSS Time, 
conducting harbor patrols between Warrington Navy Yard and Union-held Fort Pickens.  
Following Company A’s transfer to Savannah, Georgia, on 18 September, Raney 
assumed command of the Marine guard aboard the gunboat CSS Samson, and he 
participated in the Battle of Port Royal on 7 November 1861, landing on Hilton Head 
Island with reinforcements to assist in the evacuation of the Confederate garrison at Fort 
Walker.  With little naval activity in that area, he served as a recruiting officer at 
Savannah before transferring to Company D in Mobile, Alabama, some time between 25 
August and 1 November 1862.  At Mobile, Raney was assigned first to the steamer 
Junior, aboard which he and his men participated in a failed attempt to seize a Union 
blockader in January 1863.  Later, he assumed command of the Marine guard aboard the 
CSS Tennessee from the time the ship was placed in commission on 1 March 1864 until 
its surrender at the Battle of Mobile Bay on 5 August 1864.  Imprisoned, Raney escaped 
from the New Orleans cotton warehouse in which he was being held, and returned to his 
duty in Mobile on 31 October 1864, fighting on until the Mobile Squadron surrendered 
on 5 May 1865.69    
Out of necessity, Marines often served aboard a succession of ships as those 
vessels entered or left combat service.  For example, Private Tobias Gibbons of 
Company C served aboard the CSS Virginia from April to May 12 1862, when that ship 
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was scuttled, and later served aboard the CSS Drewry during the first quarter of 1863 
before being assigned to the CSS Richmond some time before January 1864.  In between 
assignments aboard ship, Gibbons appears on muster rolls for various shore duties, such 
as the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk, the Drewry’s Bluff garrison and the Rocketts 
Navy Yard in Richmond.70  Another Marine from the same company, Private Andrew 
McGaohegan, served aboard the CSS Patrick Henry during both the Hampton Roads 
engagement in March 1862 and Drewry’s Bluff in May 1862, aboard the CSS North 
Carolina throughout most of 1864 until transferring in August of that year to the CSRS 
Arctic.71
According to historian Ralph Donnelly, the CSMC represented about 13 percent 
of overall Confederate Navy strength, and its manpower filled a vital niche in providing 
combat power to individual ships of the fleet.  A straightforward analysis of the Marine 
Corps’ approximate numbers of about 600 compared to the rough estimates given by 
many sources of about 2500 to 3000 for the entire navy department show the CSMC 
equaled about twenty percent of the overall structure.  However, even these statistics can 
be misleading and blur the true level of Marine contribution to the naval effort.  For 
example, although the navy’s personnel were needed to man ships and stations 
throughout the Confederacy regardless of enemy threat, Marines could be (and often 
were) transferred in response to threats and concentrated at posts in close proximity of 
the enemy.  This method of forward deploying Marines to where they were most needed 
seems to be the approach adopted by Confederate naval leaders during the war, 
according to an analysis of its operations.  Therefore, in actuality the CSMC represented 
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a greater proportion of naval unit strength where the South most needed them:  in contact 
with the enemy.  In that light, Donnelly is entirely correct in his assertion that the 
Confederates considered a Marine Guard to be “a necessary and integral part of a ship’s 
complement.”  The next chapter will explore this theme in greater detail.  By contrast, 
the wartime USMC represented less than 7 percent of the Federal navy strength, and 
fulfilled fewer shipboard roles.72  
In summary, the CSMC served the Confederacy well in a variety of missions and 
roles, wherever its service was most required.  In addition to being creative and 
proactive in developing new tactics to defeat the enemy, the Marines moved throughout 
the South to meet Union forces.  They generally served wherever Confederate sailors 
served.  They also served alongside Army forces, in places like Pensacola, Fort Fisher or 
Fort Gaines, where the commanders of those posts valued and commended their service.  
In contrast to its Northern cousins, the CSMC embraced new technologies, tactics and 
techniques that could help them overcome the national shortages they faced in terms of 
manpower, materiel, and money.  
The South was fortunate in that it inherited a fine group of leaders who had the 
courage to explore new ideas, and supported the continuation of proven concepts.  Many 
of the CSMC’s officers had been raised under the tutelage of Commandant Henderson, 
and they carried some of those reforms with them as they joined the Confederacy.  As a 
result, the CSMC benefited from its possession of a wealth of experience from its 
inception.  The CSMC was also fortunate in being part of an overall organization that 
valued innovation and bold action.  New ideas were not only welcome in the CSMC, but 
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also expected.  All of these factors contributed to creating an environment that 
welcomed innovation, particularly in the realm of new tactics and developing roles and 
missions.  In an era that experienced great changes in naval technology in a relatively 
short time, innovation became a requirement to survive, particularly to a service that 
experienced chronic shortages of men and materiel.  The CSMC helped the Confederate 
Navy fulfill that requirement by assuming more roles and missions as the war 
progressed.   
The CSMC came to take on increased roles and missions outside those in place 
both before the war and during the first year of its existence.  The Confederate Navy 
began to employ the CSMC as an expeditionary force in readiness, assigning them to 
specialized raid missions both afloat and ashore.  By war’s end, Marines had been 
assigned to a few high-risk, high-payoff ventures, evidence that their services were both 
appreciated and had earned the respect of Confederate leaders.  The Corps’ roles became 
more complex and varied, and the missions that Marines undertook were both 
challenging and of high importance to the nation.  
To accomplish the tasks assigned to them, the CSMC became involved in the 
development of new tactics, techniques and procedures.  Planning became increasingly 
complex and detailed, and rehearsals were incorporated to help refine their actions to a 
high degree.  In the process, the CSMC gained a reputation for excellence that led in turn 
towards greater roles.  Marines found themselves participating in some of the most 
complex, risky, yet potentially rewarding assignments.  Not always successful, some 
operations failed due to circumstances outside their control and not due to failings of the 
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Marines themselves.  And, while the CSMC did not gain wide recognition for its actions 
as part of a larger group, the Marines nonetheless became a force of choice for 
Confederate leaders when the requirement for accomplishment of difficult specialized 
tasks arose. 
Naval leaders still expected the CSMC to carry out its primary tasks, when not 
fulfilling new missions and roles, and it performed those functions until the last days of 
the war.  Special tasks were accomplished in addition to their normal combat duties, not 
outside them.  Their ability to accept the most risky assignments increased their value as 
a combat force.  In this manner the Confederate Marines, more than their Northern 
counterparts, developed and executed a proven amphibious raiding capability and 
enhanced the performance of landing parties.  Despite their successes in new operational 
roles, these capabilities died with the Confederacy in April 1865, and would not 
resurface in the U.S. Marine Corps for some decades after the war. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OPERATING AS A BATTALION 
 
 The Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC) was a national service.  Viewing 
the patterns formed from its activities on a national scale is essential to a serious analysis 
of its performance, and provides a clear picture of the importance of the Marines not 
only to the Confederate Navy, but also to the Confederacy as a whole.  Such a pattern 
reveals that Confederate naval leaders sought to gain advantage from certain features of 
the CSMC’s structure that allowed them to concentrate Marines at specific points in time 
and space where they were most urgently needed, and to reallocate them in response to 
changes in tactical or operational circumstances.  This chapter examines the employing 
of these battalion-sized units in a new light to discern such patterns and support this 
analysis.  
Previous studies of the CSMC are organized in such a way that masks the pattern 
created by its employment, making it difficult for scholars to analyze its contributions to 
the war.  Although several historians have written narratives of select CSMC operations, 
they have generally chosen to present their material as events occurring within specific 
state boundaries.1  Describing the activities of the CSMC state-by-state made it easier 
for these authors to arrange their material, but that approach constitutes a flawed 
methodology for several reasons.  First, the use of a state-centered narrative model 
reinforces a false focus on the states as bases of operations rather than on the nation 
itself.  Second, such a practice does not readily support examining of the CSMC’s 
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activities on a broader scale against the overall backdrop of the enemy’s opposing 
maneuvers.  Because of these limiting factors, students of Civil War Marines relying on 
these early studies may find it difficult to discern, and thereby analyze the patterns 
formed as a result of the CSMC’s employing units on a national level.  Consequently, 
they may fail to distinguish several important features directly related to the CSMC’s 
role in Confederate national naval operations.   
During the war, the Confederacy employed its Marines as battalions on several 
occasions to counter significant enemy threats.  On at least two other instances leaders 
allocated Marine battalions to large-scale amphibious raiding units tasked with special 
operations roles.  Fortunately for the South, the CSMC’s unique structure facilitated the 
rapid raising of battalions, and it possessed an inherent flexibility that made it possible to 
redistribute combat power to other locations quickly and efficiently.  Units could be 
shifted suddenly or incrementally throughout the nation, depending on the requirements.  
This feature made the CSMC an agile and capable organization.  In contrast, the 
CSMC’s northern cousins, the USMC, maintained its conventional structure that 
essentially limited it to being used in one of two basic options:  as small shipboard 
detachments, or as battalions.  To their own regret, U.S. Marine battalions during the 
Civil War gained an early, and decidedly negative reputation with their poor, panicky 
performance in the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas), and their subsequent 
actions only reinforced that standing in many circles.  As iterated by historian Allan 
Millett, “the [U.S.] Marine Corps began the Civil War on the defensive both tactically 
and institutionally, and it never recovered.”  With rare exceptions, whenever U.S. 
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Marine battalions were employed, the disappointing results subjected them to open 
criticism.2  On the other hand, the CSMC proved quite successful in its battalion-sized 
actions, the focus of this study.  Analyses of the activities of units below the battalion 
level are addressed in a separate chapter.   
 The South formed and employed its first Marine battalion shortly after the 
Confederate bombardment of the Federal garrison at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, that 
precipitated the war on 12 April 1861.  Following Sumter’s surrender, Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis next focused on the only remaining Federal stronghold in the 
South:  Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida.  Davis quickly committed forces to secure 
Pensacola harbor for Confederate use, and the requirement for a Marine battalion was 
born.  On 24 April 1861, Secretary Mallory ordered the first available and ready 
company of Marines to deploy from their recruiting station in New Orleans to help 
occupy Warrington Navy Yard, opposite Fort Pickens.  The company would soon 
become the core of what quickly grew into a Marine battalion that served within 
Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s coalescing Army of Pensacola.  By 26 April, the 
first Marines arrived at Warrington and had been assigned to “a heavy battery in front of 
Fort Pickens,” where they were “being actively drilled in the use of great guns and small 
arms” in readiness for the anticipated fight with Union forces.3
 Reinforcements followed rapidly, as fast as the recruiters in New Orleans could 
enlist, organize, and train them.  By 24 May, the Marine presence in Pensacola had 
grown to battalion size, consisting of more than three hundred men arranged into three 
companies, each unit assigned to its specific duties within the defensive force.  Initially 
142 
 
 
commanded by Captain Alfred Van Benthuysen, the battalion allocated one company to 
man a naval artillery battery at Warrington, and two companies to occupy portions of 
General Bragg’s defensive lines.  Van Benthuysen also assigned men of the battalion to 
fill various security details around the Warrington Navy Yard and as guards for the naval 
stores located at the nearby railroad depot.  He also created Marine detachments to 
perform duties on several Confederate Navy ships as those vessels were placed into 
service.  One detachment served aboard the transport steamer CSS Time, patrolling 
Pensacola harbor.  Another unit comprised of both sailors and Marines performed a 
different type of harbor security, conducting nightly patrols aboard small boats to 
discourage Union attempts to infiltrate Confederate positions.  And, when on 3 June the 
Confederate Navy placed the cruiser CSS Sumter (formerly Habana) into active service, 
Van Benthuysen assigned one officer and twenty Marines to that vessel.4  In this 
manner, the Marines of the battalion fulfilled several important roles simultaneously 
within Bragg’s defensive scheme, serving both on land as infantrymen and artillerymen, 
and at sea aboard Navy ships, where the significantly added to the combat power of 
those vessels. 
Recognizing the need for Marines, in May 1861 the Confederate Congress 
authorized a major expansion of the CSMC and immediately began to fill its senior 
leadership positions.  The expansion act did not specify a battalion command structure, 
but the utility of such a formation must have seemed apparent and a Marine battalion 
became a familiar fixture in the Confederate Navy.  Soon after the expansion took effect, 
the CSMC’s new commandant, Colonel Lloyd J. Beall, posted an officer with extensive 
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service as a Marine, Lieutenant Colonel Henry B. Tyler, Sr., to assume command of the 
battalion at Pensacola.  Tyler’s thirty-eight years of previous service with the USMC 
gave him a wealth of experience in leading and training Marines.  On 26 July 1861, 
Tyler arrived at Pensacola and relieved Captain Van Benthuysen, who then reassumed 
command of his former company.   Tyler, formerly the Adjutant and Inspector of the 
USMC, continued to press initiatives to better prepare the men of the battalion for 
combat.  To his credit, General Bragg appreciated Tyler’s experience, rank and seniority 
and he added to Tyler’s responsibilities by appointing him concurrently as the 
commander of the 3rd Brigade, Army of Pensacola.5  
 Since they occupied key positions within the defensive lines, the Marines soon 
found themselves in the forefront of combat around Pensacola.  On the night of 13-14 
September, the battalion helped blunt a Union raid launched against the Warrington 
Navy Yard by counterattacking the raiding unit and driving them off.  And on 9 October, 
some Confederate Marines participated in a retaliatory raid against a Union Army 
encampment located on nearby Santa Rosa Island.  In that action, under cover of 
darkness a joint force of sailors, Marines and soldiers embarked aboard Confederate 
steamers and landed on the island, attacking and overrunning several Union 
encampments, routing the Federal soldiers, burning their tents and spiking several guns 
before withdrawing to Pensacola.  In their reports on both the counterattack and the raid 
at Santa Rosa, senior officers favorably commented on the performance of the Marines, 
and several members of the battalion received commendations for their gallantry under 
fire.6
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 At about 10 A.M. on 22 November, Union gunners at Fort Pickens commenced 
an artillery bombardment of Confederate positions both in the Warrington Navy Yard 
and on the CSS Time, tied up at a nearby wharf.  The fires on Warrington seemed to 
focus predominantly on the Confederate artillery positions located along the waterfront, 
including those of the Marines.  For some reason, Bragg’s headquarters ordered the 
Confederate batteries not to return fire that day, and their guns remained silent, yet the 
gun crews stayed ready in case they received orders to return fire.  All day long, the 
Federal gunners maintained a high volume of fire that did not cease until after 9:00 P.M.  
Despite the lengthy duration of the bombardment and the high number of rounds fired, 
reports noted that the Union shells had little effect on the battalion’s naval artillery 
battery, in part due to the quality of the fortifications built by the Marines in the months 
preceding the attack.  Anticipating a resumption of Union fires, early the next morning 
Bragg’s headquarters issued orders to all Confederate batteries, including those of 
Tyler’s Marines, to return fire if Union gunners resumed their barrage.  The enemy soon 
obliged, and when Federal gunners commenced firing at about 10:30 A.M., the Marines’ 
battery immediately responded, becoming the first Confederate guns to do so.  The 
exchange precipitated an artillery duel lasting until about 11:30 P.M. that evening, and 
both sides traded a total of about five thousand shells that day:  Union gunners fired an 
estimated four thousand shells, and Confederate batteries accounted for the remaining 
one thousand rounds.  And, although the ratio of the numbers of artillery rounds fired by 
each side paints a picture of a one-sided duel, reports indicated the Confederate forces 
appeared to come off better overall, achieving good effect on the enemy and inflicting 
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damage to two Union ships, eventually driving them from the area.  Despite again 
receiving a large number of enemy shells aimed at their guns, the Marine battery 
suffered few casualties and reported little damage to its positions.7  The results of the 
bombardment suggest that the Confederate gunners operated their artillery with greater 
proficiency and accuracy than their opponents.  Of special note is that this engagement 
provides early confirmation of Confederate Marines’ abilities to serve in the primary 
role of land-based naval artillerists, a role that is quite different from any U.S. Marine 
experience during the war. 
 Despite the ferocity of the artillery exchange of 22-23 November, changes in the 
national military situation prompted Mallory to reevaluate the disposition of his forces 
and reallocate units accordingly.  The November bombardment notwithstanding, Bragg’s 
Pensacola campaign had developed into a military stalemate several months previously, 
and more urgent demands surfaced for Marines as the action shifted to other areas.  
Beginning in September 1861, Union naval forces threatened the coasts of South 
Carolina and Georgia, and a landing in that region appeared imminent.  In response, on 
18 September Mallory transferred one Marine company from the Pensacola battalion to 
Savannah, Georgia.  Then, about a week after the artillery engagements of 22-23 
November 1861, the Navy Department ordered a second company to leave Pensacola 
and proceed to Virginia, apparently believing the prospects for combat were increasing 
around their new capital.8   
The transfer of the two Marine companies from Pensacola shrank the CSMC 
presence there considerably and dissolved the battalion, leaving only one company in 
146 
 
 
place at Pensacola.  The reduction precipitated a minor bureaucratic fight over who 
should control Marines assigned to theaters.  General Bragg, as commander of the 
Confederate forces at Pensacola, complained to Secretary Mallory about the transfers of 
Marines from his command.  Bragg protested that the transfers left him with only one 
company of Marines, vice the battalion that he previously held, and in a heated letter to 
the Confederate Army’s Adjutant General, mentioned that he would no longer continue 
to provide the Marines with arms and equipment only to see them soon ordered off to 
other destinations.  He peevishly remarked that this latest draft on his forces constituted 
“a depleting process I cannot stand.”9  Samuel Cooper, the Confederate Army’s Adjutant 
General, forwarded Bragg’s complaints up the chain of command, where they came to 
the attention of Secretary Mallory and Colonel Lloyd Beall, Commandant of the CSMC.  
Bragg believed that, as local commander, he exercised complete control over the troops 
assigned to him from any service; Mallory refused to support that concept and supported 
instead a philosophy of maintaining centralized control of naval assets so that he could 
respond to changing circumstances on a national level.10  Although the issue remained 
officially unresolved, in practice Mallory continued to exercise his authority and did not 
hesitate to move Marines to meet what he perceived as national requirements throughout 
the Confederacy for the duration of the war. 
 As the first year of the war came to a close, the only three combat-ready CSMC 
companies were fighting in three separate locations in the South.  The Marine battalion 
had been dissolved, but not for long, thanks to the emergence of a new threat, this time 
to the Confederacy’s capital city.  In an attempt to force a quick resolution to the South’s 
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rebellious secession, Union General George McClellan kicked off his Peninsula 
Campaign on 8 March 1862.  Hoping to avoid the strengths of the Confederate Army 
outside Washington, D.C., in Northern Virginia, McClellan sought to instead land his 
army near Union-held Fort Monroe on the lower Virginia Peninsula and move overland 
to seize Richmond before the Confederate Army could react.  Unfortunately for the 
Union, slow movements and a month-long Confederate defense near Yorktown allowed 
the South to counter McClellan, turning his bold thrust into a prolonged stalemate.11   
Nonetheless, beginning in May 1862, the Confederate Army experienced a series 
of defeats that changed the geography of the campaign.  In rapid succession, Yorktown 
fell to Union forces on 3 May, and then Williamsburg capitulated two days later, leaving 
the Union with a seemingly undefended avenue of approach to Richmond.  On 10 May 
the mayor of Norfolk surrendered his city to Union forces, giving the Federals control of 
the mouth of the James River and thereby forcing the remnants of the James River 
Squadron to withdraw toward Richmond to avoid capture.  In a shocking turn of events, 
the draft of the South’s most feared ironclad, the Virginia (formerly Merrimack), proved 
too deep for the shoals of the Upper James, and with no option for escape her captain 
ordered the Virginia scuttled.  The loss of the Virginia hit the South hard, and 
concurrently boosted the morale of her enemy, who now saw an opportunity to quickly 
reach Richmond and possibly bring a swift end to the war.12
 Panic ensued in Richmond.  With the James River evidently open to attack by the 
Union Navy, the Confederate treasury boxed its gold to be transported to safety and the 
War Department likewise prepared its records for shipment.  Some congressional leaders 
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hastily departed the city for their home states, accompanied by their family members and 
all the baggage they could ship, while refugees filled the trains and streets leaving town.  
The wife of President Jefferson Davis and the relatives of several cabinet members 
hurriedly left the capital area, ostensibly for “vacations” in South Carolina or other 
points south far removed from immediate danger.13  A climate of fear and apprehension 
descended on the city.    
 Although Confederate leaders still hoped that their strong batteries and forts 
along the James River could halt a Union drive, the success experienced by the Federal 
Navy’s tactics of simply bombarding and running such positions soon led southerners to 
decide to make a final stand at Drewry’s Bluff, widely viewed as the last defensible 
position before Richmond.  Although the Confederates had long identified a requirement 
for obstacles backed by artillery at Drewry’s Bluff, little work actually had been 
accomplished.  As late as 28 April, authorities only had emplaced two militia batteries at 
the bluff and only a few sunken pilings as obstructions in the river.  Under pressure from 
Congress to “defend [Richmond] to the last extremity,”14 Confederate Secretary of the 
Navy Stephen Mallory designated Commander Ebenezer Farrand as overall commander 
at Drewry’s Bluff, and directed him to establish an effective defense in the shortest time 
possible.  With the majority of Confederate Army troops already engaged in stopping 
McClellan’s Union Army, Confederate military leaders looked anxiously for sources of 
available manpower that might augment Farrand’s meager force.15   
To meet this urgent requirement for forces, in early May 1862, naval leaders 
began to concentrate Confederate Marines at Drewry’s Bluff, again under a battalion 
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structure.  Two of the only three operational Marine companies converged at the bluffs 
and joined with some Marines from the Corps’ headquarters in Richmond.  Secretary 
Mallory appointed Captain John Simms, formerly a USMC captain with a wealth of 
expeditionary experience, to lead the battalion, and placed him under Farrand’s 
operational command.  By 14 May, Simms’ had his battalion in place and ready for 
battle.  The next morning, when a Union flotilla rounded the bend and approached the 
elaborate defenses at the bluff, Marines contributed significantly to the subsequent 
defeat of the Federal gunships, and in turning back the Union attack up the James 
River.16   
Following the battle, the CSMC instituted a long-term presence at Drewry’s 
Bluff, manning artillery and infantry positions at the site until ordered to withdraw on 2 
April 1865.  The Confederate Marine Corps slowly improved the infrastructure at the 
fort, eventually establishing permanent quarters and facilities and christening the area 
“Camp Beall,” in honor of the Corps’ commandant, Colonel Beall.  As well as 
supporting the garrison for the defense of the bluffs, the camp also served as a training 
base for new Marine recruits and officers.17  Whenever feasible, enlistees and newly 
commissioned officers would be stationed first at Camp Beall.  There, they would 
receive daily instruction under the close supervision of more seasoned veterans.  Once 
trained, these men could then be transferred to other postings, depending on personnel 
requirements.  This arrangement allowed for a high degree of standardization of tactics, 
techniques and procedures throughout the CSMC, enhancing the interoperability within 
the Corps.  Instituting homogeneous training and consistent standards made it easier to 
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form and reform units, and allowed the Marines to manage their personnel in a more 
efficient manner.  It also permitted men to be easily transferred from one unit to another 
with negligible loss of proficiency that would normally arise from having to retrain to 
some different standard or procedure.  And, the shared experiences of the training 
undoubtedly contributed to an increased esprit de corps and cohesion within units.  In 
their personal correspondence, it is obvious that many of the Marines knew each other 
from having served together at one post or another.18
 From their permanent base at Camp Beall, naval leaders deployed the Marine 
battalion in response to new threats.  In early 1863, reacting to increased activity of the 
Union Navy and indications that it might be attempting to attack and seize the vital port 
of Charleston, South Carolina, Mallory ordered the Marine battalion to deploy to that 
city.  On 19 February, the battalion, still led by Captain John Simms, left Richmond by 
train and arrived in Charleston three days later.  Once established, the Marines began 
training for specialized raiding operations aimed at boarding, incapacitating or even 
seizing Union ironclads afloat, an idea that had been gestating since the naval 
engagements off Hampton Roads in March 1862.  The Marines worked hard to prepare 
for this new role, conducting almost daily detailed rehearsals and dry runs over the next 
two months, and becoming intimately familiar with the tactics required for such difficult 
assignments.  Although the opportunity did not present itself to actually execute that 
mission at Charleston, the experiences that the men gained through their preparation 
were not wasted, since some of the Marines later participated in similar ship seizure 
operations elsewhere in the South.19
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 While in Charleston, the Marine battalion also assisted in the defense of that city 
from Federal attack.  On 6 April 1863, a formidable Union fleet of nine ironclad 
warships entered Charleston Harbor and waited for favorable weather to begin its assault 
to seize the city.  At about 2 P.M. the following day, the fleet initiated its offensive, but 
the results were not what the Union naval leaders expected.  As soon as the attack 
commenced, the Federal ships began drawing a deadly hail of fire from Charleston’s 
defenders, who had prepared well for this action.  The Confederate forces had liberally 
sown the harbor with deadly torpedoes (early sea mines), and had stretched lines and 
chains across portions of the harbor to channel the Federal ships into zones where the 
Confederate fires could then be concentrated.  The Charleston gunners also had 
emplaced ranging buoys in the harbor that allowed them to rapidly and accurately adjust 
their rounds onto the Union ships.  The Confederate batteries poured out a heavy and 
concentrated fire, expending over 350 rounds of well-aimed ammunition in a short time.  
Despite the relative brevity of the engagement, every Union ship reported receiving 
damage from the Confederate guns.  The Southern batteries sank one Union warship 
outright, and damaged two more, thereby convincing the remainder of the Federal fleet 
to withdraw from battle and make for friendly ports to repair their damage, effectively 
ending the Union Navy’s attempts to invade Charleston for the time being.20
 With the Union threat to Charleston temporarily neutralized, Mallory recalled the 
battalion to Drewry’s Bluff, despite official protests by the Confederate commander in 
Charleston, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, that he still needed the Marines’ services.  
Like Bragg before him, Beauregard also lost the bureaucratic struggle for control of 
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Marines, and by 29 April the battalion had returned to Camp Beall.  Simms did, 
however, leave behind a detachment of Marines under the command of Lieutenant 
Henry Doak to serve aboard the South’s newest ironclad, the CSS Charleston.  Doak’s 
Marines manned two of the vessel’s broadside guns during several exchanges of fire 
with Union vessels.21
 The Marine battalion returned to Virginia in time to participate in a second battle 
with Union forces at Drewry’s Bluff in May 1864.  Unlike the first battle, this time the 
threat came from the land, in the form of Union Army forces under the command of 
General Benjamin F. Butler.  Beginning on 6 May, Butler’s cavalry commenced a series 
of attacks from their staging area near the town of Suffolk to try and sever the vital 
railroad line that maintained the major link between Richmond and the rest of the South.  
Confederate Army soldiers quickly responded and blunted the Union drive, forcing 
Butler to throw more men into the fight.  Confederate leaders also escalated their 
response and for several days the two forces skirmished, with Butler’s men eventually 
succeeding in tearing up about 300 to 500 yards of track and in pushing closer to the 
fortifications around Drewry’s Bluff.  Again, Union military forces seemed to be making 
progress in isolating the Southern capital.  On the morning of 9 May, Butler’s troops 
exchanged blows with Southern soldiers within three miles of the fortifications 
surrounding Drewry’s Bluff, and CSMC Major George Terrett, in charge of both the 
Marine battalion and the Confederate garrison at Drewry’s Bluff, urgently requested that 
Secretary Mallory send him the Marine guards from the two Navy Yards in Richmond, 
adding, “They number about 60 men and should be of incalculable service here.”22   
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Reinforced by the quick arrival of the two guard units, Terrett’s battalion made 
ready for the fight.  On 10 May, Terrett reported that the enemy had commenced 
“shelling our breastwork,” the defensive fortifications that the Marines had constructed 
around the camp.23  In response to the Union pressure, General Beauregard, now in 
command of that sector of the Confederate defense, reinforced the area around Drewry’s 
Bluff with several army brigades and attempted to blunt the Federal attack.  Nonetheless, 
by noon on the 12th, Union soldiers had managed to thrust their way into the Confederate 
earthworks around Drewry’s Bluff and the Marine battalion, now holding the left flank 
of the Confederate defensive line, directed heavy fires into the Federal concentrations 
with their artillery and small arms.  On the 13th, two regiments of Union troops again 
pushed into the Confederate trenches, but the defenders once more repulsed them.  On 
the morning of 16 May, Terrett again reported “Brisk skirmishing both with artillery and 
small arms going on along our front.”24  The fighting escalated in intensity along the 
front, yet Confederate forces held strong against the pressure and, by the end of that 
same day had managed to force the Federals to withdraw.25  The Marines had been in the 
midst of the fighting in the breastworks for almost a week and had again proven 
victorious, helping to maintain the capital’s vital rail link with the rest of the South. 
In July 1864, the Marine battalion participated in a bold scheme to rescue and 
rearm Confederate prisoners from the Union prisoner of war camp at Point Lookout, 
Maryland.  The raid, conceived at the highest levels of the Confederate government, 
planned to employ two separate elements in its execution: a land component, and an 
amphibious component.  The amphibious force, commanded by veteran raider 
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Commander John Taylor Wood, included the Marine battalion from Drewry’s Bluff, 
reinforced with the addition of another company then stationed at Wilmington, North 
Carolina.  Wood’s plan involved embarking his men and equipment aboard two 
blockade-runners, evading the Federal blockade, and landing his raiders over beaches 
near the prison camp to both free the prisoners, then arm them and employ that force to 
attack the Union capital from the rear.  The Marines responded quickly to the call for 
special service.  On 2 July 1864, the battalion, again under the command of Captain John 
Simms, received “orders to proceed to Wilmington, North Carolina” for Wood’s 
mission.26  By 6 July, the battalion arrived at Wilmington, linked up with the Marines 
stationed there, and began to plan and prepare for their part in the raid.  Soon after, the 
Marines embarked aboard two fast blockade-runners, the Let-Her-B and Florie, set sail 
on the night of 10 July, and anchored off Fort Fisher for final coordination of the assault.  
There, at literally the last moments before running the Federal blockade, Wood received 
an urgent signal cancelling the mission, and the disappointed Marines soon returned to 
Drewry’s Bluff.27   
 The Marine battalion continued to operate out of its camp at Drewry’s Bluff until 
early April 1865, when the Confederate government ordered a general evacuation of 
Richmond and its defensive line.  In those closing days of the war the Marine battalion, 
along with naval personnel from several other posts now occupied by advancing Union 
forces, joined with Richmond’s naval personnel to form a Naval Brigade under the 
command of Confederate Navy Captain (Flag-Officer) John R. Tucker.  On 2 April 
1865, Secretary Mallory ordered Tucker’s Naval Brigade to march toward Appomattox 
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with the remnants of General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Virginia.  As they departed 
Drewry’s Bluff for the last time, the sailors and Marines could hear behind them the 
explosions from the scuttling of the ships of the James River Squadron.  During the 
retreat, Lee assigned Tucker’s brigade the mission of protecting the rear of his army as 
part of General Richard Ewell’s corps, a difficult task in light of the strength of the 
pursuing Union forces.  From 2 to 6 April the brigade marched without food along roads 
swollen with mud, skirmishing with Union cavalry the whole time.28    
On 6 April, in what the contemporary chronicler John Scharf called the “last of 
the great battles of the war,” the Naval Brigade fought valiantly against Union General 
Philip Sheridan’s massed infantry and cavalry at Saylor’s Creek.  Sheridan’s men placed 
increasing pressure against Ewell’s corps and Tucker’s Brigade, still covering the retreat 
of General Lee’s Army.  Turning to fight a delaying action, the Naval Brigade occupied 
hasty defensive positions along the line of the creek, anchoring the right side of Ewell’s 
corps.  As the battle progressed, Confederate infantry brigades around them ceased firing 
and fell back, yet Tucker’s brigade held firm.  Soon, Sheridan’s men captured Ewell and 
his command group, and Ewell issued orders for the rest of his corps to surrender.  The 
Naval Brigade disregarded the command to quit, and instead fought on against two 
Union regiments with a bold determination, prompting one Union soldier to later recall 
that the battle was “one of the fiercest, most hand-to-hand and literally savage 
encounters of the war, with the remnant’s [sic] of Stile’s battalion and that of the 
Marines….  They clubbed their muskets, fired pistols into each other’s faces, and used 
the bayonet savagely.”29  Another Confederate participant gushed with praise, “Those 
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Marines fought like tigers and against odds of at least ten to one.”30  As Confederate 
Army units crumbled and surrendered around them, the remnants of the Naval Brigade 
continued to fight on as an isolated pocket of resistance, eventually pulling back into 
some dense woods and consolidating.  Soon, they discovered that Federal troops had 
surrounded them.  Only then, once forced to confront the realities of how untenable his 
position was, did Tucker surrender his force.  Nonetheless, some Marines still managed 
to escape from the Union encirclement, only to end up surrendering with the remnants of 
Lee’s Army at Appomattox three days later.31  The Marine battalion had fought on to the 
very end. 
Overall, Marine battalions served at several locations during the war, fighting at 
Pensacola, Drewry’s Bluff (participating in two key battles), Charleston, Wilmington, 
and finally at Saylor’s Creek (see Figure 4-1).  Although battalion actions account for 
only a small portion of battles and engagements that Marines fought in, analysis of the 
pattern formed by their employments indicates that Confederate leaders appreciated their 
contributions.  The repositioning of Marine battalions also suggests that Mallory gave 
considerable thought to their placement, and accordingly formed and assigned them to 
locations where their service was most needed.  This implies that Mallory and other 
naval leaders considered Confederate Marines to be a valuable resource:  one not to be 
wasted in areas where their service was not strictly required to meet a priority threat.   
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Figure 4-1.  Marine Battalion Deployments during the War.32
More importantly, the concentration and repositioning of Marines into battalion 
formations indicates that naval leaders viewed the CSMC not only as a finite resource, 
but one that possessed certain characteristics that lent themselves to such a scheme of 
employment.  Success in their various assignments only reinforced this belief and 
analysis supports the view that the senior Confederate leaders came to look on the 
CSMC as a force-in-readiness that could be rapidly employed.  The missions and roles 
assigned to the battalions expanded as well, indicating an increasing confidence in the 
capabilities of Marines.  In essence, the CSMC became an expeditionary force for the 
Navy, one that could be relied upon in extreme conditions.   
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CHAPTER V 
EMPLOYING COMPANIES AND DETACHMENTS 
 
A few days before Christmas, 1864, the commander of the Confederate garrison 
at Fort Fisher, North Carolina, forwarded an urgent request for reinforcements to help 
defend his post against imminent attack.  For some time, the Union Navy had been 
concentrating its ships and men outside the entrance to the Cape Fear inlet, the access 
point to the city of Wilmington.  Officers planned an assault to close that port and further 
choke the rebel capital at Richmond.  Fort Fisher, a massive complex of coastal artillery 
batteries, revetments and fortifications, guarded the entrance to the inlet.  Impressed with 
the extent of these defensive works, Federal engineers nicknamed the stronghold “the 
Malakoff of the South,” a reference to the famous fortress at Sevastopol in the Crimean.1   
Since 1862 Fort Fisher had afforded protection to hundreds of blockade-runners and had 
long rebuffed Federal intentions to halt the flow of vital supplies that passed through 
Wilmington.  Finally, in the last days of 1864, the Union Navy amassed its largest fleet 
yet, over 150 ships, and combined their efforts with a sizeable Federal army force to 
attempt to seize Fort Fisher and close the port of Wilmington to all Confederate traffic.2
Anticipating the attack, the Confederate garrison commander urgently requested 
reinforcements.  A company of Confederate Marines answered that call and moved 
quickly to man naval artillery and defensive positions within Battery Buchanan, the 
forward-most strongpoint within the Fort Fisher complex (see Figure 5-1).  Together 
with other Confederate Navy forces, the men at Battery Buchanan manned four guns, 
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two 11-inch Columbiads covering the land approach to the fort proper, and two more 
cannon commanding the inlet, as well as the entrenchments surrounding the battery.  The 
site had been extensively prepared to resist any Federal attempts to seize it:  torpedoes 
(mines) were strewn through the shallow water in front of the battery and palisades of 
sharpened poles planted along the flat beaches to discourage an enemy infantry attack.  
The Marine commander who reinforced the battery, Captain Alfred Van Benthuysen, 
possessed a wealth of experience, having functioned in that capacity since the first days 
of the war.  His men were also seasoned fighters who had fought both ashore and at sea.  
Like their commander, many had served since April 1861; they were accustomed to the 
sights and sounds of combat.  The Marines quickly familiarized themselves with the 
battery position and weapons and prepared for the enemy’s attack.3
 
Figure 5-1.  Contemporary Sketch of Fort Fisher, North Carolina.4
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The Confederate defenders had not long to wait.  On the night of 23 December 
1864, Federal sailors towed the warship Louisiana, laden with a massive charge of about 
250 tons of powder, to a position off Fort Fisher and subsequently detonated it at about 2 
A.M. in the early hours of Christmas Eve.  The blast generated an enormous concussive 
explosion that could be heard in the town of Wilmington, but caused little damage to the 
fort or its occupants.  The attack began soon after, preceded by a bombardment for over 
an hour by the combined guns of more than thirty-five Union warships.  However, the 
Federal land force under the command of Major General Benjamin Butler was not yet 
established ashore, and the resulting delay forced a postponement of the ground assault.  
The next morning, Butler finished landing his soldiers and prepared to attack the 
landward face of the fort.  In the meantime, Confederate sailors and Marines at Battery 
Buchanan engaged several smaller Union boats that had approached their position and 
began a process of “dragging for torpedoes,” intending to clear a lane for later attack, 
should it be needed.5  The battery’s gunners opened fire on the minesweepers, sinking 
one boat outright and quickly driving the Federal sailors away from the beach.  That 
afternoon, about 5:30 P.M., Butler launched his three thousand troops against Fort 
Fisher.  Realizing the gravity of the situation, the fort’s garrison commander again called 
on the Marines and sailors of Battery Buchanan, seemingly not the focus of attack, and 
requested that they send all men that could be spared to the fort proper to help repel 
Butler’s main attack.  The Marines responded.  Their commander ordered most of his 
company to move to the fort proper at the “double-quick,” and the relief force arrived in 
time to help turn back the enemy.  The Marines reinforced the garrison troops at several 
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Brooke guns on the landward side of the fort and also moved into the defensive works, 
reinforcing the defenders and firing into the attackers with small arms and artillery until 
Butler’s men were forced to retreat.  By placing themselves into the thick of battle at a 
critical moment, the Marines had helped to turn the tide of the battle and to repel the 
enemy’s attempt to seize the fort.  In their reports on the action, the garrison commander 
and senior Confederate officers praised the Marines for their performance under fire.6
The successful defense of Fort Fisher against a superior Union force was but one 
of many actions that Confederate Marines participated in during the war.  Sometimes the 
Confederacy employed its Marines as ad hoc battalions during such operations, but 
battalion-level activities represented only a fraction of the CSMC’s wartime 
contributions.  Concurrent with battalion operations were the activities of the five 
individual and distinct companies, and the many detachments separately deployed from 
those companies.  Exploring how those elements were employed illustrates quite clearly 
a picture of a flexible and adaptable Marine Corps committed to fighting on several 
fronts simultaneously.  The CSMC’s organization, leadership and performance gave 
Southern naval leaders a force that they relied upon to put combat power at specific 
locations in a wide variety of roles. 
 This chapter addresses another aspect of the pattern of CSMC activities by 
examining the Corps’ contributions at the company and detachment level.  Particular 
attention is paid to the employing and redeploying of units in response to specific 
perceived threats to the Confederacy.  Committing Marines in these ways illustrates that 
naval leaders fully utilized their limited CSMC assets throughout the nation in concert 
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with national naval requirements.  The Marine Corps’ companies carried out their 
obligations effectively under increasingly difficult conditions. 
The overall pattern of employing Marine companies reinforces the conclusion 
that the benefits afforded by the inherent flexibilities of the CSMC structure were 
evident to naval leaders.  Moreover, Confederate Marines developed proficiencies in 
several combat roles and increasingly assumed challenging missions.  The combination 
of its unique company-based structure and its proficiency in critical skills made the 
CSMC a versatile and flexible force, one that naval leaders exercised to their advantage.  
The CSMC saw extensive commitment and came to assume the role of a naval force-in-
readiness, an attribute that becomes apparent when their overall employment pattern is 
examined.  Operationally, the Confederate Navy posted Marine companies to various 
locations throughout the South in response to Union threat, and redeployed units as more 
dangerous threats emerged elsewhere or as requirements for Marines within a particular 
area decreased.  As shown, the Confederates also exercised the option of pooling 
multiple companies under a battalion structure, allowing them to concentrate their 
combat power to meet greater threats.  In this fashion, the company-based structure 
allowed Confederate naval leaders to concentrate their Marine assets under a centralized 
battalion command, or to disperse their assets to several locations, spreading their 
capability over a wider area by placing them aboard several ships of a squadron.  
Regardless of how they were employed, CSMC units still maintained a command and 
control structure that remained simultaneously responsive to the needs of its men and to 
the mission requirements of its immediate local commander. 
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 Notwithstanding its designation that seems to indicate being the first of its kind, 
Company A actually came into being as the second company to be formed in the CSMC.  
The unit consisted mostly of men recruited early in the war from New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and was first commanded by Captain George Holmes, a transplanted 
Southerner originally born and raised in Portland, Maine.  Holmes brought to the CSMC 
a wealth of military experience, having served first with the Florida Volunteers during 
the Mexican War and later spending twelve busy years as an officer in the U.S. Marine 
Corps.  He resigned that commission only one month previous to accepting an 
appointment as a captain in the CSMC on 29 March 1861.  At that time, Secretary 
Mallory ordered Holmes to travel to New Orleans for recruiting duty, intending for 
Holmes to recruit his own 100-man company.  Mallory also assigned newly 
commissioned First Lieutenant Beckett Kempe Howell, another former U.S. Marine 
Corps officer and distant relative of the Confederate president, to assist Holmes, and the 
two officers commenced recruiting in earnest on 10 April.7
 By 12 May Holmes’ unit was fully staffed, and on that day Lieutenant Howell 
escorted Company A and several other men, a contingent that totaled about one hundred 
and fifty Marines, from the recruiting station at New Orleans to their first combat duty 
station at Pensacola, Florida.  There, the men of Company A combined their numbers 
with another company previously dispatched to that area, together constituting the core 
of what soon became the first Confederate Marine battalion.  Because the Marines at 
Pensacola were already engaged in combat operations near Fort Pickens, the officers and 
non-commissioned officers of Company A, following the guidance of Secretary Mallory, 
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turned immediately to the task of instructing and drilling the men “in the use of their 
arms as to make them efficient soldiers in the shortest time.”8  On 24 May, Holmes, who 
had been delayed in New Orleans, arrived in Pensacola and rejoined his company.9  
 Concurrent with developing increased military proficiency, Company A’s 
Marines also shared several extra duties assigned to the battalion.  Its men helped guard 
naval stores at the nearby railroad depot and filled some security-related postings in 
rotating fashion with Marines of Company B.  On 19 June 1861, Holmes formed a 
detachment consisting of one commissioned officer and twelve Marines and assigned 
them to duty on the small transport steamer CSS Time, and it patrolled Pensacola harbor.  
Holmes appointed Second Lieutenant David G. Raney, Jr., as commander of that unit.  
The Time became an important element of General Bragg’s defenses, providing him with 
some degree of security from attack by water and a platform for reacting to enemy 
actions.10  
 Responding to reports of an increased union threat to the Georgia – South 
Carolina coast, on 18 September 1861, Mallory transferred Company A to Savannah, 
Georgia, for duty with Flag-Officer Josiah Tattnall’s “Mosquito Fleet.”  On his arrival in 
Savannah on 20 September, Holmes reported aboard Tattnall’s flagship, the Savannah, 
and conferred with the squadron commander to determine his requirements for the 
company.  Holmes established his headquarters on the Savannah, and retained some of 
his Marines for duty on that vessel.  He then created a detachment of Marines under the 
command of First Lieutenant Francis H. Cameron to serve on the navy’s side-wheel 
steamer Huntress.  He also formed a smaller detachment of only twelve Marines under 
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the command of Second Lieutenant James Thurston and assigned it to the steamer 
Sampson.  Holmes’ men, dispersed as they were among the ships of Tattnall’s squadron, 
added to the combat power of each vessel by manning naval artillery, providing security, 
and serving on landing parties.  Although the individual ships’ captains exercised direct 
operational control over their respective detachments, Holmes maintained a 
decentralized command over his men, supporting their administrative or logistical needs 
centrally from his post on Tattnall’s flagship.  This command relationship seemed 
effective since the separate detachments directly supported the operational requirements 
of the captains of each vessel in the squadron, yet retained the capability to reconsolidate 
his company when needed.  Holmes soon had an opportunity to put this method of 
employment to the test in combat.  On 4 November 1861, the Marines of Company A, 
fighting from their respective ships, collectively participated in their first naval 
engagement during a brief clash with Union ships outside the entrance to Port Royal, 
South Carolina.  In this action, Marines manned naval artillery on some of the vessels, 
and exchanged shots with the Federals at long range in an effort to disrupt their enemy’s 
formations and plans to invade the coast.11   
Tattnall’s limited engagement on the 4th proved insufficient in changing the 
Federal plan to invade Port Royal.  On 7 November, the Union Navy maneuvered 
inshore and commenced a heavy bombardment of several Confederate coastal forts to 
neutralize those positions and pave the way for the landing of troops.  Reacting to the 
situation, Tattnall formed a landing party from the Marines and sailors of the squadron to 
attempt to support and reinforce a beleaguered Confederate Army garrison at Fort 
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Walker, a focus of the Union Navy’s offensive preparation fires.  Holmes ordered his 
detachments to embark aboard several small boats and to link up ashore.  The landing 
party, with Holmes’ reconsolidated company, landed at Skull Creek near Port Royal 
undetected, and maneuvered to within less than a quarter mile from the fort.  Holmes 
then led a small reconnaissance force to establish contact with the garrison troops.  On 
reaching the fort, the advance element discovered that the garrison had already 
abandoned the strong point.  Their position now untenable, the landing party quickly 
returned overland to its boats and re-embarked aboard their respective ships.  Finding 
himself greatly outgunned and outnumbered in the face of the massive Union buildup, 
Tattnall then disengaged with the enemy and withdrew his squadron to Savannah, 
leaving the Federal forces in complete control of the Port Royal area.  Despite the 
vulnerability of the Savannah area to further attack by the Federals, the Union forces 
seemed content to consolidate their gains at Port Royal rather than press their advantage.  
As a result, little activity occurred around the Savannah Station, and Confederate leaders 
soon decided that Holmes’ company could be better employed elsewhere.  Around 22 
May 1862, in response to the Union Navy’s attempt to attack Richmond along the James 
River approach one week earlier, Mallory ordered Company A to Drewry’s Bluff to 
reinforce the Marines already stationed there.12
 Reaching Virginia, Company A moved quickly into the Marine bivouac area at 
Camp Beall and integrated into the defensive positions around Drewry’s Bluff.  Along 
with their regular responsibilities of manning the hasty entrenchments that sprang up 
around the bluffs, Holmes, cooperating with other company commanders at that 
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location, also provided men to fill several security postings in the nearby Richmond area.  
For example, on 14 February 1863, Holmes detached Second Lieutenant Nathaniel 
Venable and thirty Marines to serve as guards at the two important navy yards in 
Richmond, where construction of new ironclad ships was underway (see Figure 5-2).  
Venable and his Marines were the first to be posted at the Richmond yards, but records 
indicate that the guard detachments soon became permanent assignments for the 
Confederate Marines.  From February 1863 until the evacuation of Richmond in April 
1865, the CSMC continuously dispatched Marine detachments (each normally 
comprised of one officer and thirty men) as guards to each of the yards, meaning that a 
total of two officers and sixty Marines were always on hand in the capital city.  On 26 
May 1863, Second Lieutenant John Van de Graff replaced Venable, suggesting that the 
CSMC companies implemented some form of rotation of men to such duties.  For 
example, Venable later served for a period of time as a recruiting officer in Richmond, a 
posting that involved making occasional tours to the nearby conscription camps in 
search of qualified volunteers wishing to serve in the CSMC.  Analysis of existing orders 
and service records indicate that Marine leaders rotated officers and enlisted men 
amongst these posts, and that the companies stationed at Drewry’s Bluff apparently 
shared these Richmond responsibilities on an equal basis.13   
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Figure 5-2.  Location of the Two Navy Yards in Richmond.14
From February to April of 1863, Marines from Company A participated in the 
battalion deployment to Charleston, South Carolina, where they developed and mastered 
new tactics designed to disable or seize Union monitors operating off-shore.  Although 
they did not get an opportunity at that time to test their tactics, some of the men later put 
their training to work by participating in several raids on Union Navy vessels, making 
the effort worthwhile.  While in Charleston, the Marines also took part in the defense of 
that harbor against a Union Navy attack on 6-7 April, helping to drive off the Federal 
fleet.  Following its return to Drewry’s Bluff in late April, Company A performed picket 
duty around the Richmond area during the Chancellorsville Campaign in May 1863, 
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when some of that city’s forces were drawn off for a time to support the fighting in 
Northern Virginia.  Holmes and his men also fought during the aforementioned Second 
Battle of Drewry’s Bluff, serving principally as infantry guarding the left wing of the 
Confederate positions that surrounded the fort proper.  For about a week, from 10-16 
May 1864, Holmes’ men fought off several attempts by Union infantry to seize the 
earthworks around Drewry’s Bluff.  The Marines repelled the Federals from the trenches 
a number of times before forcing them to retreat for good around 16 May.15   
In early July 1864, the men of Company A again deployed as part of the 
amphibious landing force formed to free and arm Confederate prisoners at a Federal 
camp at Point Lookout, Maryland.  In this battalion-sized operation, Holmes departed 
Drewry’s Bluff on 3 July with about ninety Marines and arrived in Wilmington on 6 
July.  There, Holmes’ company gained reinforcements in the form of Marines posted at 
other locations, received briefings on the details of the mission and otherwise prepared 
for the operation.  Soon after, Captain Holmes, now in command of about one hundred 
Marines, embarked his men onboard the blockade-runner Florie, one of two fast ships 
purchased for their transportation to the landing beach, and loaded the necessary arms 
and equipment for the mission.  Both ships soon got underway and moved downriver in 
preparation for running the Union blockade.  Regrettably, on 11 July, while off Fort 
Fisher, the raid commander, Colonel John Taylor Wood, received orders to cancel the 
mission, the plan having been compromised.16  The cancellation of the mission deprived 
historians of what would have been an excellent test of a Marine battalion’s participation 
in an amphibious raid.  Disappointed, the Marines returned to Drewry’s Bluff.  
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Back at Camp Beall, the Marines of Company A began to form detachments for 
duty aboard ships of the James River Squadron, relieving Marines from another 
company that had previously filled those assignments.  Some of these ships were 
involved in conducting operations against Union forces downriver from Drewry’s Bluff.  
On 29 August 1864, Lieutenant Everard Eggleston relieved Lieutenant David Bradford 
as commander of the Marine detachment aboard the ironclad Fredericksburg.  One 
month later, on the morning of 29 September, the Fredericksburg received an urgent call 
for assistance from a Confederate Army unit to break up a Union assault that had already 
overrun their positions at Fort Harrison and threatened to seize the key Confederate 
batteries located at Chaffin’s Bluff.  Responding to this call, the ironclads 
Fredericksburg and Richmond departed Drewry’s Bluff and anchored near Kingsland 
Reach to bombard the Union troops.  Due to the distances and intervening terrain, ships’ 
officers were unable to judge the effect of their fires.  To remedy the situation, 
Lieutenant Eggleston and a signal officer went ashore, moved to where they could 
observe the shell impacts, and noted the rounds were falling short of their intended 
targets.  Then, through a system of pre-arranged signals, Eggleston provided the ships 
with corrections that allowed the ironclads to accurately adjust their fires onto the enemy 
using the maximum of their gun’s elevation (six to seven degrees).  This early example 
of naval gunfire spotting worked superbly and enabled the ships to fire hundreds of 
rounds into the concentrated enemy; scattering the attacking Federals and disrupting 
their assault on Chaffin’s Bluff, saving that key Confederate post from being overrun.17
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In early April 1865, Company A, along with several other Marine and Navy units 
stationed within the Richmond area, participated in some of the last major battles of the 
war.  A more detailed narration of those last, desperate actions will be provided toward 
the end of this chapter, yet it should be noted here that by 9 April, with the surrender of 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s forces at Appomattox, Virginia, Company A 
ceased to exist.  However, it left behind a proud legacy, one befitting a proud unit that 
had served in six of the eleven states of the Confederacy during the war (see Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3.  Map Showing the Deployments of Company A.18
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The next CSMC unit, Company B, provides an excellent example of the 
flexibility inherent in the CSMC’s organization.  Company B served in more different 
configurations and combat roles than any other Marine unit during the war, both North 
and South.  The history of the company clearly illustrates the wide range of missions 
expected of Confederate Marines, and it underwent a long and complex series of 
movements and command configurations as it fulfilled its assignments.  In its time, the 
unit served as an independent company unit both afloat and ashore; executed primary 
duties alternately as an artillery and infantry company; operated as an element of a 
battalion; performed as a rapid reaction force; and undertook its assignments in both 
offensive and defensive operations.  Several times in its history the company dispersed 
its strength into several detachments, and then reconsolidated back into a centralized 
company command in a different location altogether, all in response to demands for the 
services of Marines.  Throughout, the broad range and depth of its actions combined to 
illustrate the wide differences between the two American Marine Corps, and show the 
degree to which elements of the CSMC supported the Confederate military, both army 
and navy.      
Although its official designation implies otherwise, in actuality Company B 
became the first fully operational company of the CSMC.  Its first commander, Captain 
Alfred Van Benthuysen, proved to be an exceptional recruiter and organizer, and he 
raised, organized and deployed his unit in less than two weeks.  Between 10 and 23 
April 1861, he personally enlisted about ninety-five men.19  Understanding the need to 
prepare his men for combat, Van Benthuysen and his enlisted leaders immediately began 
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drilling and instructing the new recruits to ready them for action in the shortest possible 
time. 
 On 24 April, only twelve days after the firing at Fort Sumter and one day after 
Van Benthuysen’s company became operational, Secretary Mallory directed the captain 
to deploy his company to the Warrington Navy Yard, opposite Fort Pickens, to assist in 
the defense of Pensacola.  Van Benthuysen embarked his company that same evening 
and arrived in Pensacola by a combination of steamship, rail and road march on the 
evening of the 26th, reporting for duty to General Braxton Bragg.20       
 When Van Benthuysen’s men settled in at the Warrington Navy Yard, CSMC 
First Lieutenant Henry Laurens Ingraham and ten Marines from Montgomery, Alabama, 
met them.  Although then the provisional capital of the Confederacy, Montgomery had 
proven disappointing for recruiting.  By 29 April, Mallory shut down the Montgomery 
enlistment office altogether and ordered the remainder of the recruiting detachment, 
under the command of Captain Reuben Thom, to Pensacola, along with the twenty-seven 
men he had managed to enlist.  They reinforced Van Benthuysen’s company, giving him 
about one hundred twenty Marines on duty at Warrington at the end of April.21  
 Mallory paid close attention to events in the Pensacola area.  Anxious to report 
progress on that front, on 26 April Mallory advised President Jefferson Davis that 
Captain Van Benthuysen had been placed “in charge of a heavy battery in front of Fort 
Pickens,” and that his men were “being actively drilled in the use of great guns and small 
arms.”22  The New Orleans Delta reported that Van Benthuysen’s company, now for the 
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first time being referred to as Company B of the Marines, occupied combat positions 
along the left flank of General Bragg’s Confederate lines.23   
 By 17 May 1861, Captain Van Benthuysen’s Company B had become the core of 
an ad hoc battalion, and Mallory placed him in overall command of the unit.  This 
transition established the pattern for the modular approach to battalion operations that 
the CSMC would utilize for the rest of the war.  Typically, two or more companies 
combined, and officers from the companies were elevated to fill command and staff 
assignments within the battalion’s command element.  In this first iteration, the 
command structure came wholly from personnel organic to the companies themselves.  
However, after the Marine Corps expanded in late 1861, headquarters personnel from 
Richmond would often be selected to fill some battalion-level billets.  At this early stage, 
when Mallory placed Van Benthuysen in command of the battalion, the captain 
appointed one of his company officers, most likely Lieutenant Richard H. Henderson, 
son of the late USMC commandant Archibald Henderson, to command Company B in 
the interim.24  
The company continued to man its original naval artillery positions in support of 
Bragg’s forces, and also participated in various guard details within the Warrington 
Navy Yard.  And, when the Confederate Navy placed the cruiser CSS Sumter into 
service on 3 June, Mallory detailed Lieutenant Howell and twenty Marines from the 
company to serve as the ship’s detachment aboard that vessel (see Figure 5-4).  The 
Sumter soon after became quite successful as a commerce raider on the high seas, 
seizing at least eighteen Northern vessels over the next six months.  This assignment put 
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the first of many Marine detachments in naval vessels during the war, and established 
the typical model for such units, each normally consisting of one commissioned officer 
and twenty enlisted Marines.  Soon after, on 26 June 1861, the Navy Department formed 
another ship’s detachment, directing Van Benthuysen to “order Lieutenant Henderson 
with one sergeant, two corporals and 20 privates of Marines to Steamer MacRae 
[McRae] at New Orleans.”25  In the meantime, Bragg also created his own harbor patrol, 
consisting of thirteen Marines and a number of sailors aboard two small boats, and 
tasked them with conducting night picket duty in the waters off Pensacola to discourage 
Union attempts to infiltrate Confederate positions.  Apparently Van Benthuysen rotated 
these duty assignments between the various companies of the battalion as more Marines 
arrived within the Pensacola area.  On 26 July 1861, Lieutenant Colonel Tyler arrived 
from Richmond to assume command of the Marine Battalion, relieving Captain Van 
Benthuysen from that post and allowing him to again take charge of Company B.26
 
27Figure 5-4.  The Commerce Raider CSS Sumter.
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During much of their time in Pensacola, Company B manned one or more ten-
inch Columbiad guns in a battery located on a stone wharf within the Warrington Navy 
Yard (see Figure 5-5).  On the morning of 22 November, Union gunners at Fort Pickens 
opened fire on the Navy Yard and the CSS Time, tied up at the wharf near the yard.  The 
Federals maintained their fire until 9:00 P.M. that afternoon.  Despite the length of the 
bombardment, reports of the action indicated the Union shells had little effect on Van 
Benthuysen’s battery despite several direct hits.  Although Confederate batteries were 
ordered not to return fire that first day, the following morning Confederate batteries were 
authorized to retaliate if the Union resumed its bombardment.  The Federal gunners soon 
obliged and, when they commenced firing at about 10:30 A.M., Van Benthuysen’s 
battery immediately returned fire, becoming the first Confederate guns to do so.  In the 
artillery duel that lasted all day and half through the night, the Marines tirelessly worked 
their guns, traversing their fires effectively along the face of Fort Pickens.  Despite 
becoming the main targets of the enemy, with some enemy rounds “grazing the top of 
the embankment,” his men remained cool under the fire.  After the action, Van 
Benthuysen reported “not a single casualty” among his men, and he attributed that 
fortune to the strength of his fortifications and the quality of their work beforehand in 
preparing for the exchange of fires.28   
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29Figure 5-5.  Contemporary Photograph of a Water Battery at Warrington.
As fierce as the two-day bombardment was, the artillery exchange signaled the 
beginning of a stalemate in the Pensacola Campaign, and a period of relative inactivity 
descended on the area.  In response to this impasse, Mallory began reassigning 
individual companies to other parts of the Confederacy with more pressing needs.  On 13 
February 1862, Mallory ordered Company B to Mobile, Alabama.  Arriving two days 
later, Van Benthuysen established a Marine detachment aboard the gunboat Florida 
(later renamed Selma), and located the remainder of his company on board the receiving 
ship Dolman.  However, their presence in that vital port was cut short by the greater 
threat posed to the Confederacy by Union General McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, 
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aimed at seizing Richmond.  On 2 March 1862, the Florida’s Marine detachment 
returned to the company, and the entire unit departed soon after for its new posting at the 
Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard in Virginia.30    
The company’s Marines arrived in Virginia in time to participate in a flurry of 
combat actions.  Reaching Gosport Navy Yard on 11 March 1862, the men immediately 
deployed to provide security for that key post.  Van Benthuysen himself assumed duties 
as the commander of Gosport’s Marine guard, and he held that billet until 19 March, 
when newly commissioned Marine Captain John Simms, formerly of the USMC, arrived 
to relieve him of that responsibility.  Although Company B fulfilled a critical role at the 
South’s main naval base at Gosport, local events soon transpired that cut short the 
company’s tenure there.   Successful Union advances up the Virginia Peninsula had 
made the area surrounding Norfolk untenable by Southern forces, forcing the 
Confederate Army to withdraw to a defensive line along the Chickahominy River.  With 
Norfolk left suddenly open to Union attack, the Navy Department reluctantly ordered the 
evacuation and destruction of the navy yard.  The following day, the unexpected 
scuttling of the Virginia created a hole in the Confederate defenses that led directly to 
Richmond, and Mallory ordered Company B to reinforce the few troops located at 
Drewry’s Bluff to try and fill that gap.  These events culminated in the aforementioned 
First Battle of Drewry’s Bluff on 15 May 1862.  In that action, the Marines of Company 
B participated mainly as sharpshooters, firing their rifles from prepared positions dug 
along the bank of the James River.  Their accurate and concentrated small arms fires 
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helped keep enemy crew below decks and therefore limited the ability of Federals to 
adjust fires or land troops.31   
After the battle, Company B continued to garrison the Drewry’s Bluff site.  
Concurrent with their work at improving the defensive positions at the bluffs and 
constructing a more permanent Marine camp, the company also occasionally provided 
men to the various guard details that sprung up around Richmond.  Settling into its duty 
routine at the bluff, the company also worked hard to maintain its proficiency by 
developing a rigorous training regimen.  And, from February to April 1863, the company 
deployed as part of the Marine battalion to Charleston, South Carolina, where the men 
took part in special training to conduct seizures of ironclads at sea and helped defend 
that harbor from an attack by several Federal Navy ironclads.32
 In late April, following its participation in the defense of Charleston harbor, 
Company B returned with the Marine battalion to their base at Camp Beall, Drewry’s 
Bluff.  Over the next year, in response to new demands for the services of Marines afloat 
on several of the South’s new ironclads, the company dispersed its combat power into 
several detachments that served ashore at either of the two navy yards in Richmond, or 
aboard ships of the James River Squadron, then also headquartered at Drewry’s Bluff.  
Presumably, the company’s collocation with the squadron headquarters helped facilitate 
its decentralized command and control functions over its dispersed units.   
Meanwhile, things began heating up around the port city of Wilmington, North 
Carolina.  At that stage in the war, Wilmington harbor provided protection for many 
blockade-runners whose activities kept the capital supplied with provisions.  Between 
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1863-64, about 230 ships managed to evade the Union blockade off Wilmington and 
make port, a significant feat that both illustrates the weaknesses of the blockade and the 
value of Wilmington.33  In addition to providing a vital supply link for the Confederate 
capital and its surrounding army, commerce raiders utilized the harbor as a refuge and a 
base from which they could continue to attack and seize Union ships, making the 
defense of the harbor a strategic priority for the Confederacy.  Union forces realized this 
and were tightening their blockade of the port in an attempt to choke the Confederacy 
into submission.   
Realizing the necessity of keeping Wilmington open to blockade-runners and 
commerce raiders, Confederate naval leaders began redistributing their precious assets to 
strengthen the port’s defenses, and part of that effort included the reassignment of 
Marines, in the form of a new Company B.  Steadily, the company’s duties in the 
Richmond area were assumed by detachments formed from other Marine companies, 
and Marines close to the Wilmington area were transferred to a newly reformed 
Company B.  In this fashion, the company presence in the Richmond area shrank while 
concurrently growing in North Carolina to meet the new threat.  On 18 January 1864, 
First Lieutenant Richard Henderson and thirty men from Company C transferred to 
Wilmington Station and reported aboard the ironclads Raleigh and North Carolina, 
becoming the core of the new company structure.  Initially, Henderson stationed himself 
on shore and made frequent trips between the two vessels to inspect the performance and 
discipline of the Marines.  On 1 March, Lieutenant Henry Doak joined the Wilmington 
Marines from his previous post at Savannah, Georgia, and he assumed Henderson’s 
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duties as commander of the Raleigh’s detachment.  One week later, Lieutenant Murdoch 
arrived with his detachment, formerly stationed on the James River Squadron ironclad 
Richmond.34  With the arrival of Murdoch’s men, the Wilmington detachment now 
constituted about three officers and sixty Marines, equaling approximately six-tenths of 
the personnel found in a full company.  
In clear opposition to the Federal blockaders, Confederate Navy vessels 
operating out of Wilmington began clashing with Union Navy ships on a more frequent 
basis, and Marines actively participated in the engagements that followed.  For example, 
Lieutenant Doak directed two of the Raleigh’s broadside guns during a fight with several 
Union Navy blockaders on 6 – 7 May.  In that action, the Raleigh boldly attacked several 
blockading ships outside the mouth of the Cape Fear River, surprising the Union ships 
and driving all but four of the enemy vessels from the area.  In the resulting exchange of 
fires, the Federal ships found that their fires had little effect on the Raleigh’s armor.    
Nonetheless, two of the combatants, the Raleigh and a Union blockader, Nansemond, 
traded shots well into the evening, neither ceasing their fires until about 11:45 P.M., 
when they finally disengaged for the night.  Early the next morning, the Raleigh again 
attempted to close with the four Union blockaders, and eventually drove them out to sea.  
The Raleigh hit one Federal warship, the Howquah, in the funnel, seriously damaging 
that vessel.  The complete withdrawal of the enemy ships left the Raleigh now in 
command of the approaches to Wilmington, but her victory proved short-lived.   
Unfortunately for Wilmington’s defenders, on her return to port the Raleigh went 
aground on the shoals outside the mouth of the Cape Fear Inlet and broke her back, 
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forcing her captain to scuttle her to prevent her capture. The tide of battle had taken a 
drastic turn for the worse.  Now without a ship to fight from, Doak and his men returned 
to Wilmington for reassignment and, around 10 May, he assumed command of the 
Marine detachment aboard the CSS Arctic, the receiving ship for Wilmington Station.35   
Back at Drewry’s Bluff, the few remaining men of Company B formed a 
detachment under the command of Lieutenant David Bradford, and assigned it on 24 
May 1864 to the newly constructed ironclad CSS Fredericksburg.  With this assignment 
the company ceased to exist as a unit at Camp Beall, yet was gaining strength at 
Wilmington.  Finally, in recognition of the growing numbers of Marines in North 
Carolina, on 15 June 1864 Mallory ordered Captain Van Benthuysen to depart his post at 
Mobile and to proceed to Wilmington to assume command of the new Company B.36   
 The freshly reconstituted company became increasingly engaged in Wilmington 
as Union military threats intensified in the second half of 1864.  From 6 – 13 July, Van 
Benthuysen’s men participated in the briefings, rehearsals and preparations for the 
proposed amphibious raid to rescue and arm prisoners at Point Lookout, Maryland.  
Acting as an advance party, Company B met their battalion when it arrived at 
Wilmington on 6 July, and most likely provided support for the Marines as they went 
into camp that evening.  On 7 July Commander John Taylor Wood briefed all of the 
participants on the details of the mission, and the next day embarked the raiders aboard 
the two blockade-runners, the Florie and the Let-Her-Be.  Records indicate that Van 
Benthuysen’s company divided itself between the vessels to balance out the number of 
Marines on each.  The two ships got underway the evening of the 9th, dropped anchor off 
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the town of Smithville for a day, and again weighed anchor the night of the 10th, but 
were soon stopped by signalers from Fort Fisher bearing an urgent dispatch that 
cancelled the mission.  A disappointed Van Benthuysen soon after redeployed his men to 
their previous assignments.37  
 Meanwhile, Company B’s sole remaining detachment in Virginia, aboard the 
ironclad Fredericksburg, found itself engaged in combat south of Drewry’s Bluff.  In 
mid-August 1864, several ironclads and gunboats of the James River Squadron, 
including the Fredericksburg, conducted an attack on Union forces attempting to 
complete a canal near Dutch Gap, a move that would have allowed Federal forces to 
bypass several powerful Confederate land batteries and consequently weaken 
Richmond’s defensive line.  In the early morning hours of 13 August, the Confederate 
ironclads Fredericksburg, Virginia II, and Richmond, accompanied by the gunboats 
Drewry, Hampton and Nansemond, departed friendly lines near Drewry’s Bluff and 
maneuvered downriver to within three-quarters of a mile of the canal.  For twelve hours 
the warships bombarded the canal area, disrupting the digging effort and skirmishing 
with Federal gunboats.  In retaliation, Union ship and land batteries pounded the 
Confederate vessels, inflicting some damage to the Fredericksburg.  The ship 
nonetheless remained in action, even providing timely fire support to General Lee’s 
forces on 17 August that was credited with repelling an enemy attack on Signal Hill.   
Soon afterwards, on 29 August 1864, Mallory finally replaced Bradford’s detachment on 
the Fredericksburg with a detachment from Company A under Lieutenant Everard 
Eggleston, freeing that unit for service in Wilmington.  Bradford’s relief brought to a 
193 
 
close Company B’s participation in activities on the James River, where it had served for 
over two years.  Bradford’s men then proceeded to their new company headquarters in 
Wilmington, providing more manpower to that unit.38   
With all of his men now in one general location, Van Benthuysen took advantage 
of the opportunity to fill several requests that naval commanders had made for Marine 
detachments to serve aboard outgoing commerce raiders, giving the makeshift warships 
a much-needed boost in combat power.  The newest arrivals, Lieutenant Bradford and 
his men, were quickly assigned to the cruiser Chickamauga (formerly the blockade 
runner Edith).  From 28 October to 15 December 1864, the Marines participated in that 
vessel’s successful cruise in which six Union merchant ships were destroyed.  On 1 
October, Van Benthuysen assigned Lieutenant Doak and his men to the commerce raider 
CSS Tallahassee (then operating also under the name Olustee).  In the short period of 
time between 29 October and 7 November 1864, Doak and his men contributed to the 
Tallahassee’s sinking of half a dozen Federal ships, a feat that sent shivers through the 
spine of Union merchant ships operating off the eastern seaboard.  In addition to filling 
duties at sea, in early December 1864, Company B also began providing personnel to 
man some shore batteries at nearby Fort Fisher in response to requests for assistance by 
the fort’s garrison commander.  Initially, Van Benthuysen assigned Lieutenant Murdoch 
and a Marine detachment to man a land-based naval artillery battery at Battery 
Buchanan, a strongpoint located at the extreme end of Federal Point that commanded the 
entrance to New Inlet.39
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 In early December 1864, the Union Navy began building up its forces to attack 
Fort Fisher.  Within a period of less than a month the Federals conducted two large-scale 
attacks on the fort, both preceded by what was described as the most intensive naval 
bombardments ever made.  Despite having a clearly superior force, the Union failed in 
its first attempt to seize the fortress and was forced to withdraw, though it soon 
regrouped and launched a second attack some weeks later.  Throughout the ordeal, Van 
Benthuysen’s Marines played a significant role in both battles, helping to soundly turn 
back the first Union attack and again fighting savagely in the second effort.  In addition 
to providing a superb example of CSMC company operations as part of a major battle, 
the struggle for Fort Fisher also illustrates some of the contrasts in performance and 
reputation between the two Marine Corps.  In this case, elements of the two Marine 
Corps faced each other on the field of battle:  Van Benthuysen’s company fought as part 
of the defense, while an ad hoc U.S. Marine battalion fought as part of an attacking 
naval landing force.  The contrasts in their respective performances in battle merit a 
close study. 
The first Federal assault on Fort Fisher began on 23 December 1864, initiated 
quite literally with an enormous bang.  Under the cover of darkness that evening, the 
Union Navy towed the Louisiana, an aging warship deliberately packed with a massive 
charge of about 250 tons of powder, to a position located about a mile off the center of 
the fort and set her afire.  The ship exploded soon afterward, creating a powerful 
shockwave that could be felt in Wilmington, over fifteen miles away.  Despite the 
ferocity of the blast, the explosion caused no real damage to the fort itself, and failed in 
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its intent to “demolish the work and paralyze the garrison.”40  It did, however, confirm 
Confederate suspicions that the Union Army and Navy were ready to move on Fort 
Fisher.  Any remaining doubts of Federal intentions were soon erased by the 
commencement of the Union Navy’s massive preparatory bombardment undertaken by 
virtually every ship of Admiral David Dixon Porter’s fleet, a non-stop barrage that lasted 
from dawn on the 24th until about 5:30 P.M. that afternoon.  Within a period of about 
twelve hours the Federal warships hurled almost 10,000 shells against the gun 
emplacements of Fort Fisher.41   
During this first attack, the Confederate sailors and Marines initially occupied 
several gun positions located at Battery Buchanan, a strongpoint located outside the fort 
proper on the far extremity of the peninsula (see Figure 5-1).  Within that location, Van 
Benthuysen’s men helped man naval artillery pieces and also posted guards along the 
battery’s redoubts.  During that first day of bombardments, quite possibly the most 
intensive of the war to that point, most defenders did little except hunker down in bomb-
proofs to avoid the effects of the fires.  When the barrage finally lifted in the late 
afternoon the garrison troops ventured out of their shelters and surveyed the damage.  On 
the Union side, many of the attackers mistook the lack of return fire from the fort as an 
indication that their first day preparation fires had silenced most of the Confederate 
guns.  Accordingly, early on 25 December the Federals began the long process of 
landing their assault troops, covering their movements with a second barrage from their 
warships.  While the Union force was still transitioning ashore, at about 3:30 P.M., the 
men of Battery Buchanan finally became directly engaged in the fray.  Several small 
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Federal ships emerged from the smoke some distance offshore of the battery and 
appeared to be taking soundings and possibly attempting to clear that area of mines and 
obstacles.  It seemed as if the enemy was looking for another, closer landing point for 
their assault force.  To prevent such a move, the Confederates opened fire on the ships, 
sinking one Union Navy barge outright and driving the remainder out of the area before 
they could finish their task.42  Their actions had helped secure the southern flank of the 
fort from attack.   
Meanwhile, Union skirmishers had begun probing the landward side of the fort 
proper, looking for weaknesses in the defense.  Then, Federal soldiers under the 
command of General Benjamin Butler began massing for a concerted attack on the fort.  
To help break up the attacking force before it could fully organize, the garrison 
commander, Colonel William Lamb, called for Van Benthuysen’s men to help reinforce 
the defense at the threatened point.  On receipt of the request, Van Benthuysen quickly 
double-timed about two-thirds of his company over the distance of one mile from 
Battery Buchanan to the threatened point of the attack.  Arriving just in time to meet the 
attackers, the Marines moved immediately into the ramparts and began firing into the 
ranks of the enemy, repelling them with a ferocity that compelled Lamb to later 
commend their efforts at that critical juncture.  In the face of this stiffened defense, the 
Federals fell back, leaving their dead and wounded on the field.  Butler’s men soon 
withdrew to their ships and the fleet sailed out to sea amid the loud cheers of the fort’s 
garrison.43  The South had won the first round of the fight for Fort Fisher. 
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 The Confederates’ elation at driving off the Union attack proved to be short-
lived.  Anticipating a second Federal attempt to seize the fort, additional militia troops 
joined Lamb’s garrison, pushing the defenders’ strength above two thousand men, yet 
even then their numbers were still less than one-fifth of that of their opponent.  Not 
surprisingly, on 13 January 1865, the Union forces returned, this time in even greater 
strength.  The Federal commanders had used their time since the first attack to further 
refine their plans, hoping to resolve some of the problems that they believed had caused 
their first attempt to fail.  In this second effort, the Union plan again called for an intense 
preliminary bombardment of the fort, to be followed with a simultaneous attack by two 
land elements:  the first consisting of a Federal army unit of over ten thousand soldiers to 
attack the land side of the fort; the second consisting of a separate landing force of two 
thousand Union sailors and Marines assaulting the seaward face of the fort.44  With great 
precision, the sizeable Federal fleet moved into position to begin the attack (see Figure 
5-6). 
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Figure 5-6.  Sketch of the Plan for the Second Attack on Fort Fisher.45
 Again, Union Admiral David Dixon Porter concentrated all of his fleet’s 
firepower on the Confederate defenders, hoping to diminish their will to fight.  
199 
 
Commencing on 13 January 1865, Fort Fisher’s garrison suffered through three days of 
fierce naval bombardment, yet they weathered that phase with little deterioration in their 
morale or capability.  Finally, on 16 January 1865, Porter’s ships lifted their fires and the 
Union ground forces began their assault.  However, despite their prior preparations, 
confusion once again reigned among the attacking Federal elements.  The original 
scheme had called for Major General Alfred H. Terry’s ten thousand Union Army 
soldiers to begin their assault against the northern face of the fort simultaneously with 
the launching of an attack on the seaward side by Porter’s two-thousand-man naval 
landing force.  Instead, the two attacks were not properly coordinated, as the Federal 
naval force attacked the fort by itself before Terry’s land element was in place.  
Consequently, as the Union sailors and Marines attempted to cross an open stretch of 
beach in front of the fort, they drew the full brunt of Confederate fires.  A premature 
lifting of Union naval gunfire support compounded their predicament since it allowed 
the fort’s defenders to man their guns unmolested and concentrate their fires against the 
small, unsupported attackers as they moved across a couple of hundred yards of barren 
sand.  As a result, the naval force took heavy casualties and quickly became pinned 
down on the exposed beach.  Fortunately for the trapped naval landing party, Terry’s 
land element soon began their attack and, through sheer numbers, muscled their way into 
the fort.  The Confederate defenders fought tenaciously to repel the Federal army, but 
their survivors were ultimately forced to withdraw from the fort to Battery Buchanan on 
the extremity of the peninsula, where Union forces eventually cornered them. With no 
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line of retreat and facing far superior enemy numbers, Colonel Lamb had no option left 
but to surrender the remainder of the garrison.46   
 In general, the Confederate Marines garnered considerable praise for their 
performance during both actions; conversely, the U.S. Marines received harsh criticism, 
particularly for their near-disastrous assault on the fort’s seawall during the second 
attack.  Historian Allan Millett observes that Admiral Porter, Union naval commander of 
the operation, in an attempt to deflect any culpability on his part for the high casualties 
incurred by the naval landing force, became especially vocal and placed blame for the 
failure directly onto the shoulders of the U.S. Marine leaders.  In his official reports on 
the battle, Porter faulted the U.S. Marines for not clearing the rebel breastworks of 
infantry for his boarders, stating that “the marines could have cleared the parapets [of 
enemy] by keeping up a steady fire, but they failed to do so and the sailors were 
repulsed.”47  In his judgment, “the marines could have made the assault successful,” but 
failed, and therefore the group “lost about 200 in killed and wounded” in that action.48  
His detailed report contained a more direct indictment:  “All the arrangements on the 
part of the sailors had been well carried out; they had succeeded in getting up to within a 
short distance of the fort and laid securely in their ditches.  We had but very few killed 
and wounded up to this point.  The marines were to have held the rifle pits and cover the 
boarding party, which they failed to do.  [ . . .]  At this moment, had the marines 
performed their duty, every one of the rebels on the parapets would have been killed.”  
In other words, the fault originated not with Porter’s plans, which he believed were 
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sound and “would have succeeded without severe loss had the marines performed their 
duty.”49   
In Porter’s eyes the USMC leaders were solely responsible for the debacle.  
Within his chain of command he went even farther in his charges.  Writing 
confidentially of the controversy to the Undersecretary of the Navy, his friend Gustavus 
Vasa Fox, Porter conspiratorially related “I expect you were disappointed at our sailors 
not carrying the works, they ought to have done it, and would but for the infernal 
marines who were running away when the sailors were mounting the parapets, and every 
man fighting like a lion poor fellows . . . .”50   To Porter the USMC was not only 
incompetent, but also cowardly!  Porter’s comments aside, Millett and several other 
historians disagree, instead insisting that Porter should share some responsibility for his 
failure to clearly articulate and coordinate his plan, and to effectively supervise and 
direct his men.  Certainly, it is a widely accepted military practice that a commander is 
personally responsible for the actions, and inactions of his command.  A contemporary 
historical position is that the U.S. Marines were saddled with the failure after they were 
placed in the bad situation of being tasked to conduct an uncoordinated daylight attack 
across two hundred yards of open beach into the Confederate defensive positions.  
Millett nonetheless provides some harsh criticism of the Federal Marines, stating, “For 
both the Marines and the sailors, individual gallantry and collective ardor could not 
overcome inept tactical leadership and romantic planning . . . .”51  In contrast to these 
criticisms of the USMC, Scharf’s book and other contemporary accounts are filled with 
several first person testimonials of praise for the performance of Van Benthuysen and his 
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men.  In this one instance where elements of the two Marine Corps clashed in combat, 
the Confederates received accolades and the Federal Marines condemnation.52
 The surrender of Fort Fisher meant the end of Company B as a fighting unit, yet 
some of its members managed to fight on to the last throes of the Confederacy.  Per the 
customs in place at the time, some members captured in battle soon gained a pardon or 
were released because of wounds suffered in the fight, yet made their way back to 
Richmond rather than head home.53  There, they rejoined the war effort in various 
capacities, demonstrating an unusual strength of will in a time when many Confederate 
units were unraveling due to problems of morale leading to frequent desertions.  Some 
individual officers from Company B continued the fight to the absolute end of the 
Confederacy, performing tasks such as protecting fleeing government officials and 
guarding treasury trains.54
 In all, Company B served in a large number of posts throughout the Confederacy, 
becoming one of the most active Marine units.  Its Marines served at New Orleans, 
Pensacola, Mobile, Norfolk, Drewry’s Bluff, Charleston, and Wilmington (see Figure 5-
7).  Detachments from the company fought in an even wider range of locations, both on 
land and on the high seas.  Throughout their colorful history the men of Company B 
fought in a wide variety of roles and missions, ranging from infantry to artillery, raiders 
to quick reaction troops and ships’ guards, at all times acquitting themselves with honor 
and earning the respect of peers and enemy alike. 
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Figure 5-7.  Map Showing the Deployments of Company B, CSMC.55
Like its two sister companies already described, Company C can also trace its 
lineage back to the very creation of the CSMC, in fact to the first officer commissioned 
in the Corps.  Similarly, the pattern of the company’s service is worthy of inspection.  
Company C’s history provides further support of the contention that the CSMC served as 
a national naval force, and that Southern leaders shifted those units to meet national 
naval threats.  Furthermore, the company’s employment pattern strengthens the 
argument that the CSMC’s adoption of the concept of using the company as the base 
Marine organizational unit gave the CSMC great flexibility in fulfilling requirements for 
Marines.  Its history also illustrates the close relationship between the Marines and the 
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naval commanders with whom they served.  In a major step toward developing that 
closeness, Company C became the first Marine company to serve entirely afloat, 
simultaneously providing detachments aboard separate warships while creatively 
manning naval gun batteries aboard the squadron flagship with the remaining men of the 
command element.  Its contributions enhanced the fighting abilities of the squadron 
during actions that represented the epitome of Confederate naval operations during the 
war.  Additionally, the men of Company C became quite proficient in the complex art of 
conducting amphibious raids. 
On 25 March 1861, newly selected Confederate President Jefferson Davis 
appointed Reuben Triplett Thom of Fredericksburg, Virginia, to the rank of captain in 
the CSMC, granting him the distinction of being the first officer commissioned in that 
organization.  Thom, who had seen previous combat service as a first lieutenant in the 
Alabama Regiment of Infantry during the Mexican War, and who had held the position 
of Quartermaster General of Alabama prior to entering the CSMC, also became the 
CSMC’s first recruiting officer.  Immediately upon accepting his commission, Secretary 
Mallory directed Thom to begin recruiting volunteers within the Montgomery area, and 
soon after provided him an assistant in the form of newly appointed First Lieutenant 
Henry Laurens Ingraham, a former USMC officer.  Nonetheless, recruiting in 
Montgomery proved slow and unreliable.  When, by April 29, the two officers had only 
managed to enlist about twenty-seven Marines, Mallory grew frustrated and ordered 
Thom to join the Marine battalion at Pensacola with the men he had.  Soon after arriving 
in Pensacola, Thom’s unit became officially designated as Company C.56  
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 On 24 May, Mallory ordered Thom to turn over his company to Lieutenant 
Ingraham and to proceed to New Orleans to finish the task of recruiting his full 
complement.  The New Orleans area proved to be the most productive area for the 
CSMC’s recruiting effort.  Captain Thom found several recruits and also assumed the 
responsibility of serving as a purchasing agent for the Marine Corps, periodically 
contracting with local New Orleans companies for clothing and equipment items needed 
by the growing battalion in Pensacola.  In June, the overall pace of recruiting slowed 
considerably, forcing Thom and his noncommissioned officer assistants to travel outside 
the Crescent City, venturing as far as Mobile and Memphis in their quest for qualified 
enlistees.57   
 In the midst of their recruiting effort, events transpired in the New Orleans area 
that gave Captain Thom and the few recruits he had on hand their baptism of fire.  In the 
first days of July 1861, the Confederate garrison commander at New Orleans, Major 
General David Twiggs, became concerned about reports of Union warships and activity 
around Ship Island, located about twelve miles south of Biloxi, Mississippi.  Twiggs 
considered the island to be key terrain in his defensive plans and he feared that Federal 
forces were in the process of fortifying the island.  To counter the Union plans, Twiggs 
decided to seize the initiative first and he directed the Confederate naval forces in New 
Orleans to take and occupy Ship Island, and to then defend the island from enemy 
attempts to seize it.58       
 The Confederate Navy had few fighting men in New Orleans at that time.  
Twiggs ordered Lieutenant Alexander Warley, of the CSS McRae, to organize a raiding 
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party for the mission.  Beginning with the McRae’s own twenty-man detachment from 
Company B, Warley also solicited the assistance of Captain Thom and thirty-five of his 
recruits, who combined forces to constitute about half of a raiding party that eventually 
numbered about 140 men.  The raiders embarked aboard the steamers Oregon and 
Swain, and landed on Ship Island on the afternoon of 6 July.  Finding the island recently 
deserted by the enemy, the raiders quickly emplaced four artillery pieces and fortified 
their positions with cotton bales and sand bags.  The next morning, Warley’s defenders 
traded artillery fire with the USS Massachusetts, a Union warship dispatched to 
investigate reports of Confederate activity on the island.  During the engagement, 
Warley’s small party of Marines and sailors repulsed several attempts of the 
Massachusetts to land troops on the island, forced the warship to retire, and defended the 
island until relieved the following day by three companies of the 4th Louisiana 
Volunteers.  Thom’s Marines then returned to their recruiting duties in New Orleans and 
the McRae’s men resumed their patrols.59
 Back in Pensacola, the remainder of Company C conducted operations within the 
defensive line of General Bragg’s forces.  On 14 September, Captain Thom ceased his 
recruiting duties in New Orleans, and returned to Pensacola to reassume command of his 
company, now nearly up to its authorized strength of one hundred men.  With his 
departure, the CSMC’s organized recruiting in the Crescent City came to an end, the 
various recruiting officers having enlisted about 280 Marines during their six months of 
activity in that city.  In that critical first year of the war, New Orleans Marines made up 
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the majority of the first three full-strength companies, and were gaining increased 
experience and proficiency each day.60   
On the morning of 9 October 1861, Marines of Company C participated in a 
retaliatory raid against Federal forces on nearby Santa Rosa Island.  For this operation, 
Brigadier General Richard Anderson formed a combined Confederate force of about one 
thousand men, 80 percent being soldiers, about 10 percent being Marines, and another 
10 percent sailors.  The raiders embarked aboard several small transport vessels and 
barges on the night of 8 October, crossed the harbor and landed in the vicinity of some 
known enemy bivouac sites on the island.  Taking advantage of the night, the raiders 
marched from their landing point to their objective about three or four miles across the 
island and at about 3:30 A.M. commenced an attack on the campsite of the Union’s 6th 
New York Zouave Regiment.  The Confederates routed the Federals from their sleep and 
overran portions of the camp, burning any tents and supplies that they encountered.  
Anderson then withdrew, re-embarked his forces aboard the transports and returned 
before dawn to Pensacola.  In his official report on the action, Anderson personally 
commended Marine Lieutenants Calvin Sayre and Wilbur Johnson for rendering “me 
active and efficient assistance throughout the whole of the operation.”61  Sayre, seriously 
wounded in a leg during the action, was left behind during the withdrawal, captured, and 
received medical treatment at a Union field hospital.  At the urging of CSMC 
Commandant Colonel Beall, Sayre was subsequently exchanged for a captured Union 
officer and returned to active duty in Richmond on 29 January 1862.62    
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 Elsewhere, in a stroke of great fortune for the South, Federal forces withdrew 
from the Norfolk Navy Yard following Virginia’s secession in April 1861.  In their 
haste, the retreating Union forces failed to completely destroy the yard’s facilities and 
ships, leaving Norfolk ripe for the Confederate Navy.  The abandoned shipyard yielded a 
treasure of arms, stores and equipment that enabled the new nation to rapidly build up 
the capability of its growing navy.  Confederate naval engineers quickly exploited the 
facility, bringing its dry-docks and several half-scuttled vessels back to life.  The 
resurrected naval yard also became the headquarters for the Virginia State Navy, an 
outfit that merged with the Confederate States Navy by mid-June 1861.  As the Norfolk 
Navy Yard and the growing James River Squadron became increasingly engaged in the 
creation of the national navy’s new warships, it became apparent that Marines were 
needed to guard the base and serve aboard the ships.  To meet this requirement, around 
the end of November 1861, Secretary Mallory ordered Captain Thom’s Company C to 
duty in Virginia.63   
Arriving in Norfolk on 7 December, Thom moved his company onto the 
Confederate receiving ship Confederate States (formerly the USS United States), one of 
the resurrected ships that had been hastily scuttled by the Federals.  The Confederate 
States, while not considered to be seaworthy, had nonetheless been equipped with 
nineteen guns to enable her to serve as a harbor defense platform in addition to fulfilling 
her role as a training and receiving ship.  To augment the ship’s force, Thom posted a 
detachment under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Gwynn to serve aboard the 
vessel.  Similarly, Thom dispatched Lieutenant James Fendall and a detachment of 
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Marines to the steamer Jamestown, and the men took over one of the ship’s heavy guns.  
Thom also formed a detachment under the command of Lieutenant Richard Henderson 
(son of the former Commandant of the USMC, Archibald Henderson) to the steamer 
Patrick Henry (formerly USS Yorktown).  Then, with the remainder of his company, 
about forty strong, he reported to the South’s newest ironclad ram Virginia (formerly 
USS Merrimack) with the remainder of his company.  On the Virginia, Thom’s men, 
along with soldiers of the Norfolk United Artillery, manned two of the ship’s main guns, 
and Thom himself directed their training and employment.64  With these assignments, 
Company C now provided crucial gunners for the major Confederate ships of the James 
River Squadron.   
Following the refitting of the ironclad ram Virginia in February 1862, 
Confederate naval planners anxiously awaited the opportunity to test its design against 
the Union Navy’s wooden blockaders that were attempting to seal off the James River 
Squadron’s access to the sea.  Finally, on 8 March 1862, the Virginia, accompanied by 
the steamers Jamestown, Patrick Henry, Teaser and two other vessels ventured out into 
Hampton Roads to engage the ships of Federal Navy (see Figure 5-8).  In the ensuing 
fight, the Virginia rammed and sank the Union warship Cumberland, damaged and set 
ablaze the Congress, and forced the Minnesota to run aground.  The loss and damage to 
so many of their major warships sent shockwaves through the Union.  In response, the 
Federals countered by committing their newest design ironclad, the Monitor, to the fight 
for control of the Roads.  Shortly after daybreak on 9 March, the two iron behemoths 
met in battle, maneuvering around and firing at each other until the early afternoon, with 
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the Virginia unsuccessfully trying several times to either ram or even board the Monitor.  
In the end, the Monitor broke contact and sailed to the protection of Union shore 
batteries, yet most historians view the engagement as a draw.65  Despite this, the 
engagement proved the value of ironclads to both sides, and ushered in a new era of 
modern naval warfare.  Importantly, Confederate Marines were an integral part of the 
action and established an early positive reputation within the fledgling navy. 
 
Figure 5-8.  Hampton Roads Area on 8-9 March 1862.66
The Confederate Congress rewarded the men of the ships involved in the 
engagement at Hampton Roads with an official Resolution of Thanks.  The Marines of 
Company C contributed in the actions of those two days both by manning ship’s cannons 
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and by providing accurate small arms fires on enemy officers and gunners.  Some 
Marines were consequently injured or killed as a result of enemy fires, and their 
commanders respected their service.  Confederate Flag Officer Franklin Buchanan, 
captain of the Virginia noted, “The Marine Corps was well represented by Captain 
Thom, whose tranquil mien gave evidence that the hottest fire was no novelty to him.”67  
First Lieutenant James Fendall on board the Jamestown received similar accolades for 
the actions of his detachment during the fight.  In an official letter of commendation, the 
captain of the Jamestown, Lieutenant Joseph N. Barney, praised Fendall for “Devoting 
yourself with energy and application to the subject [of handling one of the great guns], 
you very soon brought your men to an excellence and thoroughness of drill highly 
creditable to yourself and to them.  In the action of the 8th and 9th of March, the coolness, 
rapidity and precision with which your gun was handled was noticed by me, as well as a 
matter of remark with the officers of the ship.”68
Soon after the engagement at Hampton Roads, Captain Thom relinquished his 
command to Captain John R. F. Tattnall.  Thom had been wounded in the fight at 
Hampton Roads and subsequently sent to Mobile on recruiting duty until he could 
recover.  On 17 April, Tattnall in turn relinquished his command of both Company C 
and as commander of the Virginia’s Marines to Captain Julius Ernest Meiere.  The 
Marines of Company C continued to work the guns on their respective ships through 
several smaller actions until the sudden evacuation of Norfolk Navy Yard on 10 May 
1862.69
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The surprise evacuation of Norfolk precipitated a chain of events that led to the 
first battle of Drewry’s Bluff, and Company C played a central role in that action.  With 
the evacuation, Thom’s detachment on the Confederate States became assigned to 
Company B, since that unit had arrived in Norfolk in March to assume duties as the 
Marine guard for that post.  The crew of the Virginia, following that ship’s scuttling on 
11 May, made their way up to Drewry’s Bluff, carrying with them several of the ship’s 
guns that were then emplaced to augment the bluffs’ defenses.  Soon after, as part of the 
plan to defend Richmond from Drewry’s Bluff, the Jamestown also was deliberately 
sank as part of an obstacle belt across the James River and the ship’s detachment also 
joined Meiere’s men on shore.  Those members of Company C not assigned to naval gun 
crews sited either ashore on the bluffs or on the deck of the Patrick Henry were then 
detailed to serve as sharpshooters along the riverbank, where they fought during the first 
battle for Drewry’s Bluff on 15 May 1862.70  
Following their success at Drewry’s Bluff, Meiere’s company remained with the 
Marine battalion at that location, helping to improve the fortifications and encampment. 
On 20 September 1862, Meiere relinquished command of the company, most likely to 
Captain Thomas Wilson, and proceeded to Mobile to assume command of Company D 
located there.  Meanwhile, Company C deployed as an element of the Marine battalion 
to Charleston from February to April 1863.  In Charleston, the Marines experimented 
with methods of seizing enemy ships at sea and also participated in the defense of that 
city from a Union Navy attack on 7 April.  After redeploying to Drewry’s Bluff, that 
company resumed its garrison duties with the Marine battalion.71
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In January 1864, Captain Wilson took a detachment of twenty-five Marines from 
the company to New Bern, North Carolina, for “special service” under Commander John 
Taylor Wood.  Already well trained in the tactics and techniques of ship seizures, 
Wood’s select group of volunteers were organized into specialized boat teams, and 
armed with pistols and cutlasses.  Wilson’s Marines also retained their rifles for more 
accurate, longer-range fires.  The group departed aboard fourteen small boats on the 
night of 1-2 February 1864, with the intent of boarding and seizing a Union Navy vessel 
on blockade duty.  Some time shortly after midnight on the 2nd, Wood’s men re-
embarked their boats and pulled silently toward their target.  At about 2:30 A.M., his 
raiding party boarded and gained control of the Federal warship Underwriter, but 
decided to set it aflame when they found that they could not get the ship underway 
quickly enough to evade return fire from nearby Union forts.  Nonetheless, the mission 
was considered a bold and audacious success by both Confederate and Union naval 
leaders.72
On returning to Drewry’s Bluff, Wilson again resumed command of Company C, 
and in mid-May 1864 his unit actively participated in the Second Battle of Drewry’s 
Bluff.  During that action, the company functioned principally in an infantry role, 
manning a sector of the defensive fortification that surrounded the fort proper, most 
likely to the right of Company A, guarding the left wing of the Confederate positions.  In 
early July 1864, the Marines of Company C also prepared for the battalion-sized raiding 
party to free and arm Confederate prisoners at Point Lookout, Maryland.  On 11 July the 
two blockade-runners assigned to transport the raiding force got underway, but the raid 
214 
 
force commander, Colonel John Taylor Wood, received orders to cancel the mission and 
the disappointed Marines returned to Drewry’s Bluff.73
On 29 July, after their return from the aborted raid, Wilson posted a detachment 
to the raider Tallahassee (formerly named Fingal and Atlanta, also spelled Atalanta), a 
fast vessel built especially for blockade running.  Its captain, Commander John Taylor 
Wood, proved equally as bold at sea as he did as a raider.  The detachment commander, 
Lieutenant Edward Crenshaw, documented the adventure in his diary; leaving a rare, 
inside account of the interaction of the Marines with the rest of the crew during what 
became for the Confederates an exceptionally fruitful cruise.  In his narrative, Crenshaw 
related his duties in the boarding of various vessels seized by Wood, and the role of 
Marines in controlling the captured ships’ crews and passengers.  He also recounted 
some of the negotiations that took place between Wood and the masters of captured 
vessels regarding the disposition of the vessels and their cargoes.  On that cruise, lasting 
only three weeks (from 4 to 26 August), Wood’s activities disrupted Union commerce 
along the eastern seaboard, capturing dozens of ships of all sizes.74
Meanwhile, in Mobile, a sizeable number of Marines from Company D were 
captured during the surrender of the Confederate forces in Mobile Bay in early August 
1864, leaving several pockets of surviving detachments in the area without officers.  
Intent on reorganizing the company as quickly as possible, on 18 August the Navy 
Department selected Captain Wilson to command the new unit.  Fortunately for Wilson, 
several groups of captured Marines managed to escape from Federal custody in the 
interim and make their way back to Mobile, thereby facilitating the rapid reconstitution 
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of the company.  In particular, the former company commander, Captain J. Ernest 
Meiere, and two of his lieutenants were among these surprise returnees, and the 
company was quickly returned to its former operational state, reinstating valuable 
trained men at a location where the Confederacy needed them.  As a result, Wilson soon 
returned control of Company D to Meiere, and by 15 December 1864 had reassumed his 
command of Company C at Drewry’s Bluff.75
In the closing days of the war, Company C provided a small group of Marines 
led by Lieutenant James Thurston to prepare for a daring torpedo raid.  The raid, under 
the command of Confederate Navy Lieutenant Charles Read, represented a bold attempt 
to infiltrate behind enemy lines with several specially constructed boats fitted with 
torpedoes, to attack the enemy’s critical enemy naval supply base at City Point on the 
James River.  Although risky, success on the part of the raiding party promised great 
reward for the South, and might have disrupted the logistics for Union General Ulysses 
Grant’s Army that threatened Richmond.  Certainly, the sinking of several transports and 
supply ships in the vicinity of City Point would have forced some adjustments in Grant’s 
overall plans.  The attempt was aborted when it was discovered that Union forces were 
aware of the effort, yet the daring adventure provides another example of the type of 
missions that Marines undertook during the war.76   
Alongside their sister unit, Company A, the men of Company C served in the 
Richmond area until its evacuation on 2 April 1865, then fought on as part of a 
composite naval unit until the surrender of General Lee’s army at Appomattox on 9 
April, when their official history came to an end.77  To the end, their steadfast service 
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gained them both respect and recognition, a fitting eulogy to a unit that served 
throughout the war in some of the most notable campaigns and engagements of the 
conflict.  The pattern of its employment provides further evidence of the inherent 
flexibility of the CSMC’s structure.  And, although the company served in fewer 
separate locations than either Company A or B, the officers and men of the unit 
demonstrated excellent initiative and ingenuity in adapting to new roles and missions, 
whether afloat or ashore (see Figure 5-9).  The company’s performance on ship is 
especially noteworthy, particularly during the first half of 1862.  The Marine’s met the 
challenges of sea duty head on, and fully integrated themselves into the gun crews 
aboard ships of the James River Squadron, adding materially to the combat power of the 
vessels.  The Marines of Company C also mastered the difficulties of amphibious 
raiding, from their early start at Ship Island in July 1861, and continued to volunteer for 
special operations throughout the war. 
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Figure 5-9.  Map Showing the Deployments of Company C.78
Discussion to this point has centered mainly on the activities of the first three 
separate Marine companies, in part because those units were operational from the 
beginning through the end of the war.  However, the histories and patterns formed by the 
actions of two other Marine companies add to our overall understanding of the 
functioning of the Corps.  In addition to the separate combat actions of these two 
companies, investigation and analysis of their activities suggest that the CSMC remained 
a high priority for the Confederate Navy throughout the war, and it follows that Marines 
were valued.  This supposition is borne out by the fact that well into the war, some 
priority of increasingly scarce manpower and materiel continued to be allocated for the 
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creation of these new companies.  Evidently, the requirements for additional Marine 
units outweighed competing demands.  There are other unique aspects of the 
employment of these new units that will be examined in turn. 
Although the CSMC never reached its authorized manpower level, it nonetheless 
continued to incrementally grow and expand as the war waged on.  Fully a year after the 
war began, new CSMC companies were still being formed and committed to battle in 
response to new threats.  One of those new companies was Company D, and that unit 
had one truly unique feature among the five separate Marine companies:  it served the 
entire war from one location, Mobile, Alabama.  Company D came into being as a direct 
result of a threatened enemy action.  The surprise surrender of New Orleans in April 
1862 generated great criticism about Mallory’s leadership of the navy, and his political 
foes believed that he should have taken more positive action to prevent the capture of the 
busiest port in the South.  With New Orleans now under Union control, public concern 
grew over preventing the same thing from happening to the port city of Mobile, suddenly 
the most critical port in the Gulf.  Although Mallory had earlier deployed Company B 
from Pensacola to Mobile, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, and the subsequent naval 
engagements around the mouth of the James River, forced him to transfer that company 
to Virginia to help defend the approaches to Richmond.79   
Quite possibly, Mallory’s receipt of several reports that seemed to indicate that 
great progress was being made in the defense of New Orleans may have led him to 
wrongly conclude that there was no immediate threat to the Delta.  His relocating of two 
of the three existent Marine companies to the James River area by March 1862 seems to 
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support this viewpoint.  In any event, the sudden and surprisingly successful Federal 
strike against New Orleans appeared to catch him and many other Southern leaders off 
guard, and it looked to many as if Mobile might be the Union’s next target.  Mallory 
needed to take immediate action to reinforce that port, and he decided that part of that 
response would include the establishment of a new Marine company to support the 
Mobile Squadron.  In June 1862, CSMC Headquarters in Richmond dispatched 
Lieutenant Calvin L. Sayre to Mobile to begin recruiting for a fourth company in that 
city.80
 Some time in early July 1862, Lieutenant James Fendall, a recent veteran of the 
naval engagements in Virginia aboard the Jamestown, joined Sayre in the effort to 
recruit a Marine company.  Enlistment continued at a steady pace, possibly aided in part 
by the sense of urgency generated by recent enemy activities in New Orleans.  To 
expedite the process of creating an additional company, on 20 September Mallory 
ordered one of his more experienced officers, Captain J. Ernest Meiere, to proceed to 
Mobile and assume command of what would soon be referred to as Company D.  By 2 
November 1862, Meiere reported his company strength at eighty-eight enlisted men; the 
majority assigned to several ships of the Mobile Naval Squadron, such as the 
Confederate ram Baltic, and the naval steamers Gaines, Morgan, and Mary Wilson.  
Onboard, the Marines were typically assigned to duties on the great guns, thereby 
increasing the combat power of the ship.  By taking over gunnery duties, the Marines 
helped free up sailors for the increasingly complex tasks involved with the daily running 
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of ships in the age of steam.  The Confederate Navy, always short of qualified technical 
help, seemed to appreciate the inclusion of skilled Marine gunners.81   
 For example, analysis of the muster roll for the Baltic reveals that the Marines 
comprised approximately one-third of the entire ship’s complement, a significant 
percentage of the crew.  Similarly, Marines made up about one-fifth of the total strength 
on the CSS Morgan and almost one-fourth of the men assigned to the ironclad ram 
Tennessee.82  These numbers are significant since Marines served in several of the 
Confederate Navy’s ships.  In fact, Marine detachments were often transferred from one 
ship to another in response to changing battle situations and as ships either entered or 
retired from battle, essentially having the effect of ensuring that Marines were rotated to 
ships with good chances of combat, further magnifying their significance.  Because of 
the relative mobility of its Marine detachments, the Confederate Navy, despite being 
chronically undermanned, could still field a potent fighting force, at least where it 
mattered most:  in contact with the enemy.  As proof of this employment concept, there 
are historically few examples of detachments assigned or maintained on ships that 
seemed to have little immediate chance of combat. 
 The Marines of Company D served both afloat and ashore during the Battle for 
Mobile Bay in August 1864.  Elements of the company not serving on ships fought as 
part of the garrison at Fort Gaines until its surrender on 7 August, and during the actions 
that took place at both Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely between 27 March and 11 April 
1865.  Survivors of these battles, some escaping from previous captivity or 
hospitalization and returning to active service, also fought in the last battles in Alabama 
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at Citronelle and the Nanna Hubba Bluffs, on 9 and 10 May 1865, respectively.83  In this 
respect, the Mobile Marines hold the keen distinction of being the last CSMC unit to 
surrender in the war, a testament to their determined convictions and sense of duty.  
The last of the five officially designated companies of the CSMC also came into 
existence in response to perceived threats to Southern naval interests.  Its abbreviated 
history is nonetheless important to this study since it supports the thesis that the 
Confederate Navy valued the service of its Marines and allocated its scarce resources to 
raise new companies to fill gaps in the Corps’ coverage.  In the face of severe national 
shortages in men and materiel, Confederate military and political leaders still supported 
growth within the CSMC, and Company E’s short history bears this out.  It also 
reinforces the contention that naval leaders considered their Marines a national military 
asset and both formed and employed units accordingly to counter new national naval 
threats.  Therefore, it follows that Marines were also viewed as a vital element in the 
pursuit of Confederate national naval strategy.  As small as Company E’s relative 
contributions were to the overall war effort, its existence alone is proof of some level of 
priority for the Marine Corps, particularly since its creation comes about almost two 
years into the war, when manpower and materiel shortages became commonplace.   
In the winter of 1862, increased Union Navy activity off the coast of Georgia and 
South Carolina generated a requirement for Marines to again serve with the Savannah 
Squadron since the previous company had been transferred to Drewry’s Bluff to 
augment that key position some months before.  Accordingly, beginning on 8 November 
1862, the Confederate Navy Department transferred about twenty-five Marines from 
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Company D in Mobile to Savannah, Georgia.  The men were placed under the command 
of Marine Lieutenant James Thurston, and became the nucleus of a new company to 
support the Savannah Squadron.  One of Thurston’s first actions was to form and post a 
detachment to serve on the new Confederate ironclad Atlanta.  Soon after, on 9 
December, Captain John Tattnall arrived in Savannah to assume command of the 
Marines of that station and the growing detachment became officially known as 
Company E.  And, on 31 December 1862, another twelve Marines joined the company 
from Mobile, bringing the total number of men to thirty-six.  In January 1863, Tattnall 
began making trips to local conscript camps in search of qualified volunteers, and by the 
end of the month those efforts were beginning to bear fruit.  The company grew to the 
point that when new Lieutenant Henry Graves arrived from his entry training at 
Drewry’s Bluff on 2 February, Tattnall had enough men on hand to assign Graves his 
own detachment to serve on the ironclad Savannah, at that time still under construction 
in the yard.  Graves began training his men for their duties and familiarizing them with 
the new ship, and also helped Tattnall with the task of recruiting.  Graves soon proved to 
be a skilled recruiter in his own right, since his visits produced an influx of new Marines 
that by 20 April brought the company close to its authorized strength of 100 men.84
Since the majority of the company consisted on new recruits, the company 
officers and noncommissioned officers worked tirelessly to prepare the men for their 
assignments.  The enlistees trained for long hours every day except Sunday, focusing 
primarily on close order drill, mastering the basics of marksmanship, and running gun 
drills on board their assigned ships.  The training soon paid off, since on 17 June the new 
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ironclad Atlanta’s detachment went into action.  In their first run out to sea, Thurston’s 
men manned two of the ship’s 6.4 inch Brooke rifles in an unequal engagement with the 
Federal monitor Weehawken.  In a bad turn of events for the Confederates, as the 
Atlanta’s captain attempted to close with his enemy, he ran his ship over a sandbar and 
grounded the ship within range of the enemy vessels’ batteries, leaving her vulnerable to 
repeated bombardment by the Weehawken’s more powerful 15-inch guns.  After trading 
shots for an hour and a half, the Atlanta remained fast aground under an increasingly 
effective battering by the Weehawken, forcing the captain to surrender soon afterward.85
Captured, but not yet out of the fight, Lieutenant Thurston managed to escape 
from the Union prison at Fort Warren on 19 August 1863, but he was recaptured several 
weeks later.  About a year later, Thurston gained a parole and returned back to the 
Richmond area by 1 October 1864 to rejoin the Confederate Marine Corps for duty.  Of 
the twenty-seven men under his command who were captured off the Atlanta, about 
twenty-one of them returned to their post after their parole, a testament to the sense of 
duty and esprit de corps of the Savannah Marines.86
As with other members of the Corps, the Marines of Company E became adept at 
a wide variety of tasks.  On several occasions, Savannah Marines were assigned as 
escorts for large contingents of Union prisoners being transferred between posts.  They 
also received assignments to guard naval stores and were used to help train Navy 
recruits.  In addition to performing these more routine duties the Marines still retained 
their fighting edge, participating in such noteworthy missions such as the bold seizure of 
the Union warship Water Witch as it conducted blockading duty in Ossabaw Sound.  
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Toward the end of 1864, with the Federal Navy effectively bottling up the Savannah 
Squadron, the Marines assumed a more active role as infantrymen, serving in the city’s 
defensive trenches during Union General Sherman’s final push on Savannah during his 
famous “March to the Sea.”  In December 1864, Lieutenant Henry Graves, a participant 
in the defense, dryly remarked that the Marines “had splendid positions but not the men 
to hold them.”87  Finally, after dusk on 20 December all Confederate troops were 
ordered to withdraw.  Graves’s Marines solemnly marched to a nearby railhead and 
boarded trains that took them to Charleston.  On the 21st, the crew and Marines of the 
Savannah scuttled their vessel and made their way overland, eventually linking up with 
their compatriots at Charleston.  Because of the chaotic battle situation, Company E 
began to fragment.  Some Marines made their way from Savannah to Augusta, Georgia 
aboard the CSS Macon only to end up manning an 8-inch Columbiad battery on Shell 
Bluff, a position that guarded the river approach to Augusta.  Another detachment was 
dispatched to guard the Naval Ordnance Works in Charlotte, North Carolina. 88  By May, 
the war was over, and Confederate control over South Carolina and Georgia had 
disintegrated; as that control vanished, so did Company E.  
In April 1865, as the Confederate army abandoned its defense of the capital city 
and withdrew toward the Appomattox River, the navy’s ships and stations on the James 
River no longer needed.  Mallory ordered all ships of the James River Squadron scuttled 
and its naval personnel integrated into General Lee’s army.  On 2 April 1865, as naval 
commanders carried out the orders calling for the destruction of the James River 
Squadron, they also formed an ad hoc Naval Brigade out of the sailors and Marine units 
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within the Richmond area.  Company A and Company C joined one such Naval Brigade 
under the command of Commander John Tucker, while several Marine detachments 
from ships of the James River Squadron joined a smaller Naval Brigade under the 
command of Admiral Rafael Semmes.  As Semmes’ Naval Brigade moved toward 
Danville, Virginia to help cover the retreat of the Confederate government, Tucker’s 
Naval Brigade joined General Lee’s army and were assigned to General Richard Ewell’s 
corps.89    
Company A reportedly fought as the rear guard of the Brigade, protecting the 
Confederate Army’s main body as it withdrew from Richmond and made its way 
towards the Appomattox River.  Company C provided support for their fellow Marines.  
On 6 April 1865, the Naval Brigade participated in a fierce battle along Saylor’s Creek, 
and steadfastly held their ground against repeated charges from Union General Phillip 
Sheridan’s troops.  When other Confederate units fell back under the pressure, the Naval 
Brigade continued to fight, soon becoming an isolated pocket of resistance against the 
brunt of Sheridan’s attack.  As darkness closed in, the Federal forces completed their 
encirclement of the majority of the Naval Brigade, and Tucker then ordered its 
surrender.  Some Marines managed to evade Union forces in the darkness and thick 
vegetation, and rejoined General Lee’s Army, only to find themselves present among the 
troops at the surrender of Lee’s forces at Appomattox Courthouse on 9 April 1865.  
Among the men of Company A were Lieutenant Henry McCune and twenty-one men of 
his detachment, Lieutenant Francis Cameron, and four other enlisted men of Company 
A.  Company commander Captain Thomas Wilson, Lieutenant Richard Henderson, and 
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thirteen other enlisted men represented Company C at the surrender, formally closing 
that unit’s history. 90  
 In summary, the Confederate Marines served the South well in a variety of 
missions and roles, fitting in where leaders decided they were most required.  The 
flexibility afforded by its innovative adoption of a company-based structure allowed for 
rapid employment and redeployment of Marines throughout the South, giving naval 
leaders a unit that could be depended upon to react to sudden changes in the enemy 
situation.  The South’s Marines performed well wherever Confederate sailors met the 
enemy.  They also cooperated effectively with army forces in places like Pensacola, Fort 
Fisher or Fort Gaines.  And, in contrast to their Northern cousins, the CSMC embraced 
new technologies, tactics and techniques that could help them overcome the national 
shortages they faced in terms of manpower, material, and money. 
 The Confederacy was fortunate in that it inherited a fine group of Marine officers 
who embraced new ideas and concepts.  Many of the CSMC’s leaders had been raised 
under the tutelage of Commandant Henderson, and they carried many of those reforms 
South with them.  As a result, the CSMC benefited from these men’s expertise from its 
inception.  These experienced leaders refused to be content with old, proven ideas, but 
felt comfortable in seeking and experimenting new solutions to new problems, creating 
an environment that supported innovation.  In other words, the South’s Marine Corps 
became both functionally and philosophically different from the Marine Corps of which 
it sprang.  Within this new Corps, original ideas were not only welcome, but also 
expected.  Furthermore, the CSMC’s officers were not content to sit and wait for orders 
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from above, but seized every opportunity to push the Corps into new roles and missions.  
The company-grade officers exercised their initiative and worked closely with their local 
superior officers to ensure that the Marines became a valuable and highly desired 
component.  In effect, the actions of these officers constituted a revolution from below; a 
movement to increase the value of Marines by becoming more relevant and skilled.  In a 
war that generated dynamic changes in naval technology in a relatively short period of 
time, the capabilities to innovate and adapt were paramount.  The CSMC met the 
challenges of modern naval warfare head on. 
 As further evidence of its innovative nature, the CSMC’s adoption of its unique 
company-based structure predated its acceptance by the U.S. Marine Corps by several 
decades.  The advantages of that system are many.  It enabled Confederate leaders to 
manage their manpower and assets more effectively by assigning forces according to 
mission and enemy threat.  Company structure allowed naval leaders to remotely assign 
Marines to locations where their service was needed and shift those assets as 
requirements changed.  Additionally, the structure of the company gave it some degree 
of self-sufficiency, facilitating both the command and control of subunits and specialized 
logistical support to keep them combat ready.  In this manner, the CSMC’s organization 
and the operational concept of employment helped Secretary Mallory achieve both 
economy of force and concentration, two important principles of war. 
  This examination of CSMC operations at the battalion, company and detachment 
level illustrates the inherent advantages of the CSMC’s organizational model over that of 
the pre-war U.S. Marine Corps structure.  Adopting permanent companies as the base 
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level of command represented an innovative departure from the traditional Marine Corps 
model and afforded Confederate naval leaders increased options and maximum 
flexibility for employment of their forces.  
 Moreover, the analysis of the patterns of employment of the individual 
companies, and the timing of their formation, support the contention that Confederate 
leaders considered the CSMC to be an integral part of the navy, and a national military 
asset.  It seems evident that the South’s leaders valued the service of their Marines and 
consequently assigned some level of priority to raising and maintaining new companies, 
even in the face of crippling national shortages and sharp competition for resources.  
Finally, a critical examination of the histories of these unit’s combat actions bears out a 
general commitment on the part of Marines collectively to accomplish their missions.  
One gains the sense that they reached even beyond their assigned tasks and exercised a 
collective initiative to do more than what was normally expected.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Anticipating that the Confederate Navy would need a corps of Marines, Southern 
leaders created the Confederate States Marine Corps (CSMC).  As a result of several 
factors, that unit evolved into a unique organization to meet special wartime challenges.  
The CSMC contributed in a number of significant ways to the South’s war effort, and its 
leaders both appreciated and commended its service during the American Civil War.  
Despite its achievements, little effort has been made over the intervening years to either 
understand or analyze the Corps’ many contributions.  Consequently, few military 
historians have realized the variety or significance of the CSMC’s actions, or how it fit 
into the history of the war.  This thesis argues that the historical importance and 
relevance of the CSMC to the Confederacy, and the contributions of its men toward the 
development of the Marine Corps as a military force is under-appreciated by historians.    
From the CSMC’s very inception, Southern leaders designed it for a specific 
purpose, unique to their needs.  This is evident from their deliberate departure from the 
traditional U.S. Marine Corps structural model, investing time and effort instead to 
configure their Corps differently.  The easiest solution would have been to simply adopt 
a version of the USMC’s structure, yet it seems clear that Confederate leaders were not 
content with that approach.  They instead invented a more flexible and adaptable 
organization that best met their perceived requirements for their new navy.  Although 
specific records of the deliberations that went into the creation of the CSMC have not yet 
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been discovered, and may not have survived the war, other historical documentation 
provides some insight into the advantages of the CSMC’s makeup and how it fit within 
the Confederate naval strategy. 
Those advantages inherent in the South’s Marine Corps structure seem clear.  
The innovative organizational model provided the Confederacy with a naval military 
unit that fulfilled a requirement for flexibility by being capable of employment in a 
variety of configurations.  Options included committing Marines as a battalion, as 
separate companies, as detachments, or even as some combination of all of these.  
Comprehensively examining the CSMC’s record of service strongly supports the 
conclusion that Confederate leaders continuously exercised this inherent operational 
flexibility to maximum advantage during the war.  And, as the war progressed, many 
changes were made to their tactical and operational employing of the Corps’ elements, 
continuously matching their Marine assets to the requirements facing them.  Southern 
leaders repeatedly allocated their Marines on a national level based on their estimation of 
operational needs in specific theaters and reallocated them in response to changes in 
their assessment.  Therefore, Marine units spent most of the war in active contact with 
the enemy, forward deployed to locations with a high likelihood of combat.   
On several occasions, Confederate leaders formed Marine battalions, committing 
them to defend priority objectives.  Some of these deployments were notable for the 
successes achieved, with Marines contributing to the defeat of significantly stronger 
enemy forces.  During these operations, Marine battalions served under both army and 
navy commands, providing further evidence of the joint nature of their mission.  In 
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rising to the demands of being employed in multiple ways, the performance of the 
Marine battalions provides a testament to the readiness and adaptability of Marine 
leaders and men in their responding as an expeditionary unit.   For example, during 
Union General George McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign of 1862, the Confederates 
created an ad hoc Marine battalion out of several companies and detachments and 
immediately committed it at Drewry’s Bluff to defend the capital of Richmond.  Despite 
the hasty nature of its forming, the CSMC battalion met the challenge and quickly 
organized for combat.  Its men served in several roles, constituting an important element 
of the joint defensive force, and performed well in a desperate fight against a superior 
Federal naval force.  The Marine battalion helped to turn back the Union drive, seal off 
the Upper James River to the enemy, and achieve a timely victory.1     
Southern leaders also detailed Marine battalions to accomplish offensive 
missions.  One notable example is their planning to use a battalion as an assault element 
in an amphibious raid in June 1864.  Hoping to land an amphibious force behind enemy 
lines to attack and free Confederate prisoners of war, southern leaders assigned the 
Marine battalion to secure a beachhead and attack Union troops guarding the prison 
camp.  Although President Jefferson Davis regretfully cancelled the raid at the last 
moment, the scope of the assignment is indicative of the level of trust and confidence 
that the Confederacy’s senior leaders possessed in the performance and capabilities of 
their Marines.2  
However, the most important characteristic in the South’s employing of its 
Marines is found in its incorporation of permanent companies into the structure of the 
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Corps.  This organizational trait makes the CSMC a truly unique American Marine unit 
and imparted it with certain operational advantages over its Northern cousin, which had 
no formal structure at all and did not form permanent companies or battalions until the 
Spanish-American War, almost half a century later.3  Although both American Marine 
Corps fielded ad hoc battalions during the war, the South’s organizing of its Marines 
into permanent companies helped to stabilize its personnel at the small-unit level, 
increasing the cohesion of the unit beyond that experienced within the USMC.  Quite 
often men remained with the same company for the duration of the war.  Personnel 
stability has long been recognized as one of the factors that add to a particular unit’s 
combat effectiveness.  Within the CSMC, the company became the base unit of 
organization, the unit to which men were assigned to first, and could then be further 
allocated in detachments.  Additionally, these same companies comprised the basic 
building block for the forming of ad hoc battalions, created by the simple expedient of 
assigning two or more companies under a battalion command element composed 
generally of headquarters personnel.  Therefore, the creating and employing of 
permanent companies added great flexibility, responsiveness and adaptability to the 
organization, and the Confederates made maximum use of those attributes.   
Analysis of the South’s pattern of employing its Marines indicates that its leaders 
deployed individual Marine companies and detachments to critical areas, allocating the 
CSMC’s combat power on a national level by applying it selectively to specific locations 
where Marines were most needed.  A good example of this methodology in action can be 
seen in the forming and employing of a separate company for service at Mobile Bay 
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following occupation of New Orleans by the Union navy.  With the sudden loss of New 
Orleans, southern leaders felt compelled to reinforce Mobile to forestall that port’s fall to 
a similar fate.  The formation of a new Marine company at that location became part of 
that effort.  Similarly, when it seemed likely that Union forces would soon attack 
Wilmington in late 1864, naval leaders relocated a Marine company to that location to 
augment its defense.  The Wilmington Marines reinforced Confederate defenders at Fort 
Fisher just in time to help repel the first assault on that strongpoint by a large-scale joint 
Union amphibious force.  The CSMC companies’ contributions were commended and 
credited with helping to defeat the Federal attack.  Although the fort fell to a second, 
stronger assault by Federals less than a month later, the Confederate Marines again 
proved valuable in the desperate fight that ensued. 
Additionally, the CSMC assigned some companies to directly support the 
operations of specific naval squadrons, particularly those most actively engaged with the 
enemy.  Depending on the needs of the squadron commander, company commanders 
would often form smaller detachments to serve aboard select Confederate Navy 
warships.  Usually, the company commander would position himself and some of his 
men aboard the squadron flagship, where he could both continue to coordinate with the 
naval commander and control the training and performance of his detachments.  Often, 
detachments were transferred between vessels as one ship might be removed from 
service because of enemy action or maintenance, allowing the commander to maintain 
the majority of his men where they would be most likely to engage the enemy.  
In combat, Confederate Marines were commonly employed either as 
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infantrymen, as artillery gunners, or even as a combination of the two roles.  Marines 
also served on occasion with the Confederate Torpedo Service, participating in several 
raids and expeditions with specialists from that field.  With regard to their role as naval 
artillerymen, Marines served as gunners on both shore and shipboard batteries.  Ashore, 
Southern Marines operated naval artillery at Pensacola, Drewry’s Bluff, Mobile, 
Savannah, Fort Fisher, and other locations.  At each of these posts, the gunners proved to 
be an important element in the defensive scheme.  Afloat, naval commanders frequently 
assigned their Marines to command and man shipboard gun batteries, where they 
demonstrated themselves to be both proficient at those duties and active contributors in 
each ship’s combat actions.  For instance, Marines directed and operated gun batteries on 
at least three of the Confederate warships that took part in the famous engagements off 
the Hampton Roads in Virginia in March 1862.  Marines also served proudly on all but 
one of the Confederate cruisers, helping them strike fear into Federal merchant ships in 
all the oceans of the world.  On the cruisers, Marines not only manned guns, but also 
formed boarding parties that seized and guarded the passengers and crews of hundreds of 
captured Union merchant vessels. 
Of course, Federal Marines also served as naval artillerymen on select Union 
ships.  However, where the employing of Southern Marines as gunners seemed an 
almost routine practice in the Confederate Navy, the use of Northern Marines in that 
same role within the Union Navy became a more controversial and often contentious 
matter.  Historian Allan Millett notes that Union “ships captains assigned Marines as gun 
crews as a matter of expediency, not as Navy Department policy.  Many [Federal] 
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vessels survived without Marine gunners.  Moreover, the vast majority of Navy vessels 
that participated in the war did not carry guards at all, and others had only a sergeant’s 
guard of ten to twenty men.”4  This is almost the exact opposite of the experience of the 
Confederate Marines, who were actively solicited for shipboard combatant service. 
The reasons for this difference may be found in the attitudes of each service’s 
officers regarding their views on their role as Marines.  Although Northern Marines 
experienced arguably their greatest successes as gunners aboard navy warships, many 
USMC officers sought to deliberately distance their men from such duties, preferring 
instead to conduct more mundane and less practical tasks as shipboard guards.  In 
combat, some Federal Marines continued to advocate the time-honored, yet increasingly 
archaic, mission of providing sharpshooters to fire on the officers and gunners of the 
opposing ship, a tactic that became increasingly impractical as both navies embraced 
ironclad ships and high-velocity naval cannon.  Some Federal Marine officers even went 
so far as to openly question the need for their Corps’ continued close association with 
the navy at all, causing further friction between the leaders of the two Northern naval 
services.5  No evidence has been uncovered that Confederate Marines enjoyed similar 
views.  In fact, accounts support the thesis that CSMC officers actively sought duty as 
gunners, and Confederate naval officers appreciated and encouraged such service. 
Similarly, there were apparent differences between the two Marine Corps 
regarding their assignments to shore batteries.  Although Southern Marines were 
routinely assigned duties manning shore-based artillery batteries, there seems to be no 
reference made to Northern Marines being employed in an equivalent capacity.  
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Confederate Marines embraced this role, and their performance in these duties was both 
appreciated and commended at the highest levels of their government.  Furthermore, 
such assignments were made irrespective of the size of the unit, whether it be battalion, 
company or detachment strength.  When in battalion strength, the Marines seemed to 
always employ at least one company as gunners, with the remainder fulfilling infantry 
roles, a clear example of mastery of modern combined arms principles.  For example, 
during the CSMC’s first battalion employment, to Pensacola in early 1861, Company B 
manned a battery of ten-inch Columbiads, and Companies A and C served as 
infantrymen in the defensive fortifications.  At the First Battle at Drewry’s Bluff in May 
1862, Marines from Company C operated several naval artillery pieces that had been 
salvaged from ships of the James River Squadron while Company B served as 
sharpshooters along the river bank to harass the enemy and repel attempts to land troops.  
Furthermore, the Marines of Company B, during their deployment in late 1864 to Fort 
Fisher, manned several naval guns sited at Battery Buchanan, then served also as a 
reaction force to repel assaulting Union troops.  Similarly, there are several examples of 
detachments manning shore batteries, usually after the ship on which it served became 
disabled or ineffective.  Evidently, naval artillery training and gunnery were required 
skills for most Marines in the CSMC, in addition to training as infantrymen.     
The CSMC’s unique company-based structure facilitated both the rapid 
concentration of forces and their subsequent redeployment to new areas of interest.  
Companies from several separate locations could be quickly retasked and organized into 
ad hoc battalions when needed.  Alternatively, when Marines were no longer required in 
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a specific area, or when faced with multiple priorities, leaders could rapidly break up the 
battalion into separate company units and redeploy them appropriately according to the 
situation at hand.  This particular concept of operations facilitated both the swift massing 
of Marine units and the achieving of economy of force:  two important principles of war 
that helped the South better manage its smaller military resources.   
Under this concept, the company headquarters not only supported its 
detachments logistically and administratively, but also allocated its resources to meet the 
needs of the area commander to which it was assigned.  Analysis of company and 
detachment operations supports the contention that this method of employment was an 
efficient system.  The company commander developed, prioritized and instituted 
standardized training for his men, and supervised them in their duties.  Each company 
also served as a base for initial recruiting and training, and with the presence of a 
battalion structure to help support higher-level training it became easy to establish a 
degree of commonality and cohesion throughout the Corps.  Although the USMC 
undoubtedly attained some similar degree of these characteristics, the permanence of the 
CSMC’s company-based assignments and its employment model seems more effective.   
The combination of all these features, amply evident through the accounts of company 
employments during the war, made the CSMC an agile and versatile unit. 
Outside of its differences in structure, the CSMC owed much to the Federal 
Marines.  From that unit the CSMC gained many of its officers and senior enlisted men, 
many of whom had acquired valuable experience in its service that directly benefited the 
new Corps.  Most of the officers had commanded Marines afloat in expeditionary-type 
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operations of varying scale and scope throughout the oceans of the world.  Some had 
worked closely with the USMC’s venerable and prescient commandant, Archibald 
Henderson, in the decade leading up to the rebellion.  Several were intimately involved 
in promulgating or instituting the various reforms pushed by Henderson that were 
designed to embrace modern naval technologies and adjust tactics with the goal of 
enhancing the combat capabilities of the Marine Corps.  These leaders brought all of that 
knowledge and experience with them when they went South, and infused the new CSMC 
with their spirit of innovation.  These men helped the new Corps to quickly make up for 
its late start and helped to place the new unit in operation in a rapid and well-organized 
manner. 
Conversely, the loss of these same leaders impacted the USMC negatively at the 
most inopportune time.  When it most needed them, the USMC lost over half of its 
company-grade officers and several key staff officers.  Had they remained in Federal 
service, all would have been intensely involved in the important task of training new 
enlistees.  Instead, their resignations created a leadership vacuum in the USMC that 
deprived incoming recruits of adequate training and supervision, a factor that contributed 
to the USMC’s poor performance in combat in its earliest test at the First Battle of Bull 
Run.6  In that fight, the Marine Battalion broke from its position three times, prompting 
their commandant to lament that the debacle was “the first instance in history where any 
portion of [the USMC] turned their backs to the enemy.”7  In this, their initial combat 
action of the war, the USMC established a negative reputation that proved difficult to 
shake.  
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The CSMC’s success depended in large part on the quality of its leaders.  Strong 
and confident officers provided the key to making the CSMC’s company-based structure 
and flexible employment concept work.  Fortunately for the South, the CSMC benefited 
greatly through its acquisition of significant numbers of former Federal officers.  
Training the South’s new Marines immediately tested these men, already skilled and 
adept at leading Marines in small-unit expeditionary operations.  In that task, 
accomplished without close or direct supervision, these leaders relied on what they had 
learned over their previous years of service.  Since Confederate Marines spent 
comparatively less time assigned to depot assignments than their Northern counterparts, 
their leaders’ previous experiences at expeditionary duties proved even more critical.  
Similarly, when assigned aboard ship, Confederate Marines were more likely to be 
placed on ship’s batteries than their USMC cousins, making proficiency in artillery 
almost a requirement.  To all indications, Confederate Marine officers imparted among 
their men not only the traditions, discipline and spirit of the prewar Marine Corps, but 
helped to achieve Commandant Henderson’s goal of creating a modern and adaptable 
fighting force as well.  Their Marines became adept at both infantry and artillery skills, 
and embraced their role as an expeditionary naval force.   
 Led by such strong, confident officers, the CSMC’s employment scheme 
emphasizing detached service had other benefits as well.  Such service fostered an 
environment that valued the exercising of good initiative and sound judgment among its 
leaders.  This environment promoted the growth of men who felt comfortable with 
articulating and coordinating mission requirements with local commanders, exercising 
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individual initiative in the absence of direct supervision, taking personal responsibility 
for their actions, and working in pursuit of common goals.  The combination of a 
structure that supported detached service and leaders accustomed to acting in the 
absence of direct supervision paid great dividends in the long run.  These factors created 
a synergistic effect that promoted an expansion of the CSMC’s roles and missions during 
the war as small unit leaders seized local opportunities to advantage.  Basically, without 
the constraint of having to consult with higher leaders on every aspect of their duties in 
advance of taking action, company and detachment commanders frequently acted on 
their own initiative to develop new tactics or adopt new roles or missions.  They 
understood both their mission and the intent of their higher commanders, and took steps 
to fulfill that intent.  Examples of this phenomenon abound, but several come to mind 
easily:  the actions of Captain Thomas Wilson, in proactively becoming expert in the 
skills of raiding, of Captain Thom in helping seize Ship Island, and of Lieutenant 
Everard Eggleston, in his developing the art of shore-based naval gunfire spotting.8  
Institutionally, the CSMC’s senior leaders also contributed significantly to the 
successes enjoyed by the Marines.  Gaining some of Archibald Henderson’s leading 
proponents of modernization and reform, the CSMC became the de facto extension of 
the old commandant’s drive.  Men such as Major Israel Greene, Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Tyler, Sr., and Captains John Simms and George Terrett kept Henderson’s 
reforms and his spirit of innovation alive, and also fostered within their Corps a sense of 
esprit de corps.  These officers shaped the direction that the CSMC would take and 
implemented training programs that were built off the ones they left behind in the North.  
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These leaders instilled discipline and motivations within the ranks that reflected the 
exacting standards and principles they themselves had served under for decades.  Under 
their tutelage, new officers and men were screened, trained and imbued with the spirit of 
Henderson’s antebellum Marine Corps.   
Archibald Henderson had espoused a need for the Marine Corps to become more 
dynamic by acquiring skills in amphibious and expeditionary operations.  He had 
labored to expand the Marine Corps’ capabilities in those areas.  And, since many of his 
principle supporters of these initiatives entered the CSMC, some of these same ideas 
transferred to the South’s Corps with them.  Furthermore, the Confederate Navy came to 
be led by Stephen Mallory, a man who embraced new ideas and concepts as a means of 
overcoming the South’s disadvantages and shortages.  Mallory also exercised a form of 
decentralized command and control of the navy, creating an environment in which 
subordinate leaders were expected to exercise their personal initiative in the absence of 
direct orders.  In this environment, independent and confident Marines thrived.  The 
CSMC’s officers welcomed innovation and actively sought to expand their participation 
into new areas of combat.  Their efforts would take Marines increasingly into new areas, 
particularly the arena of amphibious raids and special operations.  Thus, the CSMC 
became an integral and indispensable part of the Confederate Navy. 
In the end, the initiatives of Archibald Henderson did more to prepare the CSMC 
for its service during the Civil War than it did for the USMC.  Its abbreviated history 
indicates that the CSMC moved into new mission areas and embraced new technologies 
and tactics.  In contrast, under the direction of Henderson’s more traditional and 
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conservative replacement, Colonel John Harris, the USMC regressed into its historical 
support tasks that were not in tune with the realities of modern naval tactics.  Within the 
same period of time that saw the CSMC become adept at amphibious raiding and 
performing vital combat functions on naval ships, the USMC, despite organizing itself 
for use as an amphibious element, spent much of its time as mere passengers aboard 
navy ships; being moved almost administratively from area to area aboard transports, yet 
seldom being afforded an opportunity to be committed ashore.  Although there are a few 
notable exceptions, when assigned afloat, Federal Marines functioned too often as little 
more than guards for the ship’s officers, an increasingly irrelevant role in the age of 
ironclads and long-range naval artillery.  In the few instances when it was employed as 
part of an amphibious force, the USMC’s generally poor performance served only to 
draw increased criticism and made leaders more reluctant to employ them in the future.  
The CSMC, however, earned the respect of the leaders it supported and its officers 
passed up few opportunities to do more than what was expected of them. 
If the progressive development of the prewar Marine Corps were viewed using 
the analogy of the growth of a tree, and secession representing a split of the trunk into 
two separate branches, events that occurred within the Federal Marine Corps soon after 
secession stunted the growth of its branch.  Conversely, the South’s branch continued to 
grow during the war, becoming in a sense the lead bough of the Marine Corps’ 
developmental tree as that unit reached into new mission areas and mastered modern 
tactics.  Unfortunately for both Marine Corps (and by extension, the American armed 
forces), the South’s defeat resulted in its branch being broken off completely, leaving the 
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stunted branch representing the U.S. Marine Corps to struggle for mere existence for the 
next three decades.  To make matters worse, little effort seemed to be made on the part 
of the victorious Union to try and realize any lessons from its Southern cousin’s service.  
As a result, several successful initiatives of the CSMC were overlooked, and American 
Marine Corps development experienced a setback that took decades to overcome.  
Federal Marines, having both regressed in their development and suffering from their 
poor performance record in the war, found themselves in serious danger of becoming 
obsolete, or being possibly absorbed by other services.  According to historian Jack 
Shulimson, “by the late 1870s the [U.S.] Marine Corps was an organizational anomaly 
and in some disarray.  Dispersed into small detachments of usually 100 men or less, the 
Marine Corps had no formal company, battalion, or regimental structure,”9 a simple step 
forward that might have been discerned if even a cursory examination of the CSMC had 
been made.  Instead, decades after the war, lessons remained unlearned and as a result 
the USMC found itself in serious danger of being dissolved.   
On several occasions during the war, despite operating in an environment of 
shortages and competing priorities, the Confederate Congress expanded the authorized 
strength of the CSMC.  This simple, yet significant, action confirmed not only their 
confidence in that unit, but acknowledged that the requirements for its service grew 
commensurately as the war progressed.  It provides further proof that the South’s leaders 
considered the CSMC to be an essential component of the Confederate Navy.  
Furthermore, although the CSMC never managed to fill its authorized strength, it 
nonetheless continued to increase its personnel in spite of the mounting challenges to 
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recruit men for its demanding duties.  Despite offering potential recruits lower relative 
pay, little chance of promotion, a strict disciplinarian lifestyle and guaranteed service 
outside one’s home state, by 1865 the CSMC contained more personnel than it did in 
December 1861.10  This fact in itself is significant, particularly when one compares the 
CSMC’s size to the strengths of many of the Confederate Army’s regiments at the end of 
the war.11  Notwithstanding the rigors of national service as a Marine, the CSMC 
stubbornly continued to field operational units through the final days of the war, and in 
some cases constituted almost one quarter of the on-hand strength aboard the few 
remaining navy ships.  Marines represented a significant percentage of the manpower in 
the Confederate Navy, a far greater percentage than their Northern cousins, the USMC. 
This thesis has demonstrated that previous accounts have failed to clearly 
appreciate the level of the CSMC’s rich history of service within the Confederate 
military.  In particular, previous historians have not fully explored the Corps’ service at 
the national level.  Throughout the conflict, Marines served within army and navy 
organizations, and were involved in some significant battles of the war, especially at 
Drewry’s Bluff in 1862, where their actions helped prevent an early Union seizure of the 
Southern capital city.  Moreover, Confederate leaders understood the value of their 
Marines and shifted them from one theater to another in response to national priorities 
and in support of a national naval strategy.  The CSMC rarely saw a break in action, 
since inactivity in one particular location usually signaled redeployment to another area 
with more pressing needs.         
Throughout the war, Confederate Marines increased the breadth and range of 
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their capabilities, becoming a progressively greater asset to the Confederate Navy and a 
valued and important unit in their own regard.  The war saw their expansion from a more 
traditional use as guard forces on ships and naval bases to their becoming seasoned 
veterans of important battles and masters of the tactics, techniques and procedures 
inherent in highly specialized raids.  The innovative nature of the CSMC came into its 
own when its men began to fill the vacuum caused by the revolution in naval technology 
and tactics.  Southern Marines developed and expanded their skills to meet the 
operational challenges of the day, often without outside direction.  Individually, many of 
the CSMC’s leaders developed an innate understanding of what needed to be 
accomplished and took action to get the job done.  Often, their actions went 
unrecognized by the public at large, yet they persevered for the cause they believed in, 
fighting against superior forces until the very end of the war.  Although for decades 
much of their efforts have been under-appreciated, their legacy of action and innovation 
now speaks for itself.   
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Company, 1982), 100. 
5 See Chapter II for a discussion of this topic; see also Millett, Semper Fidelis, 97-98. 
6 See Millett, Semper Fidelis, 78-80; David M. Sullivan, The United States Marine Corps 
in the Civil War, 4 vols. (Shippensburg, Pa.:  White Mane Publishing, 2000), 1:  
142-53. 
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7 Harris to Welles, Headquarters, letter, 26 July 1861, Record Group 80 (Letters from 
Marine Officers), National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, 
D.C. (hereafter NA). 
8 Capt. Thomas Wilson and his men became skilled at raiding and seizing enemy ships 
afloat after working to develop such tactics and procedures in early 1863 at 
Charleston, South Carolina.  Wilson and his men put their skills to work in early 
1864 by participating in the seizure and destruction of the Federal warship 
Underwriter off New Berne, North Carolina.  Capt. Reuben Thom and thirty-five 
new enlistees, reinforced by the twenty-man Marine detachment of the steamer 
McRae, formed the nucleus of an amphibious raiding party that successfully 
occupied and defended Ship Island in the approach to New Orleans in July 1861.  
Lt. Everard Eggleston, a detachment commander aboard the ironclad 
Fredericksburg, moved ashore with a signals officer to adjust naval gunfire onto 
a concentration of Federal troops that were about to overrun a Confederate army 
position.  The Fredericksburg’s gunners could not see where their rounds were 
falling, so Eggleston located himself where he could do so, and his actions were 
credited with breaking up the Union attack.  This may represent one of the 
earliest examples of shore-based naval gunfire spotting in American military 
history.  See the appropriate accounts in Chapters III, IV, and V for greater 
detail.  
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9 Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880-1898 (Lawrence, 
Kans.:  University Press of Kansas, 1993), 1-10, quote from 1. 
10 According to Ralph Donnelly, The History of the Confederate States Marine Corps 
(New Bern, N.C.:  published by the author, 1976), 4, the end strength of the 
CSMC in 1861 was probably around 350, while it was estimated at 561 on 31 
October 1864.  Also see the author’s analysis of Donnelly’s figures and estimates 
of the CSMC’s end strength at various benchmarks in Chapter II.  
11 In the last few years of the war, many Confederate regiments had shrunk to the size 
where they had become combat ineffective, some being manned only by senior 
and often infirm officers.  Many were regiments in name only.  Several efforts on 
the part of politicians and army headquarters to consolidate assets and weed out 
inefficiencies met with little success.  In light of this situation, the success of 
senior CSMC leaders in fielding combat units to the end of the conflict seems to 
be a noteworthy success.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
U.S.  Marine Corps Officers Who Resigned or Were Dismissed Between December 
1860 and December 18631  
 
Name    Rank  Separation Type  Remarks  
Terrett, George H.  Major  Dismissed   CSMC, CSA 
Tyler, Henry B. Sr.  Major  Dismissed   CSMC 
 
Rich, Jabez C.   Capt  Dismissed   Va. MC 
Simms, John D.  Capt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Tansill, Robert  Capt  Dismissed   CSMC, CSA 
Taylor, Algernon S.  Capt  Dismissed   CSMC 
 
Baker, Adam N.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Greene, Israel   1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Hays, Andrew J.  1stLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Henderson, Charles A. 1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Holmes, George  1stLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Kidd, Robert   1stLt  Dismissed   Unknown 
Matthews, S. H.  1stLt  Dismissed   Unknown 
                                                 
1 Material included in this appendix is compiled from two sources:  U.S. Navy Department, “List of All 
Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps who Left the Service Between December 1, 1860 
and December 1, 1863, by Resignation, Dismissal, or Desertion, to Engage in the Rebellion Against the 
Government, or Otherwise,” Executive Document No. 3 (January 5, 1864), 38th Cong., 1st Sess.; also 
biographical information found in Donnelly, Biographical Sketches. 8-11, 84-85, 91-92, 101-102, 105, 
111-112, 129-131, 168-170, 189-190, 197-199, 224-225, 230-233, 236-239, 259, 263-265, 267-269, 286, 
4, 77, 213, 17, and 243,  respectively.
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Name    Rank  Separation Type  Remarks  
Meier, Julius E.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Read, Jacob   1stLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Stark, Alexander W.   1stLt  Dismissed   CSA 
Tattnall, John R.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Turner, George P.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Tyler, Henry B. Jr.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
Wilson, Thomas S.  1stLt  Dismissed   CSMC 
 
Cummins, George W.  2ndLt  Dismissed   Unknown 
Grant, Oscar B.  2ndLt  Resigned   In North 
Howell, Becket K.  2ndLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Ingraham, Henry L.  2ndLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Rathbone, J. H.  2ndLt  Resigned   In North 
Reber, J. M.   2ndLt  Dismissed   In North 
Sayre, Calvin L.  2ndLt  Resigned   CSMC 
Sells, D. M.   2ndLt  Resigned   In North 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Confederate Marine Corps Officers with Prior Service in the  
United States Military1  
 
U.S. Marine Corps 
Name    Rank Date Served Combat Duty CSMC Rank  
Baker, Adam Neill  1stLt 1853-1861 No  1stLt 
Greene, Israel   Capt 1847-1861 Yes  Major (Adjutant) 
Hays, Andrew Jackson 1stLt 1847-1861 No  1stLt 
Holmes, George  1stLt 1849-1861 Yes  Capt 
Howell, Beckett Kempe 2ndLt 1860-1861 No  1stLt 
Ingraham, Henry Laurens 2ndLt 1858-1861 No  1stLt 
Meier, Julius Ernest  1stLt 1855-1861 Yes  1stLt 
Read, Jacob   Capt 1847-1861 Yes  Capt 
Sayre, Calvin Lawrence 2ndLt 1858-1861 Yes  1stLt 
Simms Jr., John Douglas Capt 1841-1861 Yes  Capt 
Tattnall, John Rogers   Capt 1847-1861 Yes  Capt 
Taylor, Algernon Sidney Capt 1839-1861 Yes  Major 
Terrett, George Hunter Major 1830-1861 Yes  Major 
Turner, George Pendleton 1stLt 1856-1861 Yes  1stLt
                                                 
1 Material included in this appendix is compiled from two sources:  U.S. Navy Department, “List of All 
Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps who Left the Service Between December 1, 1860 
and December 1, 1863, by Resignation, Dismissal, or Desertion, to Engage in the Rebellion Against the 
Government, or Otherwise,” Executive Document No. 3 (January 5, 1864), 38th Cong., 1st Sess.; also 
biographical information found in Donnelly, Biographical Sketches. 8-11, 84-85, 91-92, 101-102, 105, 
111-112, 129-131, 168-170, 189-190, 197-199, 224-225, 230-233, 236-239, 259, 263-265, 267-269, 286, 
4, 77, 213, 17, and 243,  respectively. 
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U.S. Marine Corps (Continued) 
Name    Rank Date Served Combat Duty CSMC Rank  
Tyler Sr., Henry Ball  Major 1823-1861 Yes  LtCol 
Tyler Jr., Henry Ball  2ndLt 1855-1861 Yes  1stLt 
Wilson, Thomas Smith 2ndLt 1857-1861 No  1stLt 
 
U.S. Navy 
Name    Rank Date Served Combat Duty CSMC Rank  
Allison, Richard Taylor Purser 1849-1861 No  Major (Paymaster) 
Gonzalez, Samuel Zacharias SK2 1854-1861 No  Major (Qtrmaster) 
Stockton, Edward Cantey Lt 1849-1858 No  2ndLt 
 
U.S. Army 
Name    Rank Date Served Combat Duty CSMC Rank  
Beall, Lloyd James  Col 1826-1861 Yes  Col (Commandant) 
Thom, Reuben Triplett 1stLt3 1846-1848 Yes  Capt 
                                                 
2 Storekeeper. 
3 Also served as the Attorney General for the state of Alabama prior to secession. 
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